PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

PROVISIONAL ORDER BILLS

Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Warrington) Bill.

North West Midlands joint Electricity Authority Provisional Order Bill.

Ministry of Health Provisional Order (North Lindsey Water Board) Bill.

Read a Second time, and committed.

Oral Answers to Questions — PORTUGAL (WOLFRAM EXPORTS, GERMANY)

Mr. G. Strauss: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any statement to make about the negotiations with the Portuguese Government over the supply of wolfram to Germany.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is now in a position to make a statement in regard to his negotiations with the Portuguese Government on the subject of wolfram exports to Germany.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I regret that I am not yet in a position to make a statement. I hope, however, to have an announcement to make very shortly.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR, FAR EAST

Treatment

Captain Gammans: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is in a position to make any further statement on the treatment of British prisoners of war by the Japanese.

Mr. Eden: I have no further statement to make at present.

Captain Gammans: Is my right hon. Friend aware, in view of the statement that he made on this subject in the House a short time ago, of the report in this morning's papers from the Papal Delegate in Tokio, to the effect that the conditions in these camps are not as bad as my right hon. Friend reported?

Mr. Eden: I have read it, and I am checking up the camps to which the report may refer. I am obliged to my hon. and gallant Friend. I need hardly say that, if we get better news, we shall be only too delighted to give it.

Viscountess Astor: Will my right hon. Friend make it very prominent that he is doing all he can? I am receiving hundreds of letters from people asking that the Government should do more, when we know they are doing all they can.

Mr. Eden: We are really doing all we can and are working in close collaboration with the United States and Netherlands Governments, each trying to help the other.

Inquiry Centre

Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the special centre to deal with inquiries from relatives of prisoners of war in the Far East has been set up.

Mr. Eden: Yes, Sir. The Government have now opened such a bureau. It is called the Prisoner of War (Far East) Inquiry Centre and is situated at Curzon Street House, Curzon Street, London, W.I. As stated in my reply to my hon. Friend of 26th April, it will deal particularly with inquiries from relatives of prisoners of war in the Far East who are uncertain which Department to approach. A handbook for the information of relatives and friends of prisoners of war and interned civilians in the Far East is in course of preparation and copies, when printed, will be placed in the Library of the House. Copies of the handbook will be supplied free to each recorded next-of-kin and it will also be on sale to the public.

Sir Joseph Lamb: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication when they are likely to be available?

Mr. Eden: I think very soon indeed.

Oral Answers to Questions — INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE (CONTRIBUTIONS)

Captain Crowder: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many of the 43 nations taking part in the recent I.L.O. Conference paid their contributions to that organisation in the last year for which accounts have been published.

Mr. Eden: 1942 is the last year for which accounts have so far been published. In that year 12 Member-States of the League of Nations and 4 non-Member States paid their contributions in respect of 1942 and 4 Member-States paid in respect of 1941.

Oral Answers to Questions — TANGIER (GERMAN OFFICIALS)

Mr. Vernon Bartlett: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the German Consulate in Tangier has now been closed down; and what precautions are being taken against the transfer of its staff and activities to the neighbouring territory of Spanish Morocco.

Mr. Edgar Granville: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the members of the German Legation and other Nazi agents have now left Tangier.

Mr. Eden: His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier has reported that the Spanish authorities had arranged for the German Consulate-General to be finally closed yesterday. Nine members of the staff were due to leave Tangier to-day and the repatriation of the whole staff should be completed very shortly. Four German agents have already left Tangier in the past few days and arrangements are being made for the early departure of other agents. The recent agreement with the Spanish Government expressly provides for the departure of the German Consular staff and of German agents from Spanish-controlled territory (which of course includes Spanish Morocco) and also from metropolitan Spain.

Mr. Bartlett: Is it quite clear that, when the Germans are sent out of Spanish territory back to Germany, they cannot be replaced by other people doing the same sort of job?

Mr. Eden: It is clear that they cannot be replaced in Tangier.

Mr. Granville: In view of the emphasis that the right hon. Gentleman placed on the time, when the first agreement was made, and also in view of the statement of the Secretary of State for War about impending military operations, if there is any doubt about getting them away, is there any reason why the United Nations should not send troops to remove these Nazi spies from the International Settlement?

Mr. Eden: I think the arrangement is going rather well. These people either have been or are being removed. I do not feel dissatisfied with the progress. If I did, I should make representations accordingly.

Commander Sir Archibald Southby: Is not my right hon. Friend entirely satisfied that the Spanish Government are loyally carrying out their undertakings?

Oral Answers to Questions — FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Mr. Edgar Granville: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has any statement to make upon the new status of the French Committee of National Liberation.

Mr. Eden: I am aware that the Consultative Assembly at Algiers passed a resolution on 15th May that the French Committee of National Liberation should henceforth be known as the Provisional Government of the Republic, and I understand that the French Committee subsequently decided to give effect to this resolution. So far as I am aware, however, no action has yet been taken.

Mr. Granville: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the gallantry of the French troops has at last earned the recognition that they believe to be their due? Would he send a copy of Low's cartoon in yesterday's "Evening Standard" to the State Department at Washington; and will he take a look at it himself at the same time?

Mr. Eden: As I have said, I understand that the French Committee subsequently decided to give effect to this resolution. As far as I am aware, no action has yet been taken by them. As regards our position on the general problem, perhaps the hon. Member will await the Prime Minister's statement later to-day.

Mr. Cocks: Is not the Committee worthy of being recognised?

Mr. Eden: We made a certain recognition of the French National Committee as such last year, and I made a further statement a fortnight ago. For the rest, I must ask the hon. Member to await the statement of the Prime Minister.

Oral Answers to Questions — CHINA (EXCHANGE RATE)

Flight-Lieutenant Teeling: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can inform the House of the value of the pound sterling in Chinese dollars now and six months ago; and whether he can make any statement on how inflation in China is affecting funds subscribed in this country for Chinese relief and the payments for delivery of war material to China.

Mr. Eden: There has been no change in the official rate of exchange between the pound sterling and Chinese national currency during the last six months. There has, however, been a very substantial increase of prices in Free China. This has presented a serious problem as regards sums remitted to China for the purchase of goods there, including sums so remitted by funds subscribed in this country for Chinese relief, which is being urgently considered. No question as regards payments for delivery of war material to China arises since such material is supplied on lend-lease terms or out of credits.

Flight-Lieutenant Teeling: Is it not a fact that inflation in China is developing on somewhat similar lines to those seen in the case of Germany about 1923?

Mr. Eden: I do not know that I have enough knowledge to make those comparisons. All I can say is that we are studying the question in conjunction with the Treasury. The situation is an anxious one which we should all like to see improved.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

Ground Staffs (Pooling)

Sir Waldron Smithers: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether, in view of the fact that ground staffs take a personal pride in the pilots and machines which they serve, which makes for

maximum efficiency, he will take the necessary steps to stop the growing practice of the pooling of ground staffs.

The Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair): No, Sir. The system of pooling ground staffs, which has been introduced in varying degrees in the different Commands, has been dictated by the need for the utmost economy in the use of manpower and equipment. I can assure my hon. Friend that the importance of the consideration to which he refers has not been overlooked.

Oversea Service

Mr. Viant: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is aware that men who have recently returned to this country from Malta, having seen service there for two years and more, are again being posted for oversea service before others who have seen no oversea service; and will he give this his sympathetic consideration.

Sir A. Sinclair: I sympathise with the object which the hon. Member has in view and can assure him that, wherever possible, an overseas tour is followed by a full period of duty on the home establishment. Operational requirements must, however, remain the decisive factor, and it is sometimes unavoidable that experienced personnel or those possessing particular technical or trade qualifications should be posted for a second overseas tour before others who have not yet been abroad.

Mr. Viant: What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by a "full period"?

Sir A. Sinclair: I said a full period of duty on the home establishment. After a man has been oversea, he should have a full period of duty on the home establishment before he goes out again.

Mr. Viant: How long?

Sir A. Sinclair: It varies.

Aerodrome Buildings (Post-war Use)

Mr. Wakefield: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he is making arrangements with the Government departments, local authorities and various public and private interests concerned to use, after the cessation of hostilities, for educational, instructional and other similar


purposes, aerodrome buildings not permanently required by the R.A.F. so that such buildings will not fall into disuse, as after the last war, but will be available during holiday and vacation time for service annual training purposes and for whole-time use in the event of another national emergency.

Sir A. Sinclair: I appreciate my hon. Friend's interest in this matter, and can assure him that the considerations to which he refers are being borne in mind.

Pay and Allowances (White Paper Proposals)

Captain Prescott: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is aware that since the recent revision of pay and allowances, an airman who is married and without children and is in the highest paid R.A.F. trade rating (Group I), has to make a compulsory allotment of 1s. 9d. per day as opposed to 1s. 6d. per day previously; and whether, as the allowance in respect of the wife has not been increased, he will reduce the allotment to the previous figure of 1s. 6d. per day.

Sir A. Sinclair: I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the Reply given to the hon. Member for North Tottenham (Mr. R. C. Morrison) on 18th May. As stated in that Reply the changes in the qualifying allotments are necessary to secure broad uniformity as between the three Services, and in no case where the allotment has been changed is there any reduction in the joint receipts of man and wife. Where the wife has a child or children there is in all cases an increase. For administrative reasons, the rates of qualifying allotment must be the same for airmen with childless wives as for other married airmen.

Captain Prescott: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that the answer given to the hon. Member for North Tottenham (Mr. R. C. Morrison) is not satisfactory and that this matter is causing considerable dissatisfaction? Does the right hon. Gentleman also appreciate that the result of this regulation is that an R.A.F. man who is married and has no children will have less money himself, while his wife will obtain more money out of her husband's money and not from public funds?

Sir A. Sinclair: This matter was fully explained in the White Paper, and it was available for debate in the House when the White Paper was debated. There was no expression of dissatisfaction then, and I have not received many representations about it.

Mr. McGovern: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is a growing storm against the way the recent increases are being given, namely, by taking away from people who in many cases are getting no more than when this committee recommended to the Government?

Sir A. Sinclair: Everything is being done exactly in accordance with the White Paper which was brought before Parliament.

Mr. Bowles: When did the Debate on the White Paper take place?

Mr. Walter Edwards: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the extreme discontent in the R.A.F. over this policy, and does he not agree that it is all the fault of the R.A.F. authorities in not having a compulsory allotment in common with the Army in the past?

Sir A. Sinclair: I think there is a great deal of force in the last observation of my hon. and gallant Friend, not that I think any fault was due to the Air Ministry. It is true that a different scale of allotment from that of the other two Services had become the practice in the R.A.F., and it was considered necessary —and I gather that my hon. and gallant Friend agrees with me—to bring the scales into conformity.

Mr. Walter Edwards: asked the Secretary of State for Air what adjustments have been made in the pay scales of the R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel to correspond with those announced in the White Paper for other ranks in the Army.

Sir A. Sinclair: With the hon. Member's permission, I will circulate these details in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the information:

The pay scale of the lowest paid trade group in the R.A.F. and W.A.A.F., namely, Group V, has been improved and a consequential amendment has been made in the scale of one other trade group, Group M. The changes are shown below:

—
Former Daily Rate.
New Daily Rate.


Airmen.
Airwomen.
Airmen.
Airwomen.


Group V.
s.
d.
s.
d.
s.
d.
s.
d.


A.C.2 and A.C.W.2—


on entry
…
3
0
2
0
3
0
2
0


Over 6 months
…
3
 0
2
0
3
6
2
4


Over 12 months
…
3
9
2
6
4
0
2
8


A.C.1 and A.C.W.1
…
4
6
3
0
4
6
3
0


L.A.C. and L.A.C.W.
…
5
0
3
4
5
0
3
4


Over 3 years as L.A.C. or L.A.C.W.
…
5
0
3
4
5
3
3
6


Corporal
…
5
6
3
8
5
9
3
10


Over 4 years as Corporal
…
6
0
4
0
6
0
4
0


GROUP M.


A.C.2 and A.C.W.2 on entry
…
3
0
2
0
3
0
2
0


Over 6 months
…
3
0
2
0
3
6
2
4

Another improvement is that, in cases where "reclassification" does not depend on a trade test, all aircraftmen and aircraftwomen will be reclassified as 1st class (A.C.I and A.C.W.I) after 2 years' service if they are recommended as suitable; similarly, all aircraftmen and aircraft-women will have a reasonable prospect of becoming leading aircraftmen and leading aircraftwomen within three years from date of entry.

Squadron-Leader Sir Gifford Fox: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is aware that the recent changes in service pay were so badly announced that many of the higher rank and file were led to believe that the Government were acting generously in cases where no real concession was made; and whether, as the whole transaction is viewed by those concerned as misleading, he will see that in future the exact intentions of his Department on these matters are more accurately explained.

Sir A. Sinclair: As regards pay, the recent White Paper made it clear that increases would be granted only to non-tradesmen, private soldiers and corresponding categories in the other Services.
As regards allowances, it was clearly stated that a substantial improvement would be made in the position of those men with families who were in the lower ranges of pay and that this would be achieved by an additional State contribution to family allowance which would diminish as the man's rate of pay, and consequently his qualifying allotment, increased. For other ranks on the highest

rates of pay, there would be no increase in the State contribution.
As regards officers, it was also clearly stated that the greatest assistance towards the discharge of family responsibilities would be provided where it was most needed, that is, in the lower paid ranges. The recent changes were therefore exactly described in the White Paper.

Sir G. Fox: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Air Force were misled by the headlines in the newspapers?

Sir A. Southby: Can my right hon. Friend tell the House on what date the Debate on the White Paper to which he referred took place?

Sir A. Sinclair: I am obliged to my hon. and gallant Friend. I had in my mind the previous Debate. It is true that a Debate has not taken place since the White Paper was laid, but the Paper gives full information about these changes.

Mr. Bowles: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman why he went on to say that no objection was taken to the changes?

Sir A. Sinclair: I should have said that no objection was taken in this House.

Mr. Bellenger: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware—I am sure he must be—that over 90 per cent. of the R.A.F. are not on the lower rates of pay, and, therefore, the Air Ministry must have known, in issuing their statements, that the majority of the men would not qualify for the higher allowances.

Sir A. Sinclair: I am sure that the majority of the men who make qualifying allotments within these ranges of pay, make a higher qualifying allotment than that which they are asked to make under this new scheme. There is no ground for saying that the House has been misled by the White Paper or for suggesting that the newspapers were misled. The White Paper stated with absolute frankness that the scales of allotment will be on a similar basis in all three Services and will result for the most part in a reduction of the present scales, though there will be some increases in the R.A.F.

Mr. Shinwell: Now that my right hon. Friend realises that there is discontent in the House, which reflects the feeling of a large number of men in the R.A.F., as exemplified in letters sent to Members, will he reconsider the whole position?

Sir A. Sinclair: No, Sir, because I have so carefully considered it and because it has been the subject of so much patient consideration. If I may put the position briefly to my hon. Friend, the position is this. If the qualifying allotment of the R.A.F. was not to be brought into line with the Army allotment, we should have to do one of two things. We should either have to pay the wife less, which we think is undesirable, as wives of R.A.F. men would be receiving less than the wives of men similarly placed in the other two Services; or we should have to increase the basic pay of the men in the R.A.F., which would give them a higher basic rate than men in a similar position in the other Services.

Mr. Bellenger: The right hon. Gentleman is attempting to give the impression to the House that the White Paper is accurate, and that the allowances in the R.A.F. are brought into line with those in the Army. That is not so. May I ask, therefore, whether we have any power to stop the right hon. Gentleman doing that?

Mr. Speaker: It cannot be done by question and answer. It is a matter for debate.

Mr. Driberg: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the situation, and in view of the fact that the Air Ministry has had to issue to its pay offices instructions that pay issues are to be restored to their former level forthwith—thus indicating the unsatisfactory nature of the position—I beg

to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Sir A. Sinclair: The hon. Member's suggestion is quite misleading.

Sir G. Fox: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he is aware that corporals who are married without children and flight-sergeants who are married without children are having 6d. and 3d. a day, respectively, compulsorily deducted from their pay for the increased allotment to their wives without the wives getting any corresponding increases in their allowances; and whether he will reconsider the recent changes in pay of which complaint is made.

Sir A. Sinclair: I am aware that some corporals and some flight-sergeants who are married without children are to have an additional 6d. and 3d. a day respectively deducted from their pay but the wives will get the full benefit of these increased allotments. As was stated in the reply to the hon. Member for North Tottenham (Mr. R. C. Morrison) by my right hon. Friend, the Under-Secretary of State on 18th May, changes in qualifying allotments are necessary to secure broad uniformity as between the three Services and for administrative reasons the rates of qualifying allotment must be the same for airmen with childless wives as for other married airmen.

Sir G. Fox: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the wives are not getting this benefit? How long is this state of affairs likely to continue?

Sir A. Sinclair: The wives are getting the benefit. There will be some delay in making the payments. That brings me to the question which was put by an hon. Gentleman opposite. The men will not be asked to make a larger deduction from their pay in respect of the qualifying allotment, until the wives get the cash under the new scheme.

Mr. Gallacher: Is the Minister aware that this House was represented at a conference of Ministers at which there was no proposal for the elimination of the qualifying allotment, and that there was never any suggestion about any of the allotment being increased?

Sir A. Sinclair: It was clearly stated in the White Paper.

Mr. Bellenger: rose—

Mr. Speaker: We cannot have further questions or it will become a Debate.

Northern Irish Personnel (Leave)

Dr. Little: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he will arrange that Northern Ireland members of air crews in training shall be granted the same privilege as trained members are being permitted to spend their leave at home.

Sir A. Sinclair: The general restrictions on travel to Northern Ireland which were recently announced apply to ordinary leave for all Royal Air Force personnel, including aircrew, whether under training or not.

Dr. Little: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the serious dissatisfaction that exists about this differentiation between trained and untrained crews?

Sir A. Sinclair: I think that my hon. Friend cannot have heard my answer. These restrictions apply to ordinary leave for all R.A.F. personnel, including air crews, whether in training or not.

Dr. Little: I am advised differently.

Royal Observer Corps (Chevrons)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he will expedite the issue of chevrons to members of the R.O.C.

Sir A. Sinclair: So far as I am aware, the issue of chevrons to members of the Royal Observer Corps is proceeding satisfactorily. Demands from a small number of groups are still outstanding and these are now being expedited.

Wing-Commander Grant-Ferris: Will my right hon. Friend not make it clear to the R.A.F. whether these chevrons are compulsory or not? There seems to be a great deal of misunderstanding on the subject.

Sir A. Sinclair: I will certainly look into that point.

Training Courses, Canada (Disembarkation Leave)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Air why non-commissioned ranks, returning to this country from training courses in Canada, are granted substantially shorter periods of disembarkation leave than officers who have been on the same courses.

Sir A. Sinclair: Officers and airmen returning to this country from training in Canada are eligible for the same period of disembarkation leave. Owing to accommodation difficulties however, it is occasionally necessary, particularly in the case of officers, to allow an additional leave period.

Mr. Driberg: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a dozen sergeants at one station have recently had 19 days' embarkation leave, while officers who were on precisely the same course have had 28 days and that this is not an isolated instance?

Sir A. Sinclair: I can quite understand that it is not an isolated instance, but I can assure my hon. Friend that there is no question of differentiation in favour of officers.

Parliamentary Franchise (Register)

Mr. Quintin Hogg: asked the Secretary of State for Air what information he has regarding the number of officers and men in the R.A.F. who have so far completed the arrangements to apply for the Parliamentary franchise.

Sir A. Sinclair: None, Sir; no record is kept of the number of officers and airmen of the Royal Air Force who have applied for registration under the Parliament (Elections and Meetings) Act.

Mr. Hogg: Does my right hon. Friend realise that the distribution of the application cards has not been satisfactory? Does he also realise that nobody will get a vote in the Forces, even if he was on the old Register, unless he applies under this procedure?

Sir A. Sinclair: Those are very different points from the points in my hon. Friend's Question. If he has any evidence that there is anything unsatisfactory about the distribution of cards, I shall be very glad if he will give it to me. My only anxiety is to make this distribution as successful as I can.

Mr. Bellenger: As a central Register is to be prepared of Service voters, will the right hon. Gentleman issue instructions in his Department that statistics shall be kept of those registered, so that we can put questions to ensure that the R.A.F., at least, shall be properly brought on to the Register?

Sir A. Sinclair: No, Sir, that is an obligation which Parliament, in its wisdom, did not place upon the Service. Registration has already started.

Oral Answers to Questions — POST-WAR AIR TRANSPORT

Sir Oliver Simmonds: asked the Secretary of State for Air (1) whether the Government are actively interested to receive proposals from potential operators of post-war air transport services;
(2) what are the principal conditions which must be fulfilled by any company offering to operate post-war air transport services.

Sir A. Sinclair: My right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal in his speech on 11th May in another place outlined the nature and scope of proposals which the Government would be willing to study. I have nothing to add to that statement.

Sir O. Simmonds: Would my right hon. Friend assure the House that if these proposals are put before him they will be reviewed freely and openly, unfettered by the conditions of the British Overseas Airways Corporation?

Sir A. Sinclair: No, Sir. I would refer my hon. Friend to the careful statement made by the Lord Privy Seal in another place, when he will see that it would not be in accordance with that statement.

Sir O. Simmonds: Is the Minister not aware that that statement was very ambiguous? Would he explain it at some convenient time?

Oral Answers to Questions — AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION FIRMS (GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS)

Mr. Ivor Thomas: asked the Minister of Aircraft Production whether he will cause a list to be published showing the names of commercial undertakings, in which his Department has some concern and to which the Government have nominated a director, together with the names of such directors.

The Minister of Aircraft Production (Sir Stafford Cripps): I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a list of the names of the gentlemen I have nominated to serve as directors in respect of the two companies with which my Department is concerned, and of which all the shares are

held on behalf of the Government, that is to say:

Short Bros. (Rochester &amp; Bedford) Ltd.
Power Jets (Research &amp; Development) Ltd.

A number of changes have been made by agreement in the direction of other companies, but it has not been necessary for me to utilise my powers to make any appointments.

Following is the list:

Short Bros. (Rochester & Bedford) Ltd.—

Sir Frederick Heaton, Chairman.
P. G. Stone-Clark, Managing Director.
Lord Ashfield.
William Branham.
Sir Nigel Campbell.
Arnold J. Romer.

Power Jets (Research & Development) Ltd.—

Dr. H. Roxbee-Cox, Chairman and Managing Director.
Sam. H. Brown.
E. N. Plowden.
H. R. Ricardo, F.R.S.
Sir Wm. Stanier, F.R.S.
J. C. B. Tinling.
R. D. Williams.

Oral Answers to Questions — PREFABRICATED HOUSES

Mr. Silkin: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works whether invitations were extended to the architectural profession or to any persons, other than the architect actually selected, to submit plans or ideas for a temporary prefabricated house.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works (Mr. Hicks): As indicated by my Noble Friend in another place, the prototype emergency house now on exhibition was developed by my Ministry with the assistance of the consulting architect appointed, the firms concerned, and our scientific advisers.

Mr. Silkin: Could not outside architects have an opportunity to submit designs?

Mr. Hicks: I cannot say that.

Sir Herbert Holdsworth: Are the Government to have a complete monopoly of this type of house and is no one to be asked to estimate for prefabricated houses? Would it not be wise to throw it open?

Mr. Hicks: This house has been evolved by the Ministry of Works. It has been created by the Government in order that it shall be publicly-owned and licensed. It is an emergency house. It is intended to be temporary, in order to help to tide over a housing difficulty. Consequently, it is not in competition with standard houses.

Sir H. Holdsworth: Would it not be possible to have other types submitted, and for them still to be publicly controlled, if that is the policy?

Mr. Hicks: There are other efforts being made at prefabricated houses. They will have to stand on their merits. We are not in competition with them. This house was designed entirely by my Ministry for the purpose of tiding over a difficulty.

Sir H. Holdsworth: Has the Ministry a complete monopoly?

Mr. A. Edwards: Can the Minister tell the House whether the Churchill shelter was designed by an architect?

Mr. Hicks: For the hon. Member's information, I may say that the Presidents of the Royal Institute of British Architects and the Royal Fine Arts Commission have both complimented my Minister on the design of the house.

Mr. John Beattie: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works what proportion of the steel prefabricated houses known as Churchill houses have been allotted for erection in Belfast where the housing situation has been rendered acute as a result of enemy action; and, in view of the imperial contribution totalling £82,200,000 since the outbreak of hostilities of the six counties of Ulster, will he see that Northern Ireland is allotted a considerable number of these houses.

Mr. Hicks: The question of allocation of production of the emergency factory-made house does not yet arise. That is a matter for determination by the Government in due course, and the claims of Northern Ireland will no doubt be considered.

Sir Waldron Smithers: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works whether, in considering what electrically operated amenities he will put into the new houses, he has taken into consideration the price per unit of electricity.

Mr. Hicks: The equipment of the emergency house is designed to give an economic and efficient use of the different methods of heating and cooking. Electrical cookers will not be used unless the price of electricity is suitable.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL NAVY

Table Money Allowance (Senior Officers)

Mr. Ivor Thomas: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what is the scale of entertainment allowance for senior officers in the Royal Navy and the extent to which such allowances exceed the cost of the entertainment which the recipients are normally called upon to provide.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. A. V. Alexander): I assume that the hon. Member has in mind the allowance known as table money, which is payable only to those flag officers who fly their personal flags symbolising command over a station or squadron or other operational command. The maximum rate, payable to a Commander-in-Chief, is £4 10s. a day; lower rates for other flag officers are fixed according to the circumstances of the individual appointment. Flag officers commanding are inevitably called upon to do a considerable amount of entertaining, and I have no reason to suppose that the present scale is in any way out of proportion.

Lecture (Racial Discrimination)

Mr. Hugh Lawson: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that naval recruits were urged to indulge in racial discrimination against negroes in a compulsory lecture by a British officer in a British naval establishment, of which he has been informed; and what steps he is taking to prevent incitement of this sort in future.

Mr. Alexander: I have received a report upon the only lecture which can be identified with that referred to by the hon. Member. I am satisfied that he has been misinformed as to its purport, and that it contained no incitement to racial discrimination against negroes. The last part of the Question does not, therefore, arise.

Mr. Lawson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the following words were used in that lecture:
In the States, negroes are separated from white men. The Americans regard a negro as a child, and not the equal of the white races. Please conform to that idea.


Is he aware that that was taken down in shorthand in that lecture, and that it was an incitement to racial discrimination?

Mr. Alexander: I have told the hon. Member that that report is incorrect. So far from the lecture being given from the point of view of inciting racial discrimination, it was given to our troops in order to enable them to guard against any ill-disposed people who may be out to use the colour question as a means to stir up trouble with our Allies.

Mr. Lawson: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter on the Adjournment.

Parliamentary Franchise (Register)

Mr. Quintin Hogg: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what information he has regarding the numbers of officers and men in the R.N. who have applied for registration for the Parliamentary franchise.

Mr. Alexander: I regret that it would not be practicable to keep a record of the numbers of officers and men who have applied for registration.

Mr. Hogg: Has my right hon. Friend drawn the attention of the officers and men to the fact that, even if they are on the old Register, they will not get the vote unless they complete these arrangements; and has he satisfied himself that a reasonable proportion are, in fact, taking this course?

Mr. Alexander: The fact is that the Admiralty are taking particular steps to try to make this Act a success. Officers are specially detailed to explain the provisions of the 1943 Act. Of course, we cannot exercise any compulsion upon either officer or man to make his application. In the case of ratings in shore establishments, we do not know, with regard to large numbers of them, whether they have applied or not.

Mr. Hogg: Has my right hon. Friend no information on how this application is going? Has he no information at all to tell the Hause?

Mr. Alexander: That is not the Question on the Paper.

Royal Marines, Middle East (Awards)

Sir A. Southby: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether officers and men of the R.M. who served in the Middle East and are qualified for the Africa Star have received their ribbons; and whether members of the R.M. who served overseas have been issued with the ribbon of the 1939–43 Star if not qualified for the Africa Star.

Mr. Alexander: It is intended to issue the Africa Star ribbon to the Royal Navy and Royal Marines as soon as the qualifications for the 1939–43 Star have been finally settled. For the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, the 1939–43 Star takes precedence over the Africa Star, which will therefore not be issued to naval or marine personnel who qualify for the 1939–43 Star. With regard to the second part of the Question, the ribbon of the 1939–43 Star has been issued to Royal Marines qualified under the conditions at present approved.

Sir A. Southby: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some of the marines are qualified to wear the Eighth Army distinctive mark on the ribbon of their Africa Stars and that they have not yet received the ribbon of the Star? Is he also aware that there is considerable dissatisfaction in all three Services on the subject of the issue of these ribbons, both of the 1939–43 Star and the Africa Star?

Mr. Alexander: I have already said that they will be issued as soon as the qualifications have been finally settled.

Mr. Astor: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Admiralty is going to reach this decision?

Mr. Alexander: It is a decision which will be general for the Fighting Services, and not confined to the Admiralty alone.

Oral Answers to Questions — NORTHERN RHODESIA (COPPER PRODUCTION)

Mr. A. Edwards: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why, in January, his Department announced that copper output in Rhodesia would be cut by 25 per cent. and followed this by: a more recent statement to the contrary.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Colonel Oliver Stanley): At the beginning of this year the copper position as


far as the United Kingdom is concerned had eased sufficiently for His Majesty's Government to plan reducing its purchases of copper from Northern Rhodesia and other sources of supply. It has since become evident that production in the United States will be adversely affected by manpower shortages, and, after a review of the whole situation by the Combined Raw Materials Board, it has been decided that production from all sources should be maintained as far as practicable. In conformity with this decision production in Northern Rhodesia will be maintained on the basis described in my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities (Mr. E. Harvey) on 10th May.

Mr. Edwards: Does that not mean that there has been a serious miscalculation as to the Allied requirements of this commodity?

Colonel Stanley: The hon. Member will realise that the purchaser in this case was the Minister of Supply, and any detailed questions ought to be put to him. I take it that a new situation arose after the first decision was taken.

Earl Winterton: In view of the fact that this territory is so largely dependent on copper output—in the case of the European population to the extent of 90 per cent.—would it not be possible, if there is a variation, to give long-term notice of any change?

Colonel Stanley: Very considerable notice was given in this case.

Oral Answers to Questions — JAMAICA

Destitute Workless (Relief)

Mr. Thomas Fraser: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what provision is made for the destitute workless in Jamaica when no work can be given them; and what is the estimated number of such persons.

Colonel Stanley: The destitute workless, for whom no employment can be found, are afforded temporary relief on application to the parochial boards. Some 11,000 persons who would otherwise be destitute workless are employed under various Government schemes. Though there is no complete record of the number of destitute workless not so provided with em-

ployment this number seems to be inconsiderable.

Mr. Fraser: Cannot the right hon. and gallant Gentleman tell us what sort of provision is made for the people who cannot be given relief work?

Colonel Stanley: As I have said, they are afforded temporary relief on application to the parochial boards.

Mr. Fraser: What is the extent of that relief ?

Colonel Stanley: If the hon. Member wants the actual details, I will get them, but he will realise that it takes some time to get the figures from the Colonies.

Draft Constitution

Mr. Riley: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware of the suspicion which has been aroused in Jamaica by the refusal of the Government to publish the new draft Constitution until it has been accepted by the Legislative Council; and will he take steps to have it published so that adequate public consideration can be given to its provisions before being adopted.

Colonel Stanley: I would refer to the reply which I gave to the Honourable Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Mathers) on 17th May, to which I have nothing to add.

Oral Answers to Questions — COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT (INFORMATION)

Sir Edward Grigg: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what arrangements exist in his Department for making available information about developments in the Colonies for the use of Members and other persons or organisations engaged in research on Colonial questions.

Colonel Stanley: In view of the increased demand for information about developments in the Colonies, contained in official papers, fuller than that normally published in the Press and elsewhere, I have recently created in the annex to the Colonial Office, Palace Chambers, Bridge Street, a reference and information section in which are filed typescript copies of non-confidential reports, memoranda and other papers covering the whole range of Colonial development questions. These


documents, which are indexed and classified, may be consulted by those engaged in research on Colonial questions. I hope all Members of Parliament will make use of the section.

Mr. McGovern: Is it not possible to get some booklet giving information such as the "Daily Express" gave before the war in the "Know Your Empire" series?

Colonel Stanley: In co-operation with the Ministry of Information, a considerable number of booklets have been published.

Mr. Shinwell: Would it be very difficult to make these documents available in the Library?

Colonel Stanley: There is an enormous mass of them and they would require to be properly classified and indexed to be any good.

Oral Answers to Questions — WEST INDIES (LAND SETTLEMENT SCHEMES)

Mr. Edmund Harvey: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether consideration has yet been given to the use of the Colonial Development Fund for the purchase of land for the purpose of creating small holdings and allotments in those West Indian Colonies in which there is no Crown land available, especially Antigua, Barbados and St. Kitts; and whether such purchase is practicable in the immediate future.

Colonel Stanley: Yes, Sir. Proposals for land settlement schemes, including small holdings, and the purchase of the necessary land, have already been approved for the West Indies including Antigua and St. Kitts. Others are now being considered.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH HONDURAS (EMPLOYMENT)

Mr. Edmund Harvey: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what steps are being taken for the provision of employment to unemployed workers in British Honduras; and whether arrangements have been made to allow labour to be recruited for the U.S.A. and are there already in operation.

Colonel Stanley: My last information indicated that relief works to absorb

some 700 men were likely to be required, and it was proposed to employ these on the construction of two roads. It was anticipated that these measures would provide work to last several months. As regards recruitment for the United States of America, my information is that it was hoped to secure shipping for some 1,000 forest workers from British Honduras. I am asking the Governor to let me have the most recent information on these two points, and I will communicate it to the hon. Member on receipt.

Mr. Harvey: May we take it that there is no objection to recruitment for work in the United States?

Colonel Stanley: As far as we are concerned, we are only too anxious for it to happen, but it depends, of course, on the United States.

Oral Answers to Questions — SEYCHELLES (DEFENCE REGULATION)

Mr. Riley: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been drawn to a Defence Regulation issued in December, 1943, by the Government of the Seychelles; whether he is aware that under this Regulation, No. 1, 1944, non-Europeans serving in the Seychelles Pioneer Companies below the rank of officer are prohibited in the town of Mahé from entering any hotel, restaurant, bar or tobacco shop; that the military and civil police are authorised to enter these places of refreshment and to search, arrest and take into custody these Seychelles Pioneer troops; and can he state the grounds for this discrimination between European and non-European serving men.

Colonel Stanley: I have no information on this matter but I am making inquiries.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROAD ACCIDENTS (STATISTICS)

Mr. T. J. Brooks: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport the annual figures of killed and injured on the roads of this country for the last 25 years.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport (Mr. Noel-Baker): With my hon. Friend's permission, I will circulate the figures for the years 1926 to 1943 inclusive, in the


OFFICIAL REPORT. I regret that the figures for the years before 1926 are not available.

Mr. Brooks: What has the Minister of War Transport in mind, to deal with this very serious loss of life and limb? Will the Department give very serious thought to this question?

Mr. Noel-Baker: As I said in the Debate on the Estimates, we have a Committee, over which I preside, sitting in the Ministry which is preparing an interim programme for immediately after the war, and it will then proceed to prepare a long-term programme for dealing with the problem.

Number of Persons Killed and Injured in Road Accidents in Great Britain.


Year.
Killed.
Injured.


1926
…
…
4,886
133,888


1927
…
…
5,329
148,575


1928
…
…
6,238
164,838


1929
…
…
6,696
170,917


1930
…
…
7,305
177,895


1931
…
…
6,691
202,119


1932
…
…
6,667
206,450


1933
…
…
7,202
216,328


1934
…
…
7,343
231,603


1935
…
…
6,502
221,726


1936
…
…
6,561
227,823


1937
…
…
6,633
226,402


1938
…
…
6,648
226,711


1939
…
…
8,272
125,303






(first 7 months only)


1940
…
…
8,609
Not Available


1941
…
…
9,169
146,527






(last 9 months only)


1942
…
…
6,926
140,618


1943
…
…
5,796
116,740


Note.—The reporting of non-fatal injuries during the war may not be as complete as regards slight injuries as was the case before the war.

Oral Answers to Questions — KENNET AND AVON CANAL

Sir Stanley Reed: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport whether any decision has been reached as to the future use, if any, of the Kennet and Avon Canal.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The future of the Kennet and Avon Canal, as of other canals, must depend on decisions on post-war policy which it has not yet been possible for the Government to make.

Sir S. Reed: Would not a considerable amount of labour, and also the money

being utilised for the maintenance of the Kennet and Avon Canal, be absolutely wasted if it was not put into service in the post-war period?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I will look into that point. The main point is as I explained in my original reply.

Oral Answers to Questions — MEDAL RIBBONS (NEXT-OF-KIN)

Major-General Sir Alfred Knox: asked the Prime Minister if the appropriate ribbon, with permission to wear, will be issued to the next-of-kin of a man killed by enemy action pending the issue of that medal.

The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): No, Sir. It is contrary to our custom for permission to be given to next-of-kin to wear the ribbons of medals earned by relatives killed in action.

Sir A. Knox: Would the right hon. Gentleman give some reason for this refusal? Will he take into consideration the solace it would be to the relatives?

Mr. Attlee: Because the medals are issued to parents. If they are to be handed about among relatives, it might lead to all sort of mistakes.

Mr. Tinker: My right hon. Friend does not make the matter very clear. He says "It is contrary to our custom." This war has altered a lot of customs. Cannot this one be altered too?

Oral Answers to Questions — POST-WAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY (WHITE PAPER)

Mr. Mander: asked the Prime Minister when the Government intend to announce their proposals with regard to the prevention of unemployment after the war; and whether these will take the form of a White Paper, a Bill or Ministerial statement.

Mr. Attlee: A White Paper on employment policy will be presented on Friday next.

Mr. Mander: Is it proposed to give the House an opportunity to discuss the White Paper, in due course?

Mr. Attlee: Perhaps my hon. Friend will put that question to the Leader of the House.

Mr. McGovern: Will the proposals be taken from the Liberal Party's "Yellow Book," which was issued after the last war?

Mr. J. J. Lawson: asked the Minister without Portfolio when the Government's White Paper on Reconstruction will be published.

Mr. A. S. L. Young (Lord of the Treasury): I have been asked to reply. The Government are not proposing to publish any general paper on reconstruction. If my hon. Friend has in mind particularly the problem of full employment, I would refer him to the answer given to-day by the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander).

Oral Answers to Questions — NEWSPRINT (ALLOCATION)

Mr. Silkin: asked the Minister of Production whether the increased allocation of newsprint not taken up by some newspapers can be allocated to other newspapers of a serious character, for which the demand is greatly in excess of the present supply.

The Minister of Production (Mr. Lyttelton): As stated in my reply to the hon. Member for Rothwell (Mr. T. J. Brooks), on 17th May, virtually all the increased allocation of newsprint is now being used. I could not, in any case, agree that an additional allowance should be made to any newspaper on the grounds suggested, as this would involve attempting to discriminate between newspapers according to their nature and contents.

Mr. W. J. Brown: Is there not something grotesque about the distribution of newsprint on a basis which results in a situation in which half of "Everyman" is out of print and the "News of the World" can publish 4,500,000 copies?

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

Motor-Car Tyres

Mr. Silkin: asked the Minister of Supply how persons who are granted petrol rations for their motor-car on the ground of hardship may apply for new tyres when their existing ones become worn out.

The Minister of Supply (Sir Andrew Duncan): As stated in reply to a Question by the hon. Member for West Islington (Mr. Montague) on 24th June last, cases of hardship are considered, on application, through the Regional Petroleum Officers.

Mr. Silkin: Does that apply to tyres as well as petrol?

Sir A. Duncan: Yes, Sir.

Iron Railings

Mr. A. Edwards: asked the Minister of Supply how much iron from railings has been melted since he started collecting; and how much is now stocked at various dumps.

Sir A. Duncan: It is estimated that since collection started, 530,000 tons of iron railings have been sent to iron and steel works for melting, and that 20,000 tons are now being sorted out and cut up, preparatory to going to steel works. Only 43,000 tons remain in stock at various dumps.

Mr. Edwards: Will the Minister not acknowledge that this collection was a huge mistake, and the cause of immense inconvenience?

Sir A. Duncan: These railings have proved really first-class scrap, and they are indispensable.

Mr. Edwards: Will the right hon. Gentleman look at those figures again? I am sure that he will then find that an immense proportion of all the railings collected is still lying in dumps.

Sir A. Duncan: I have given figures of the amount lying in dumps.

Mr. Edwards: They are wrong.

Synthetic Rubber

Mr. Hammersley: asked the Minister of Supply under what authority the Rubber Control have issued an instruction that no firm will be supplied with synthetic rubber unless they agree to disclose the details of the whole of their present and future processes to the industry; and whether he is satisfied that any such forced disclosures will adequately safeguard the rights of inventors.

Sir A. Duncan: I am glad to inform my hon. Friend that no such instruction has been issued.

Northern Irish Workers, Great Britain (Holidays)

Mr. John Beattie: asked the Minister of Supply whether he is aware that 50 Northern Ireland workers employed at Burton-on-Trent on contract were promised holidays after a stated period of time had elapsed; why this promise has not been fulfilled; whether compassionate leave has been granted or refused to these men; and what steps will he take to see that the conditions attached to the employment of the men are fulfilled at the earliest possible date.

Sir A. Duncan: If my hon. Friend will kindly give me full particulars, I will Make inquiries, and communicate with him.

Steel-making Plants, Scotland (Closing)

Mr. Thomas Fraser: asked the Minister of Supply how many steel-making works in Scotland have been partially or completely closed down in the last 12 months; and what percentage of the labour has been transferred to other industry.

Sir A. Duncan: No steel-making plants in Scotland have been closed in the last 12 months. Small reductions in production have been made at two works. The labour released has been absorbed within the steel industry.

Mr. McGovern: What is the number of workers released?

Sir A. Duncan: I must have notice of that question.

Mr. Buchanan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is anxiety among steel workers over rumours that certain steel works are to close?

Sir A. Duncan: There may be rumours, but I should not think that there is any foundation for them.

Liquorice Root (Imports)

Sir A. Southby: asked the Minister of Supply to what extent liquorice root is being imported from Russia; whether liquorice root is being imported from Syria; and what is the import price of the article in each case.

Sir A. Duncan: Large quantities of liquorice root have been received from Russia, under our reciprocal supply

arrangements with the Soviet Government. Small quantities of peeled liquorice root are being imported from Syria. It would not be desirable to make public the details of purchases.

Sir A. Southby: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the import licensing department of the Board of Trade is refusing licences to import liquorice from Syria; and is it the policy to import the Russian root, instead of the Syrian root, which is the superior article?

Sir A. Duncan: I cannot speak for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade; but the supplies are ample.

Sir A. Southby: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I put this Question to his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, and that it was transferred by the President of the Board of Trade to him?

Oral Answers to Questions — FOOD SUPPLIES

Pulse (Purchase)

Sir Reginald Clarry: asked the Minister of Food whether he is satisfied that the present policy of making all purchases of pulse from the Dominions pass through the normal trading channels to the Cereals Import Board still continues to be satisfactory to all concerned, or whether any change in this arrangement is contemplated.

The Minister of Food (Colonel Llewellin): The purchase of pulse from the Dominions, through normal trade channels, has generally proved satisfactory; but exports are now controlled in most producing countries, and purchases are, therefore, now usually made on a Government-to-Government basis.

Sir R. Clarry: Is any change from the present arrangements contemplated?

Colonel Llewellin: Not from the arrangements which I have just announced.

Cooking Fats

Mr. Wootton-Davies: asked the Minister of Food whether he is aware that, owing to the rationing of cooking fats, the larger proportion of fish-frying establishments are having to close down; whether he will reconsider his present policy and institute a more generous treatment of


these establishments, especially in view of the fact that, whilst many of these shops are closing down, other catering resorts in some districts are being reopened.

Colonel Llewellin: No, Sir. My hon. Friend is, I am afraid, misinformed as to the facts in regard to both parts of his Question.

Inspectors (Test Purchases)

Sir Waldron Smithers: asked the Minister of Food whether his inspectors always reveal their identity, in accordance with the pledge given by the Parliamentary Secretary on 14th July, 1943, before making a purchase.

Colonel Llewellin: Test purchases are sometimes necessary to trace and bring to conviction persons guilty of offences. The answer, therefore, is, No, Sir. The pledge referred to had reference to cases in which it is necessary for enforcement officers to ask questions of retailers or others in the course of their duty. That pledge still stands.

Sir W. Smithers: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that, recently, respectable business people, of 40 years' standing, who committed a technical offence, and were fined £75, were trapped?

Colonel Llewellin: That is not quite accurate. My hon. Friend has drawn my attention to that case. There were two complaints that this shop was doing conditional sales, which are, of course, prohibited. On those complaints, enforcement officers went to the shop, and, on the prosecution being brought, these men stated their view of the case.

Tea Rationing (Old Age Pensioners)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Minister of Food what percentage of the total annual consumption of tea in this country is represented by the 7,500,000 to 8,000,000 pounds that would be involved in the allowance of an additional ration of a quarter of a pound monthly to old age pensioners of 70 years and over.

Colonel Llewellin: Under 3 per cent.

Mr. Driberg: If the percentage is so very small, could not the right hon. and gallant Gentleman reconsider his decision not to allow some extra tea to these old people, who suffer great hardship in this matter?

Colonel Llewellin: I have already given assurances to a number of my hon. Friends that if I can do anything for this class of people, I intend to do it.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

General Mihailovitch (Communiqués)

Captain Alan Graham: asked the Minister of Information whether he will grant to the British Press the same freedom to print the war communiqués of General Mihailovitch as is enjoyed by the United States Press.

The Minister of Information (Mr. Brendan Bracken): There never has been anything to stop the British Press from publishing the communiqués of General Mihailovitch, if they wish to do so. The British Press have always been eager to give prominence to the communiqués of generals engaged in fighting Axis forces, and they will be greatly surprised by the suggestion that their freedom to do so has been restricted by the Ministry of Information.

Captain Graham: Is my right hon. Friend aware that grave distress has been caused to many devoted Yugoslav friends of this country, both here and in Yugoslavia, by the absolutely partisan attitude of the British Press towards various Yugoslav enemies of the Axis?

Mr. Bracken: If editors in this country are not to be allowed to form their own opinion about news, if the Ministry of Information is to dictate the form the news should take, great harm will be done to the country.

Coal Supplies (Broadcast News Item)

Mr. Mainwaring: asked the Minister of Information on what authority the items of news concerning available supplies of coal for household purposes during the months of May and June was broadcast by the B.B.C. at the end of April.

Mr. Bracken: This news item was based on information released for publication by the Ministry of Fuel and Power.

Mr. Mainwaring: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that recent information has caused a very great amount of anxiety among people who find that it is unfounded? Should not the B.B.C. be pre-


vented from giving information which is entirely misleading the people of this country?

Mr. Bracken: If the information is entirely misleading the people of the country, this House should look into it; but, as I told my hon. Friend, the information was given to the B.B.C. by the Ministry of Fuel and Power.

Political Broadcasts

Mr. Edgar Granville: asked the Minister of Information, who constitutes the all-party panel for advising the B.B.C. on political broadcasting.

Mr. Bracken: I presume that the hon. Member is referring to the Talks Advisory Committee; on which the principal political parties in this House were represented. The B.B.C. have not found it necessary to call on this Committee's services during the war, partly because there have not been any talks on party lines. If and when they decide to resume such talks, I have no doubt that they will take advantage of the advice of the Committee, which included four hon. Members of this House.

Mr. Rhys Davies: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the B.B.C. should provide a few minutes out of the 24 hours for those who take a minority view on public questions?

Mr. Bracken: If those who take a minority view are anxious to impede the war effort, the B.B.C. will give them no time whatever.

Mr. Granville: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that the views of those who support the war effort, and who are outside the parties forming the Government, are adequately represented? Also, will he give the names of those who are on the panel?

Mr. Bracken: The hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir I. Albery), the hon. Member for Anglesey (Miss Lloyd George), the hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. A. P. Herbert), and the hon. Member for North Southwark (Mr. Isaacs).

Mr. A. Edwards: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that, had not minorities pressed their views on the Government during the war and immediately before the war, we should have been out of the war long ago, defeated?

Oral Answers to Questions — JUVENILE COURTS, DONCASTER (AGE OF MAGISTRATES)

Mr. Evelyn Walkden: asked the Attorney General the average age of the magistrates of the West Riding county district juvenile court holden at Doncaster; and what percentage are over 60 years of age.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. J. S. C. Reid): I have been asked to reply. It is assumed that the Question relates to the Lower Strafforth and Tickhill petty sessional division of the West Riding, which is known as the Doncaster West Riding or Doncaster county division. Two juvenile courts sit for this division, one fortnightly at Doncaster and one monthly at Thorne. The juvenile court panel for the whole division consists of 24 justices; eight of these are over 60 and the average age is 57.

Mr. Walkden: Is the Minister aware that there is a strong feeling in the area, with reference to the bench which sits at the juvenile court at Doncaster, that some revision is very necessary; and would the Lord Chancellor agree to have a look at the problem himself?

Mr. Reid: I will see that that is conveyed to my Noble Friend.

Mr. E. Walkden: asked the Attorney General the average age of the magistrates who serve on the bench of the juvenile court in the borough of Doncaster; and what percentage are over 60 years of age.

The Lord Advocate: I have been asked to reply that the Doncaster borough panel consists of nine justices, of whom four are over 60. The average age is 58.

Oral Answers to Questions — COÁL MINES (CONVEYOR BELTING)

Mr. Craik Henderson: asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he is aware that the quality of conveyor belting in mines is still unsatisfactory and involves loss of production; and what steps he is taking to remedy the position.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Fuel and Power (Mr. Tom Smith): I am aware that there has been some deterioration in quality of conveyor belting as compared with pre-war standards. Subect to the limitations imposed by war in the supply of raw materials, everything possible is being done to maintain the quality.

Mr. Henderson: Does the Minister realise the importance of dealing with this problem, which has an effect on production in many places, and that the matter is very urgent?

Mr. Smith: We do appreciate the importance of it, and I am pleased to say that there has been an increase in production.

Oral Answers to Questions — SPAIN (EXPORTS TO GERMANY)

Sir William Davison: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether, in the recent negotiations with the Spanish Government, attention was drawn to the controlling interest acquired by Germany in a large number of Spanish companies producing iron, steel, nitrogen and other war essentials; and what steps have been taken to prevent Germany from continuing to be supplied by Spain with these war essentials.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Mr. Dingle Foot): While it is true, as I informed my hon. Friend the Member for East Middlesbrough (Mr. A. Edwards) on 3rd February, that I have received considerable evidence of German infiltration into Spanish industry, the acquisition by foreign companies of controlling interests in Spanish companies is prohibited under Spanish law. There were no exports of nitrogen in 1943, and exports of iron and steel (as distinct from iron ore) from Spain to Germany were negligible; indeed, Spain imported iron and steel from Germany and German-occupied territories. The second part of the Question does not, therefore, arise.

Sir W. Davison: Will the Minister realise the seriousness of enemy control of so many Spanish companies producing war essentials, both now and after the war, and will he give this matter the very closest attention?

Mr. Foot: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply already given to the hon. Member for East Middlesbrough.

Mr. Levy: Is the Minister aware that this links up with the cartel system, and, although the cartel system is being dealt with in America, there is no machinery in this country to deal with it?

Oral Answers to Questions — UTILITY FURNITURE (NORTHERN IRELAND)

Dr. Little: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make arrangements whereby a supply of utility furniture will be provided in Northern Ireland sufficient to meet the demand.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Captain Waterhouse): My right hon. Friend is in close touch with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland on this matter, and it is hoped that it will be possible to make an announcement shortly.

Mr. W. J. Brown: Can the Minister say if the Board of Trade will speed up its plans for utility furniture?

Oral Answers to Questions — PLYMOUTH PLAN

Mr. Astor: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that all copies of the Plymouth Plan were sold out on publication; that local authorities and others concerned in planning are unable to get copies; and whether he will allot paper to enable a second edition to be printed.

Captain Waterhouse: Yes, Sir. This has been arranged.

Oral Answers to Questions — UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (TRANSFER OF TERRITORIES)

Mr. Gallacher: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether the Government still adheres to the policy announced by Mr. J. H. Thomas on 20th June, 1935, that no colonial territory would be handed over for incorporation within the Union of South Africa without prior consultation with and the consent of the native peoples in such territories.

The Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Mr. Emrys-Evans): The statement made by Mr. Thomas on the occasion in question referred to the undertakings which had been given by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question of the transfer to the Union of South Africa of the government of the territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. These pledges which are set out in the aidememoire published in the Parliamentary


Paper Command 4948, were to the effect that the transfer of these territories should not take place until the inhabitants, both native and European, have been consulted and until Parliament has been given an opportunity of expressing its views. His Majesty's Government adhere to these pledges.

Mr. Gallacher: Is the Minister aware that, in view of the abominable terms that the coloured people get in the Union of South Africa, it is highly undesirable for any territory, under any condition, that is occupied by the ordinary African to be handed over to the Union?

Sir Alfred Beit: Has the Union made any official request for this transfer?

Mr. Emrys-Evans: No, Sir.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME GUARD (NOMINATED WOMEN)

Colonel Burton: asked the Secretary of State for War whether he has come to any decision as to the issue of steel helmets, respirators and haversacks to nominated women of the Home Guard.

The Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. Arthur Henderson): I have nothing to add to the reply given to my hon. and gallant Friend by my right hon. Friend on 16th May.

Colonel Burton: Will the War Department make up their minds on this matter, as these women run grave risks and are getting no protection at all?

Oral Answers to Questions — MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS

That they have agreed to—

Consolidated Fund (No. 3) Bill.
Pensions (Increase) Bill.
Police and Firemen (War Service) Bill, without Amendment.
London and North Eastern Railway Bill, with Amendments.

That they have passed a Bill, intituled "An Act to make further provision in reference to the undertakings and funds of the Mayor Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Gillingham and with respect to their income and expenditure and for other purposes." [Gillingham Corporation Bill [Lords.]

Oral Answers to Questions — GILLINGHAM CORPORATION BILL [Lords]

Read the First time, and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

Oral Answers to Questions — PUBLIC PETITIONS

Special Report from the Committee on Public Petitions (with Minutes of Evidence and an Appendix), brought up, and read; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed [No. 80].

Oral Answers to Questions — STANDING ORDERS

Resolution reported from the Select Committee on Standing Orders:
That in the case of the Derwent Valley Water Bill [Lords]. Petition for additional Provision, the Standing Orders ought to be dispensed with:—That the parties be permitted to insert their additional Provision if the Committee on the Bill think fit.

Resolution agreed to.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered:
That this day notwithstanding anything in Standing Order No. 14, Business in Committee of Supply may be taken after the hour appointed for the interruption of Business, and that the Proceedings of the Committee of Supply be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House) for Two hours after the hour appointed for the interruption of Business."—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[6TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee:

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1944

Orders of the Day — FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding, £40, be granted to His Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the following services relating to Foreign Affairs and the foreign policy of this country and the Dominions, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1945:

Class I., Vote 4, Treasury and Sub-ordinate Departments
£10


Class II., Vote 1, Foreign Office
£10


Class II., Vote 3, League of Nations
£10


Class II., Vote 4, Dominions Office
£10



£40"

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I hope the Committee will permit me to enter a plea for the modest request made from the Chair. The meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers, which covered the best part of three weeks, has now concluded, and very full statements to Parliament and the public have been made, individually by the Prime Ministers themselves, and collectively by the declaration to which we have all subscribed. I could not pretend that we have arrived at hard and fast conclusions, or precise decisions upon all the questions which torment this afflicted globe, but it can fairly be said that, having discussed a great many of them, there was revealed a core of agreement which will enable the British Empire and Commonwealth to meet in discussion with other great organisms in the world in a firmly-knit array. We have advanced from vague


generalities to more precise points of agreement, and we are in a position to carry on discussions with other countries, within the limits which we have imposed upon ourselves.
But this is a Debate upon foreign affairs, and nothing was more remarkable than the cordial agreement which was expressed by every one of the Dominion Prime Ministers on the general conduct of our foreign affairs and on the principles which govern that conduct, nor, I should add, on the skill and consistency with which they have been treated by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. The utmost confidence was expressed in him and in his handling of all those very difficult affairs, in spite of the complications by which they are surrounded, and in spite of the need for prompt action which so often arises—for prompt action by the Mother Country before there is time to have full consultation. In spite of all these difficulties, the fullest confidence and pleasure were expressed in the work which my right hon. Friend has done. We therefore embark upon the present Debate with the backing of their good will from all these representatives of the Commonwealth and Empire—the word "Empire" is permitted to be used, which may be a great shock to certain strains of intellectual opinion. And we embark upon the present Debate not only with this backing of hearty good will, but with the feeling that this meeting of Prime Ministers from all over the Empire and the representatives of India in the midst of a second deadly war is in fact the highest pinnacle to which our world-wide family association has yet reached.
At this time, in policy and in war, our objective is the same, namely, to beat the enemy as soon as possible; and I am not aware of any action or of any studied inaction for which His Majesty's Government are responsible that has not been directly related to that single and dominant purpose. The duty of all persons responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs in a world war of this deadly character and of all who, in different ways, exercise influence is to help the fighting men to perform the heavy tasks entrusted to them and to ensure them all possible ease in execution and advantage in victory. Everyone in a position to guide public opinion, like Members of this House

or of another place, or newspaper editors, broadcasters, calumnists, or columnists—I remember a tendency to throw the accent forward—and others—all of these should keep this very clear duty before their eyes. They should always think of the soldier in the battle and ask themselves whether what they say or write will make his task easier or harder. We long for the day to come when this slaughter will be over and then this additional restraint which imposes itself on every conscientious man in war-time can be relaxed or will vanish away entirely.
I must make my acknowledgments, first of all, to the very great degree with which these precepts are followed among those who accept the task of guiding public opinion, and especially in the House of Commons, which is always so careful of the public interest and which in other ways has shown itself to be possessed of those steadfast and unyielding qualities in the face of danger and fatigue for which it has always been renowned, but never more renowned than now. I shall try to practise what I have been preaching in the remarks I have to make, and I am sure the Committee will remember how many different audiences I have to address at the same moment, not only here but out of doors and not only in this Island, but throughout the Empire, not only among our Allies, great and small, West or East, but finally, among our enemies, besides, of course, satellites and neutrals of various hues. I must, therefore, pick my way among heated ploughshares, and in this ordeal the only guides are singleness and simplicity of purpose and a good or, at any rate, a well trained conscience.
Since I last spoke here on foreign affairs, just about three months ago, almost all the purposes which I mentioned to you have prospered, severally and collectively, First of all, let us survey the Mediterranean and the Balkan spheres. The great disappointment which I had last October, when I was not able to procure the necessary forces for gaining the command of the Aegean Sea, following upon the collapse of Italy, and gaining possession of the principal Italian islands, has, of course, been accompanied by an exaggerated attitude of caution on the part of Turkey. The hopes we cherished of Turkey boldly entering the war in February or March, or at least according us the necessary bases for air


action—those hopes faded. After giving £20,000,000 worth of British and American arms to Turkey in 1943 alone, we have suspended the process and ceased to exhort Turkey to range herself with the victorious United Powers, with whom she has frequently declared that her sympathies lie, and with whom, I think, there is no doubt that her sympathies do lie. The Turks at the end of last year and the beginning of this year magnified their dangers. Their military men took the gloomiest view of Russian prospects in South Russia and in the Crimea. They never dreamed that by the early summer the Red Army would be on the slopes of the Carpathians, drawn up along the Pruth and Serreth Rivers, or that Odessa and Sevastopol would have been liberated and regained by the extraordinary valour, might and energy of the Soviet onslaught. Consequently the Turks did not measure with sufficient accuracy what might have occurred, or would occur, in Rumania and Bulgaria or, I may add, Hungary, what would be the result on all those countries of these tremendous Russian hammer blows, struck even in months which are particularly unsuitable for operations in these regions and which normally would be devoted to the process of replenishing the advancing front for future action. Having over-rated their dangers, our Turkish friends increased their demands for supplies to such a point that, having regard to the means of communication and transport alone, the war would probably be over before these supplies could reach them.
We have, therefore, with great regret, discontinued the process of arming Turkey because it looks probable that, in spite of our disappointment in the Aegean, the great Allies will be able to win the war in the Balkans and generally throughout South Eastern Europe without Turkey being involved now at all, though, of course, the aid of Turkey would be a great help and acceleration of that process. This, of course, is a decision for Turkey to take. We have put no pressure upon them, other than the pressure of argument and of not giving the supplies we need for ourselves and other nations that are fighting. But the course which is being taken, and has been taken so far, by Turkey will not, in my view, procure for the Turks the strong position at the peace which would attend their joining the Allies.
I must, however, note the good service and significant gesture rendered to us by the Turkish Government quite recently, and it is said that it has been rendered to us on the personal initiative of Turkey's honoured President, General Inonu, namely, the complete cessation of all chrome exports to Germany. It is not too much to expect that the assistance given us in respect of chrome will also shortly be extended to cover other commodities, the export of which, even if of less importance than chrome, is of material assistance to the enemy. If so, we shall endeavour to compensate the Turkish people for the sacrifice which their co-operative action might entail by other means of importation.
I thought it right to speak bluntly. Turkey and Britain have a long history. They entered into relations with us before the war when things looked very black. They did their best through difficult times. I have thought it better to put things bluntly to-day, but I cannot conclude, notwithstanding anything I have said in criticism, without saying that we hope with increasing confidence that a still better day will dawn for the relations of Turkey with Britain and, indeed, with all the great Allies. Always in recent decades there has been in the Mediterranean a certain tension between Turkey and Italy on account of Italian ambitions in the Greek Islands and, also, possibly in the Adana Province of Turkey. The Turks could never be sure which way the Italian dictator would turn his would-be conquering sword. On that score Turkish anxiety has certainly been largely removed.
The fate of Italy is indeed terrible, and I personally find it very difficult to nourish animosity against the Italian people. The overwhelming mass of the nation rejoiced in the idea of being delivered from the subtle tyranny of the Fascists, and they wished, when Mussolini was overthrown, to take their place as speedily as possible by the side of the British and American Armies who, it was expected, would quickly rid the country of the Germans. However, this did not happen. All the Italian forces which could have defended Italy had either been squandered by Mussolini in the African desert or by Hitler amid the Russian snows, or they were widely dispersed corn-batting, in a half-hearted way, the patriots of Yugoslavia Hitler decided to make great exertions to retain Italy, just as he


has decided to make great exertions to gain the mighty battle which is at the moment at its climax to the South of Rome. It may be that after the fall of Mussolini our action might have been more swift and audacious. As I have said before, it is no part of my submission to the House that no mistakes are made by us or by the common action of our Allies; but, anyhow, here is this beautiful country suffering the worst horrors of war, with the larger part still in the cruel and vengeful grip of the Nazis, and with a hideous prospect of the red-hot rake of the battle-line being drawn from sea to sea right up the whole length of the peninsula.
It is clear that the Germans will be driven out of Italy by the Allies, but what will happen on the moving battle fronts and what the Germans will do on their way out in the way of destruction to a people they hate and despise, and who, they allege, have betrayed them, cannot be imagined or forecast. All I can say is that we shall do our utmost to make the ordeal as short and as little destructive as possible. We have great hopes that the city of Rome may be preserved from the area of struggle of our Armies. The House will recall that when I last spoke on foreign matters I expressed the view that it would be best that King Victor Emmanuel, and above all Marshal Badoglio, should remain at the head of the Executive of the Italian nation and armed forces until we reached Rome, when it was agreed by all that a general review of the position must be made.
Such a policy naturally entailed differences of opinion which were reflected not only among the Allied Governments but inside every Allied country. However, I am happy to say that after various unexpected happenings and many twists and turns the situation is now exactly what I ventured to suggest and as I described it to the House three months ago. In addition, far beyond my hopes, an Italian Government has been formed, of a broadly based character, around the King and Badoglio, and the King himself has decided that on the capture of Rome he will retire into private life forever and transfer his constitutional functions to his eldest son, the Prince of Piedmont, with the title of Lieutenant of the Realm.
I have good confidence in this new Italian Government which has been

formed. It will require further strengthening and broadening, especially as we come more closely into touch with the populous industrial areas of the North—that is essential—but,. at any rate, it is facing its responsibilites manfully and doing all in its power to aid the Allies in their advance. Here I may say we are doing our best to equip the Italian force who are eager to fight with us and not in the power of the Germans. They have played their part in the line on more than one occasion. Their fleet is discharging a most useful and important service for us not only in the Mediterranean but in the Atlantic; and the loyal Italian Air Force has also fought so well that I am making special efforts to supply them with improved aircraft of British manufacture. We are also doing our best to assist the Italian Government to grapple with the difficult financial and economic conditions which they inherited from Fascism and the war and which, though improving, are still severe behind the lines of the Army. It is understood throughout Italy, and it is the firm intention of the United Nations, that Italy, like all other countries which are now associated with us, shall have a fair and free opportunity, as soon as the Germans are driven out and tranquillity is restored, of deciding whatever form of democratic government, whether monarchical or republican, they desire. They can choose freely for themselves. I emphasise, however, the word "democratic," because it is quite clear that we should not allow any form of Fascism to be restored or set up in any country with whom we have been at war.
From Italy one turns naturally to Spain, once the most famous Empire in the world and down to this day a strong community in a wide land, with a marked personality and distinguished culture among the nations of Europe. Some people think that our foreign policy towards Spain is best expressed by drawing comical or even rude caricatures of General Franco; but I think there is more to it than that. When our present Ambassador to Spain, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare), went to Madrid almost exactly four years ago to a month, we arranged to keep his airplane waiting on the airfield, as it seemed almost certain that Spain, whose dominant party were under the influence of Germany because Ger-


many had helped them so vigorously in the recently-ended civil war, would follow the example of Italy and join the victorious Germans in the war against Great Britain. Indeed, at this time the Germans proposed to the Spanish Government that triumphal marches of German troops should be held in the principal Spanish cities, and I have no doubt that they suggested to them that the Germans would undertake, in return for the virtual occupation of their country, the seizure of Gibraltar, which would then be handed back to a Germanised Spain. This last feature would have been easier said than done.
There is no doubt that if Spain had yielded to German blandishments and pressure at that juncture our burden would have been much heavier. The Straits of Gibraltar would have been closed and all access to Malta would have been cut off from the West. All the Spanish coast would have become the nesting place of German U-boats. I certainly did not feel at the time that I should like to see any of those things happen and none of them did happen. Our Ambassador deserves credit for the influence he rapidly acquired and which continually grew. In his work he was assisted by a gifted man, Mr. Yencken, whose sudden death by airplane accident is a loss which I am sure has been noted by the House. But the main credit is undoubtedly due to the Spanish resolve to keep out of the war. They had had enough of war and they wished to keep out of it. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is a matter of opinion."] Yes, I think so, and that is why my main principle of beating the enemy as soon as possible should be steadily followed. But they had had enough, and I think some of the sentiment may have been due to the fact that, looking back, the Spanish people, who are a people who do look back, could remember that Britain had helped Spain to free herself from the Napoleonic tyranny of. 130 years ago. At any rate the critical moment passed; the Battle of Britain was won; the Island Power which was expected to be ruined and subjugated in a few months was seen that very winter not only intact and far stronger in the homeland but also advancing by giant strides, under Wavell's guidance, along the African shore, taking perhaps a quarter of a million Italian prisoners on the way.
But another very serious crisis occurred in our relations with Spain before the operation designated "Torch," that is to say, the descent of the United States and British Forces upon North-West Africa, was begun. Before that operation was begun Spain's power to injure us was at its very highest. For a long time before this we had been steadily extending our airfield at Gibraltar and building it out into the sea, and for a month before zero hour, on 7th November, 1942, we had sometimes 600 airplanes crowded on this airfield in full range and in full view of the Spanish batteries. It was very difficult for the Spaniards to believe that these airplanes were intended to reinforce Malta, and I can assure the House that the passage of those critical days was very anxious indeed. However, the Spaniards continued absolutely friendly and tranquil. They asked no questions, they raised no inconveniences.
If, in some directions, they have taken an indulgent view of German U-boats in distress, or continued active exportations to Germany, they made amends on this occasion, in my view, so far as our advantage was concerned, for these irregularities by completely ignoring the situation at Gibraltar, where, apart from aircraft, enormous numbers of ships were anchored far outside the neutral waters, inside the Bay of Algeciras, always under the command of Spanish shore guns. We should have suffered the greatest inconvenience of we had been ordered to move those ships. Indeed, I do not know how the vast convoys would have been marshalled and assembled. I must say that I shall always consider a service was rendered at this time by Spain, not only to the United Kingdom and to the British Empire and Commonwealth, but to the cause of the United Nations.
I have, therefore, no sympathy with those who think it clever, and even funny, to insult and abuse the Government of Spain whenever occasion serves. I have had the responsibility of guiding the Government while we have passed through mortal perils, and, therefore, I think I have some means of forming a correct judgment about the values of events at critical moments as they occur. I am very glad now that, after prolonged negotiations, a still better arrangement has been made with Spain, which deals in a satisfactory manner with the Italian ships which have taken refuge in Spanish


harbours, and has led to the hauling down of the German flag in Tangier and the breaking of the shield over the Consulate, and which will, in a few days, be followed by the complete departure of the German representatives from Tangier, although they still remain in Dublin. Finally, it has led to the agreement about Spanish wolfram, which has been reached without any affront to Spanish dignity, and has reduced the export of wolfram from Spain to Germany during the coming critical months to a few lorry-loads a month.
It is true that this agreement has been helped by the continuous victories of the Allies in many parts of the world, and especially in North Africa and Italy, and also by the immense threat by which the Germans conceive themselves to be menaced, by all this talk of an invasion across the Channel. This, for what it is worth, has made it quite impossible for Hitler to consider reprisals on Spain. All his troops have had to be moved away from the frontier, and he has no inclination to face bitter guerilla warfare, because he has got quite enough to satisfy himself in so many other countries which he is holding down by brute force.
As I am here to-day speaking kindly words about Spain, let me add that I hope she will be a strong influence for the peace of the Mediterranean after the war. Internal political problems in Spain are a matter for the Spaniards themselves. It is not for us—that is, the Government—to meddle in such affairs—

Mr. Shinwell: Why then in Italy? My right hon. Friend did remark, as regards the restoration of the Government in Italy, that it could not be Fascist. That was his declaration. Why not in Spain?

The Prime Minister: The reason is that Italy attacked us. We were at war with Italy. We struck Italy down. My hon. Friend, I am sure, will see that a very clear line of distinction can be drawn between nations we go to war with, and nations who leave us alone.

Dr. Haden Guest: Is not a Fascist Government anywhere, a preparation for an attack?

The Prime Minister: I presume we do not include in our programme of world renovation any forcible action against any

Government whose internal form of administration does not come up to our own ideas, and any remarks I have made on that subject referred only to enemy Powers and their satellites who will have been struck down by force of arms. They are the ones who have ventured into the open and they are the ones whom we shall not allow to become, again, the expression of those peculiar doctrines associated with Fascism and Nazism, which have, undoubtedly, brought about the terrible struggle in which we are engaged. Surely, anyone could see the difference between the one and the other. There is all the difference in the world between a man who knocks you down and a man who leaves you alone. You may, conceivably, take an active interest in what happens to the former in case his inclination should recur, but we pass many people in the ordinary daily round of life about whose internal affairs and private quarrels we do not feel ourselves called upon to make continued inquiry.
Well, I say we speak the same words to the Spaniards in the hour of our strength as we did in the hour of our weakness. I look forward to increasingly good relations with Spain and to an extremely fertile trade between Spain and this country which will, I trust, grow even during the war and will expand after the peace. The iron from Bilbao and the North of Spain is of great value to this country both in war and peace. Our Ambassador now goes back to Spain for further important duties, and I have no doubt he goes with the good wishes of the large majority of the House and of all thoughtful and unprejudiced persons. I am sure that no one more than my hon. Friend opposite would wish that he should be successful in any work for the common cause. My hon. Friend has been often a vigilant and severe critic of His Majesty's Government, but as a real Opposition figure he has failed, because he never can conceal his satisfaction when we win—and we sometimes do.
I am happy to announce a hopeful turn in Greek affairs. When I spoke last on this I described them as the saddest case of all. We have passed through a crisis of a serious character since then. A Greek brigade and a large proportion of the Greek Navy mutinied, declaring themselves, in one way or other, on the side of the organisation called E.A.M., the


Greek freedom movement, and, of course, against the King and his Government. The King of Greece, who was in London, was advised by nearly everyone concerned in Cairo not to go back and warned that his life would be in danger. He returned the next day. The situation was then most serious. The Greek brigade was encircled by British forces some 30 miles away from Alexandria, and the Greek ships which had mutinied in Alexandria harbour were lying under the guns both of the shore batteries and of our superior naval forces which had rapidly gathered. This tension lasted for nearly three weeks. In due course the mutinies in the Fleet were suppressed. The disorderly ships were boarded by Greeks, under the orders of the Greek Government, and, with about 50 killed and wounded, the mutineers were collected and sent ashore. The mutinous brigade in the desert was assaulted by superior British forces, which captured the eminences commanding the camp, and the 4,000 men there surrendered. There were no casualties among the Greeks, but one British officer was killed in the attack upon the eminences. This is a matter which cannot be overlooked. The greatest patience and tact were shown by the British military and naval authorities involved, and, for some weeks past, order has been firmly established and the Greek forces who were misled into evil deeds by subversive movements have been interned for the time being.
The then Prime Minister, M. Tsouderos, had already tried, before these things happened, to arrange a meeting of all representatives of Greek opinion and to construct his Administration so as to include them. He acquitted himself with dignity and was helped by M. Venizelos, the son of the great. Venizelos whom we all esteemed so highly in the first world war. At this moment there emerged upon the scene M. Papandreou, a man greatly respected, who had lived throughout the war in Athens and was known as a man of remarkable character and one who would not be swayed by party interests, his own party being a very small one. M. Papandreou became the King's new Prime Minister, but before forming his Government he called a conference which met last week in the Lebanon. Every party in Greek life was represented there, including E.A.M., the Communists and others—a dozen parties or more. The

fullest debate took place and all expressed their feelings freely.
This disclosed an appalling situation in Greece. The excesses of E.L.A.S., which is the military body operating under E.A.M., had so alienated the population in many parts that the Germans had been able to form security battalions of Greeks to fight the E.A.M. These security battalions were made up of men, in many cases, who would far rather have been out in the hills maintaining the guerilla warfare. They had been completely alienated. At the same time, the state of hostility and suspicion which led last autumn to an actual civil war, existed between E.A.M. and the other resistance organisations, especially the E.D.E.S. under Colonel Zervas, a leader who commands the undivided support of the civilian population in his area and has always shown the strictest compliance with the orders sent him from G.H.Q., Middle East, under whom all his forces have been placed. Thus it seemed to be a question of all against all, and no one but the Germans rejoicing.
After prolonged discussion complete unity was reached at the Lebanon Conference and all parties will be represented in the new Government, which will devote itself to what is after all the only purpose worthy of consideration, namely, the forming of a national army in which all the guerilla bands will be incorporated and the driving, with this army, of the enemy from the country or, better still, destroying the enemy where he stands.
On Monday there was published in the newspapers the very agreeable letter which I received from the leaders of the Communists—that is more than I have ever received from the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher); perhaps he might write me one, to tell me that he confirms it—and the extreme Left wing party. There is published to-day in the papers the letter I have received from M. Papandreou, and another one to my right hon. Friend expressing the hopes which he has for the future of his Government, and thanks for the assistance we have given in getting round these troubles—what I call the diseases of defeat which Greece has now a chance of shaking off. I believe that the present situation—I hope and pray that it may be so—indicates that a new and fair start will come to Greece in her struggle to cleanse her native soil


from the foreign invader. I have, therefore, to report to the House that a very marked and beneficial change has occurred in the situation in Greece, which is more than I could say when I last spoke upon this subject. There was trouble with the destroyer we were giving the Greeks here, and while matters remained so uncertain, we were not able to hand her over, but I have been in correspondence with the Admiralty, and I hope that as a result of this reconstructed Government, and the new start that has been made, this ship will soon be manned and go to strengthen the Greek Navy as it returns to discipline and duty.
I gave some lengthy account last time of the position in Yugoslavia and of our relations with the different jurisdictions there. The difficulty and magnitude of this business are very great, and it must be remembered that not only three strongly marked races—the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—are involved but, further South, the Albanians are also making a bold bid for freedom from German rule. But they, too, at the present time are split into several competing and even antagonistic groups. Nothing is easier than to espouse any one of the various causes in these different countries, with all their claims and counter-claims, and one can find complete satisfaction in telling the tale from that particular standpoint. The best and easiest kind of speech to make is to take a particular cause and run it home on a single-track mind without any consideration of anything else, but we have to think of policy as well as oratory, and we have to think of the problem as a whole, and also to relate our action to the main purpose which I proclaimed at the beginning of my speech, namely, beating the enemy as soon as possible and to gather all forces for that purpose in priority to any other purpose.
I can only tell the Committee to-day the further positions which have been reached in Yugoslavia as the result of the unremitting exertions of our foreign policy. They are, in my opinion, far more satisfactory than they were. I have received a message from King Peter that he has accepted the resignation of Mr. Puric and his Cabinet and is in process of forming a new and smaller Cabinet with the purpose of assisting active resistance in Yugoslavia and of uniting as

far as possible all fighting elements in the country. I understand that this process of forming the new Government involves the severance from the Royal Yugoslav Government of General Mihailovitch in his capacity as Minister of War. I understand also that the Ban of Croatia is an important factor in the new political arrangements, around whom, or beside whom, certain other elements may group themselves for the purpose of beating the enemy and uniting Yugoslavia. This, of course, has the support of His Majesty's Government.
We do not know what will happen in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. The reason why we have ceased to supply Mihailovitch with arms and support is a simple one. He has not been fighting the enemy and, moreover, some of his subordinates have made accommodations with the enemy from which have arisen armed conflicts with the forces of Marshal Tito, accompanied by many charges and counter-charges, and the loss of patriot lives to the German advantage. Mihailovitch certainly holds a powerful position locally as Commander-in-Chief, and it does not mean that his ceasing to be Minister of War will rob him of his local influence. We cannot predict what he will do or what will happen. We have proclaimed ourselves the strong supporters of Marshal Tito because of his heroic and massive struggle against the German armies. We are sending, and planning to send, the largest possible supplies of weapons to him and to make the closest contacts with him. I had the advantage on Monday of a long conversation with General Velebit, who has been over here on a military mission from Marshal Tito, and it has been arranged among other things that Marshal Tito shall send here a personal military representative in order that we may be kept in the closest touch with all that is being done and with the effect of it in Yugoslavia. This is, of course, additional to the contacts established with Marshal Tito at General Wilson's headquarters in Algiers and will, of course, be co-ordinated therewith.
It must be remembered, however, that this question does not turn on Mihailovitch alone; there is also a very large body, amounting to perhaps 200,000, of Serbian peasant proprietors who are anti-German but strongly Serbian and who


naturally hold the views of a peasant ownership community in regard to property, less enthusiastic in regard to Communism than some of those in Croatia or Slovenia. Marshal Tito has largely sunk his Communist aspect in his character as a Yugoslav patriot leader. He repeatedly proclaims he has no intention of reversing the property and social systems which prevail in Serbia, but these facts are not accepted yet by the other side. The Serbians are a race with an historic past; it was from Serbia came the spark which fired the explosion of the first world war. We remember their historic retreat over the mountains. A very large number of Serbians are fighting with Marshal Tito's forces. Our object is that all forces in Yugoslavia, and the whole united strength of Serbia, may be made to work together under the military direction of Marshal Tito for a united, independent Yugoslavia which will expel from native soil the Hitlerite murderers and invaders, and destroy them until not one remains. The cruelties and atrocities of the Germans in Greece and in Yugoslavia exceed anything that we have heard, and we have heard terrible things, but the resistance of these historic mountaineers has been one of the most splendid features of the war. It will long be honoured in history, and I am sure that children will read the romance of this struggle and will have imprinted on their minds that love of freedom, that readiness to give away life and comfort, and all there is around one, in order to gain the right to live unmolested on your native heath.
All I can say is that we must be given a little reasonable latitude to work together for this union. It would be quite easy, as I said just now, to take wholeheartedly one side or the other. I have made it very plain where my sympathies lie, but nothing would give greater pleasure to the Germans than to see all these hearty mountaineers engaged in intestine strife against one another. We cannot afford at this crisis to neglect anything which may obstruct a real unity throughout wide regions in which at present upwards of 12 German divisions are gripped in Yugoslavia alone and 20 in all—that is another eight—in the Balkans and the Aegean Islands. All eyes must be turned upon the common foe. Perhaps we have had some success in this direction in Greece. At any rate it sums up our policy towards Yugoslavia, and the House will note that

all questions of monarchy or republic or Leftism or Rightism are strictly subordinate to the main purpose which we have in mind. In one place we support a king, in another a Communist—there is no attempt by us to enforce particular ideologies. We only want to beat the enemy and then, with a happy and serene peace, let the best expression be given to the will of the people in every way.
For a long time past the Foreign Secretary and I have laboured with all our strength to try to bring about a resumption of relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government which we recognise—[Interruption.]—which we have always recognised since the days of General Sikorski. We were conscious of the difficulty of our task and some may say we should have been wiser not to attempt it. Well, we cannot accept that view. We are the Ally of both countries. We went to war because Germany made an unprovoked attack upon our Ally, Poland. We have signed a 20-year Treaty with our Ally the Soviet Union, and this Treaty is the foundation of our policy. Polish forces are fighting with our Armies and have recently distinguished themselves remarkably well. Polish forces under Russian guidance are also fighting with the Soviet Army against the common enemy.
Our effort to bring about a renewal of relations between the Polish Government and Russia in London has not succeeded. We deeply regret that fact, and we must take care to say nothing that would make agreement more difficult in the future. I must repeat that the essential part of any arrangement is regulation of the Polish Eastern frontier, and that, in return for any withdrawal made by Poland in that quarter, she should receive other territories at the expense of Germany, which will give her an ample seaboard and a good, adequate and reasonable homeland in which the Polish nation may safely dwell. We must trust that, when we all engage in the struggle with the common foe, when nothing can surpass the bravery of our Polish Allies in Italy and daily on the sea, and in the air, and in the heroic resistance of the underground movement to the Germans. I have seen here men who came a few days ago out of Poland, who told me about it, and who are in relation with, and under the orders of, the present Polish Government in London. They are most anxious that this


underground movement should not clash with the advancing Russian Army, but should help it, and orders have been sent by the Polish Government in London that the underground movement is to help the Russian Armies in as many ways as possible. There are many ways possible in which guerillas cart be successful, and we must trust that statesmanship will yet find some way through.
I have the impression—and it is no more than an impression—that things are not so bad as they may appear on the surface between Russia and Poland. I need not say that we—and I think I may certainly add, the United States—would welcome any arrangement between Russia and Poland, however it was brought about, whether directly between the Powers concerned, or with the help of His Majesty's Government, or any other Government. There is no question of pride on our part, only of sincere good will to both, and earnest and anxious aspirations to a solution of problems fraught with grave consequences to Europe and the harmony of the Grand Alliance. In the meantime, our relations, both with the Polish and the Soviet Governments, remain regulated by the public statements which have been made and repeated from time to time from this bench during the present war. There I leave this question, and I trust that if it is dealt with in Debate those who deal with it will always consider what we want, namely, the united action of all Poles, with all Russians, against all Germans.
We have to rejoice at the brilliant and skilful fighting of the French Moroccan and Algerian divisions, and the brilliant leading they have had by their officers in the heart shaking battle to which I have referred, and which is now at its climax. The French Committee of National Liberation, in Algiers, has the credit of having prepared these troops, which were armed and equipped by the United States under President Roosevelt's personal decision. The French Committee also places at the full service of the Allies a powerful Navy, including, in the "Richelieu," one of the finest battleships in the world. They guide and govern a vast Empire, all of whose strategic points are freely placed at the disposal of the United Nations. They have a numerous and powerful underground

army in France, sometimes called the Maquis, and sometimes the French Army of the Interior, which may be called upon to play an important part before the end of the war.
There is no doubt that this political entity, the French Committee of National Liberation, presides over, and directs, forces at the present time which, in the struggle against Hitler in Europe, give it the fourth place in the Grand Alliance. The reason why the United States and Great Britain have not been able to recognise it yet as the Government of France, or even as the Provisional Government of France, is because we are not sure that it represents the French nation in the same way as the Governments of Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia represent the whole body of their people. The Committee will, of course, exercise the leadership to establish law and order in the liberated areas of France under the supervision, while the military exigency lasts, of the supreme Allied Commander, but we do not wish to commit ourselves at this stage to imposing the Government of the French Committee upon all of France which might fall under our control without more knowledge than we now possess of the situation in the interior of France. At the same time I must make it clear that we shall have no dealings with the Vichy Government, or anyone tainted with that association, because they have decided to follow the path of collaboration with our enemies. Many of them have definitely desired, and worked for, a German victory.
In Norway and the Low Countries it is different. If we go there we shall find that continuity of lawful government is maintained by the Governments which we recognise, and with which we are in intimate relations. The Governments of King Haakon and Queen Wilhelmina are the lawfully founded Governments of those States, with perfect and unbroken continuity, and should our liberating Armies enter those countries we feel we should deal with them and also, as far as possible, with the Belgian and Danish Governments, although their Sovereigns are prisoners, but with whose countries we have the closest ties. On the other hand, we are not able to take a decision at this time to treat the French Committee of National Liberation, or the French Provisional Government, as it has been


called, as the full, final, and lawful embodiment of the French Republic. It may be that the Committee itself may be able to aid us in the solution of these riddles and I must say that I think their decree governing their future action constitutes a most forceful and helpful step in that direction. With the full approval of the President of the United States I have invited General de Gaulle to pay us a visit over here in the near future and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has just shown me a telegram from Mr. Duff Cooper, in Algiers, saying that General de Gaulle will be very glad to come. There is nothing like talking things over, and seeing where we can get to. I hope he will bring some members of his Government with him so that the whole matter can be reviewed.
As this war has progressed, it has become less ideological in its character, in my opinion. The Fascist power in Italy has been overthrown and will, in a reasonable period of time, be completely expunged, mainly by the Italian democracy themselves. If there is anything left over for the future we will look after it. Profound changes have taken place in Soviet Russia; the Trotskyite form of Communism has been completely wiped out. The victories of the Russian Armies have been attended by a great rise in the strength of the Russian State, and a remarkable broadening of its views. The religious side of Russian life has had a wonderful rebirth. The discipline and military etiquette of the Russian Armies are unsurpassed. There is a new National Anthem, the music of which Premier Stalin—

Mr. Gallacher: Take all the solace you can.

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman had better be careful to keep in step. There is a new National Anthem, the music of which Premier Stalin sent me, which I asked the B.B.C. to play on the frequent occasions when there are great Russian victories to celebrate. The terms offered by Russia to Rumania made no suggestion of altering the standards of society in that country and were in many respects, if not in all, remarkably generous. Russia has been very patient with Finland. The Comintern has been abolished, which is sometimes forgotten. Quite recently, some of our representatives from the Ministry of Information

were allowed to make a considerable tour in Russia, and found opportunities of seeing for themselves what they liked. They found an atmosphere of candid friendliness and a keen desire to see British films and hear about our country and what it was doing in the war. The children in the schools were being informed about the war on the seas, and of its difficulties and its perils, and how the Northern convoys got through to Russia. There seemed a great desire among the people that Britain and Russia should be friends. These are very marked departures from the conceptions which were held some years ago, for reasons which we can all understand.

Mr. MacLaren: On both sides.

The Prime Minister: Certainly, on both sides. We have no need to look back into the past and add up the tale and tally of recrimination. Many terrible things have happened. But we began 30 years ago to march forward with the Russians in the battle against the German tyranny of the Kaiser and we are now marching with them, and I trust we shall until all forms of German tyranny have been extirpated. As to Nazism, the other ideology, we intend to wipe that out utterly, however drastic may be the methods required. We are all agreed on that in this House, whatever our political views and doctrines may be. Throughout the whole of the British Dominions and the United States, and all the United Nations, there is only one opinion about that, and for the rest, whatever may be said as to former differences, there is nothing that has occurred which should in any way make us regret the 20 years' Treaty which we have signed with the Russians, and which will be the dominating factor in the relations which we shall have with them.
I see that in some quarters I am expected to-day to lay out, quite plainly and decisively, the future plan of world organisation, and also to set the Atlantic Charter in its exact and true relation to subsequent declarations and current events. It is easier to ask such questions than to answer them. We are working with 33 United Nations and, in particular, with two great Allies who, in some forms of power, far exceed the British Empire. Taking everything into con-


sideration, including men and money, war effort, expanse of territory, we can claim to be an equal to those great Powers, but not, in my view, a superior. It would be a great mistake for me, as head of the British Government, or, I may add—speaking to this Committee as a most respected institution—the Grand Alliance, or for the House, to take it upon ourselves, to lay down the law to all those different countries, including the two great Powers with which we have to work, if the world is to be brought back into a good condition.
This small Island and this marvellous structure of States and dependencies which have gathered round it, if we all hold together, occupy a worthy place in the vanguard of the nations. It is idle to suppose that we are the only people who are to prescribe what all other countries, for their own good, are to do. Many other ideas and forces come into play and nothing could be more unwise than for the meeting of Prime Ministers, for instance, to attempt to prescribe for all countries the way they should go.
Consultations are always proceeding between the three great Powers and others, and every effort is being made to explore the future, to resolve difficulties and to obtain the greatest measure of common agreement on levels below the Ministerial level in a way which does not commit the Government. A few things have already become quite clear and very prominent at the Conference which has just concluded. The first is that we will fight on all together until Germany is forced to capitulate and until Nazism is extirpated and the Nazi Party are stripped of all continuing power of doing evil. The next is that the Atlantic Charter remains a guiding signpost, expressing a vast body of opinion amongst all the Powers now fighting together against tyranny. The third point is that the Atlantic Charter in no way binds us about the future of Germany, nor is it a bargain or contract with our enemies. It has no quality of an offer to our enemy. It was no offer to the Germans to surrender. If it had been an offer, that offer was rejected. But the principle of unconditional surrender, which has also been promulgated, will be adhered to as far as Nazi Germany and Japan are concerned, and that principle itself wipes away the danger of anything Like Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points being

brought up by the Germans after their defeat, claiming that they surrendered in consideration of them.
I have repeatedly said that unconditional surrender gives the enemy no rights but relieves us from no duties. Justice will have to be done and retribution will fall upon the wicked and the cruel. The miscreants who set out to subjugate first Europe and then the world must be punished, and so must their agents who, in so many countries, have perpetrated horrible crimes and who must be brought back to face the judgment of the population, very likely in the very scenes of their atrocities. There is no question of Germany enjoying any guarantee that she will not undergo territorial changes if it should seem that the making of such changes renders more secure and more lasting the peace of Europe.
Scarred and armed with experience we intend to take better measures this time than could ever previously have been conceived in order to prevent a renewal, in the lifetime of our children or our grandchildren at least, of the horrible destruction of human values which has marked the last and the present world wars. We intend to set up a world order and organisation, equipped with all the necessary attributes of power, in order to prevent the breaking out of future wars, or the long planning of them in advance, by restless and ambitious nations. For this purpose there must be a World Council, a controlling Council, comprising the greatest States which emerge victorious from this war, who will be obligated to keep in being a certain minimum standard of armaments for the purpose of preserving peace. There must also be a world assembly of all Powers, whose relation to the world Executive, or controlling power, for the purpose of maintaining peace I am in no position to define. I cannot say. If I did, I should only be stepping outside the bounds which are proper to us.
The shape of these bodies, and their relations to each other, can only be settled after the formidable foes we are now facing have been beaten down and reduced +o complete submission. It would be presumption for any one Power to prescribe in detail exactly what solution will be found. Anyone can see how many different alternatives there are. A mere


attempt on our part to do so, or to put forward what is a majority view on this or that, might prejudice us in gaining consideration for our arguments when the time comes.
I shall not even attempt to parade the many questions of difficulty which will arise and which are present in our minds. Anyone can write down on paper at least a dozen large questions of this kind—Should there be united forces of nations? or Should there be a world police? and so on. There are other matters of a highly interesting character which should be discussed. But it would be stepping out of our place in the forward march for us to go beyond the gradual formulation of opinion and ideas which are constantly going on inside the British Commonwealth and in contact with our principal Allies. It must not be supposed, however, that these questions cannot be answered and the difficulties cannot be overcome and that a complete victory will not be a powerful aid to the solution of all problems, and that the good will and practical common sense which exist in the majority of men and in the majority of nations will not find full expression in the new structure which must regulate the affairs of every people in so far as they may clash with another people's. The future towards which we are marching, across bloody fields and frightful manifestations of destruction, must surely be based upon the broad and simple virtues and upon the nobility of mankind. It must be based upon a reign of law which upholds the principles of justice and fair play and which protects the weak against the strong if the weak have justice on their side. There must be an end to predatory exploitation and nationalistic ambitions.
This does not mean that nations should not be entitled to rejoice in their traditions and achievements, but they will not be allowed, by armed force, to gratify appetites of aggrandisement at the expense of other countries merely because they are smaller or weaker or less well prepared, and measures will be taken to have ample Armies, Fleets and Air Forces available to prevent anything like that coming about. We must undoubtedly in our world structure embody a great part of all that was gained to the world by the structure and formation of the League of Nations. But we must arm our world organisation and make sure that, within

the limits assigned to it, it has overwhelming military power. We must remember that we shall be hard put to it to gain our living, to repair the devastation that has been wrought and to give back that wider and more comfortable life which is so deeply desired. We must strive to preserve the reasonable rights and liberties of the individual. We must respect the rights and opinions of others, while holding firmly to our own faith and convictions.
There must be room in this new great structure of the world for the happiness and prosperity of all and in the end it must be capable of bringing happiness and prosperity even to the guilty and vanquished nations. There must be room within the great world organisation for organisms like the British Empire and Commonwealth, as we now call it, and I trust that there will be room also for the fraternal association of the British Commonwealth and the United States. We are bound by our 20 years Treaty with Russia, and besides this—I, for my part, hope to deserve to be called a good European—to try to raise the glorious Continent of Europe, the parent of so many powerful States, from its present miserable condition as a kind of volcano of strife and tumult to its old glory of a family of nations and a vital expression of Christendom. I am sure these great entities which I have mentioned—the British Empire, the conception of a Europe truly united, the fraternal association with the United States—will in no way disturb the general purposes of the world organisation. In fact, they may help powerfully to make it run. I hope and pray that all this may be established and that we may be led to exert ourselves to secure these permanent and glorious achievements which alone can make amends to mankind for all the miseries and toil which have been their lot and for all the heroism and sacrifice which have been their glory.

Mr. Harold Nicolson: The Committee will, I feel sure, be united in congratulating the Prime Minister upon the speech that he has just made. Vast as was the canvas which he had chosen he has managed to display a power of composition which only a practised painter can achieve. By his examination of several obscure problems he was able to illuminate many dark corners and to dispel many


misty doubts. I think the Committee will agree that in his long speech he showed all that lucidity and all that humour which we associate with the gigantic speeches of 1940.
The Prime Minister has given us a very detailed survey of current foreign affairs. He has dealt very lucidly, in great detail, and with amazing frankness, with the countries, one by one, about whose policy we have been in doubt and whose special conditions have sometimes exposed us in our turn to policies which have seemed at the moment to be policies of hesitation. But he has not dealt, and perhaps did not intend to deal, with foreign policy as such. He indicated the nature of the world organisation which he had in mind; and it is evident that that organisation is conceived by him as something approximating to the League of Nations but a League of Nations with overwhelming force. Such an organisation would command the willing assent of the great majority of the people of this country and will meet with the support of all the Governments of the United Nations. I feel myself that the faults of the Covenant of the League are not to be sought in its drafting and not in any way in the nature of the provisions which it contains, but it was fundamentally based on a conception of human nature as naturally pacific. In other words, it was based on an interpretation of human nature which, had it been a correct interpretation, would have rendered any league unnecessary. It therefore failed owing to the fact that it promised to do everything for everybody everywhere; thereby it inflated its own currency. I am sure that if the new world organisation is based on the certainty of contribution and certainty of effort, we shall have, not an inflated, but a deflated currency in international order.
I regret to some extent that the Prime Minister did not reaffirm or outline the traditional principles of British foreign policy. It is fashionable nowadays to consider any traditional principles as old fashioned. I cannot conceive, however, that principles which have been absorbed, stated and practised by such diverse characters as Castlereagh and Canning, Palmerston and Gladstone, Grey and Arthur Henderson—principles which have become part of the natural atmosphere of British foreign policy—can ever become otiose or outworn. It is necessary that

they should be reaffirmed on occasions. These principles, some people imagine, have been profoundly altered by changes in the balance of power and alterations in means of communication. This is not so. The principles remain exactly the same. The method of their application has slightly altered. Those principles are based upon the immutable facts of geography. They impose upon us a consistent attitude and policy. They are based upon the dual fact that this island is, in the first place, a tiny little territory situated off the peninsula of Europe, from which it is separated by only 26 miles or four flying minutes. In the second place, our principles are conditioned by the fact that we are at the same time a vast Empire spread over the Seven Seas.
Our attitude, our policy, the principles of our policy, the tradition of our policy, must therefore always be dual. Our foreign policy must be both general and special. It must be world-wide and local. It must be oceanic and Continental. When we talk of a great world order, a great world organisation, we are talking of general policy, not of special policy. What distresses me about the policy of the Government in recent months is not their general, or oceanic, policy, which seems to me in every way admirable and consistently carried out. Their Continental policy, however, their European policy, seems to me—and I know the difficulties—to be in certain respects uncertain and timid. I am well aware that my right hon. Friend has done his best—and that is saying a great deal—to drive a straight furrow. I recognise that this is difficult for him because his plough is yoked on one side to a young Eagle apt to indulge in flights of fantasy, and, on the other side, to an enormous Bear whose reticent attitude about her own intentions is only equalled by her suspicion of the intentions of others. This hampers my right hon. Friend's style. Moreover, even the best principles of foreign policy must occasionally in war-time be sacrificed; but I feel that we have in this war gone a little too far sometimes in displaying deference to what may be only transitory opinion in Moscow and what may be only transitory opinion in Washington.
What therefore are the essential, basic, traditional and consistent principles of British foreign policy? They are based upon our dual position, our oceanic and Continental position, and upon the fact


that we are, in a way, the most vulnerable and, in another way, the most invulnerable of all nations. We have, therefore, as our first principle the protection of the coast and communications of this island by the possession of a Navy, and, we must now add, an Air Force, more powerful than that of any conceivable enemy. The United States is not a conceivable enemy. In the second place then our principles of policy are based, and always have been based, on the identity of our interests with the vital and primary interests of the majority of other European countries. We are absolutely conditioned by geography; and, as Sir Eyre Crowe stated, it is almost a law of nature that we should find ourselves the natural enemy of any country or group of countries which seeks by power to dominate Western Europe. That must always be so. However great the world organisation, the new League of Nations, may become, however powerful the force it will possess, there will always be anxiety about what is happening four flying minutes away.
It is that consideration which, to my mind, we are neglecting. We are not taking sufficient account of the rights, interests and independence of the smaller Powers of Western Europe. I know that it may be necessary in war-time, especially in the fifth year of a long and deadly war, to exert pressure on neutral and small Powers which we should never dream of exerting in normal times, and about which we should feel horrified if someone else exercised it themselves. We may have had to act in regard to neutrals in a way which, whatever may be the immediate advantage gained, may in the end cause us feelings of regret. I only hope—and I am sure that my right hon. Friend agrees—that when the war crisis is over and we have a new peace conference, a new peace congress, we shall do everything in our power to exercise the influence which we have achieved, to see that the small Powers, the weak Powers, are taken into consultation and treated with such deference and respect as will do something to efface the impression left by the rather highhanded methods which we have used in the last few months.
To return to our own region, to our own frontier. I cannot fully explain either to myself or to others the true nature of the policy adopted by His Majesty's Govern-

ment towards France. I hope that in this Debate Members of all parties and from all benches in the Committee will take occasion to impress upon the Government that public opinion is indeed confused and somewhat distressed by the negative attitude now being adopted by His Majesty's Government towards the French. The British public has an amazingly keen, quick and true instinct in foreign affairs. I think that in this French question their confusion has been caused by the fact that two instincts have been brought into play. The first instinct is a political one, an instinctive feeling that a weak or unfriendly France would be a danger to the security of this island. The second instinct is a more human feeling, a feeling which I am sure every Member shares, that when you have been fighting with a man at your side and he has been knocked out and rendered almost unconscious, and when you turn round and see he has recovered and is fighting again as well as and even better than before, your natural instinct is to cheer him, to be delighted, to welcome him.
It seems to me and to many Frenchmen that the United States Government, with His Majesty's Government in their train, instead of helping the French and welcoming them, lose no opportunity of administering any snub which ingenuity can devise and ill-manners perpetrate. I hope that my right hon. Friend will go further than the negative and even ungracious statement made on this subject by the Prime Minister. After all, we treat the French as full Allies in Italy; they are fighting for us and with us. In the battle line they have complete equality of status, even a preference, but the moment we get on to the diplomatic field we ignore them and snub them. It is most unwise, most weak and most ill-informed of the United States Government to refuse to accord any special recognition to the National Committee or provisional government. I am convinced that this is a grave error of policy. It is not only inexpedient, it is not only unfair but it may expose us to an absurd situation.
I expect every moment to open my paper and read that the Soviet Government have recognised the De Gaulle Committee as the Provisional Government of France. We will come in late, ungracious, ungenerous, and unthanked, creeping in at the last moment and giving no recognition of the deep feeling of respect and


admiration that we have for what the National Committee has been able to do. We refuse to recognise them. There may be reasons for this which are not within our control. But we go much further than that. We refuse to let them communicate at a moment of immense urgency with their Government in Algiers. We refuse to allow them to attend the European Council; this appears to be grotesque. Here is an allied body discussing the future of Europe and France is not to be there. This is grotesque. It is a discourtesy such as one would hardly adopt towards a neutral and certainly not to an Ally which has recovered herself and regained her repute among the nations of the world.
I know that it is said—and I also know that my right hon. Friend will be the last to assert it himself—that the objections to treating the National Committee in a different way come not from here but from Washington. I find it difficult to believe that. I feel to-day, as I have always felt, that if you have a reasonable, sensible and just proposition to put forward you always find that, in the end, the United States people and Government will agree. It is lamentable when one considers that long 150 years tradition of intimate affection which has existed between France and the United States, that, owing to some curious prejudice on the part of the State Department, that great tradition is being seriously endangered. I only trust that when my right hon. Friend has heard what other Members have to say—and I am sure that Members of all parties feel as deeply as I do upon it—that he will realise that there is wide perturbation on this subject and that he will revive and restate those ancient principles of British policy which, if I may quote a phrase of the Prime Minister's, have been
handed down to us by the ancient architects of our magnitude and renown.
These things are our special regional responsibility, and not that of the United States. We are pledged to take a special interest in these matters in the House of Commons, and we hope and pray that, just as we welcome at the Front the cooperation of the French soldiers, so we will, in the councils of Europe and elsewhere, welcome the presence of France as an equal, an Ally and a friend.

Mr. Cary: I do not wish to inflict upon the Committee some of the smooth and easy phrases which could be said in praise of the important speech which opened this Debate, but I would like to say this of the Prime Minister: the whole nation has admired the way he has inspired, directed and presided over the conference of Empire Prime Ministers. The good example he set may will count as a new model, in the endless adventure of leadership and good government. The Prime Minister, at the conclusion of his speech, dealt with some of the broader hopes for the future; if my right hon. Friend has anything to do with post-war consultations between the nations, in the same way as he has presided over the consultations of the British Commonwealth, perhaps the future of a new, international supervising authority will be launched in the happiest circumstances.
I feel that many Members of the Committee were slightly troubled in mind on Thursday morning last when there appeared, or rather re-appeared, in the headlines of the newspapers, the term "League of Nations." At the beginning of this Parliament, the League of Nations Union had more vice-presidents per square inch on the Floor of the House of Commons than there are parsons to the square vote in the constituency of the distinguished Burgesses for Oxford University. I should say that the two things which created most suspicion among the countries in the last 20 years have been the League of Nations and gold. Gold was dealt with in a recent Debate, which showed clearly that little can be expected from that glittering, decorative, ornamental but quite useless metal, in rebuilding the world. Perhaps it is not of the substance which inspires good manners or wise electioneering among mankind. I say to Members of the Committee that it would be infinitely better for the future, if the old League of Nations were left undisturbed in its buried partnership with gold.
In seeking a new prospectus, I do not think new capital or enthusiasm is likely to be attracted by using the title of the old firm, "League of Nations." The sort of body we want in the future is one that will have the power this time to enforce decisions. Therein is the touchstone of its future. If we ignore that point we shall get into great difficulties. If there


are great arguments between the House of Commons and our Service Departments through the Committee of Imperial Defence or between the Service Departments of important nations arguing as to the sovereignty of their Services, then there will be what I would call a paper authority, good at welfare, but without power of enforcing decisions. In those circumstances we should only return at the end of the war to the tragedy that we saw at Geneva before it broke out. Let us never forget that if some nations allow again their destinies to be taken over by sham statesmen like Mussolini and Hitler, or by the worst type of nouveau riche like Ribbentrop, and those nations are admitted to membership of a new international Power, in my opinion a third world war is certain in the future.
Field-Marshal Smuts has reminded us that if we attempt to proceed by a process of over-simplification and falsification, we shall see even worse dangers, troubles and tragedies than we have known in the past. If I may venture, without impertinence from these benches, to criticise so great a man as Field-Marshal Smuts, I would say that I think he has misled opinion, in perhaps one of the most important speeches he has made in his life. He was reported as saying some time ago, within the precincts of this building:
France has gone, and will be gone in our day, and perhaps for many a day;
and, in reference to Germany:
Germany will be written off the slate in Europe for long, long years.
Surely, the true lesson of history is the resilience of nations. I think we may be greatly surprised after the end of the war, to see the rapid recovery which the French people—and the German people if they are free—will make in an effort to rebuild the world again. If that be so, and if they are resilient, Great Britain, France and a reformed, reorganised, free and democratic Germany, may be taking their part in a wide, comprehensive federation of States in the rebuilding of the world as we would like it to be. If their total populations, roughly 165,000,000, with their immense resources and their great ports, like the Pool of London, Hamburg and Le Havre, located so close together on one part of the surface of the globe, could co-operate, indeed the prospect for the world would then be bright.
If I could express a wish for the future, in fulfilment of British foreign policy, I should like to see most, first that our old ties of friendship and understanding with France were restored in full. In listening to my hon. Friend the Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson) I was a little confused by his references to our neglect of the French National Committee. I thought he was making a charge against the authorities in Washington, but at one moment he seemed to turn from Washington and to direct his argument to the Foreign Secretary here. I hope that the neglect has been in Washington; I have yet to be persuaded in the course of the Debate that the neglect rests entirely upon the shoulders of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. With the restoration of our old position with France I should like to see, secondly, the coming into existence of a new federation of German States, taking their full share in the stability and peace of Europe. Our approach to those two most desirable objectives does not begin in some obscure European capital, but begins in the assistance which Members of the Committee can give to the Government in framing a realistic foreign policy.
In my opinion, a House of Commons of the future, deeply divided on issues of foreign policy, would be a House of Commons which had already lost the peace. If the House is to retain some of the functional power which has accrued to it in war-time—the Select Committee on National Expenditure is a good example—then new methods and ways must be found of keeping Members better informed in regard to the course of foreign affairs, and to prevent political parties from splitting apart on the main lines of policy. May I put a suggestion before the Committee? I have tried to choose my words with care. It might be desirable for hon. and right hon. Members to impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance, bringing to an end all unofficial party foreign affairs committees and setting up in their places one official, single, all-party Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. McGovern: Could I be a member?

Mr. Cary: Perhaps the hon. Member who interrupted will allow me to embroider and elaborate the suggestion.

Mr. Mander: Give us the chairmanship.

Mr. Cary: Perhaps, in an honorary capacity. Such a committee as I have in mind would receive evidence from all persons wishing to bring to the notice of Members generally facts and figures in foreign relationships, issue printed reports of a special or general character and, if the Committee will forgive me putting it in these words, acting at all times as the chief custodian of Parliamentary responsibility in checking and advising the Executive.
In addition to the work of this powerful committee it would also be the duty of the Executive to issue, at suitable intervals, printed statements on the course of foreign affairs and the effect of British foreign policy in relation to them. Such statements from the Government would form the basis of all future foreign affairs Debates. My imagination has not taken me into that world of possibilities of a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament—particularly for occasions of acute crises in foreign relationships.
This war has imposed upon us all an irksome political discipline. But I venture to suggest that the tolerance we have been wise enough to show to one another has enhanced the reputation of Parliament, and made in a family sense new friendships and understandings across the lines of political parties. Yet our native talent for political controversy and energetic political thinking has not suffered, and indeed may have been improved by being freed from some of the stale arguments and ways of the 19th century. I feel that the times in which we live, and will come to live at the end of this war, will demand the competent discharge of duties rather than the assertion of rights. An immense responsibility will rest upon the Members of this Committee. I should dread facing the future if we were to return to the form of Foreign Affairs Debates which used to take place in this House of Commons before the war. I hope that the energy and attention which the House of Commons gives to the future of, foreign policy and any other subject in which it may be allowed to do so will go forward on a basis of party consultation and coalition, I think that is absolutely vital. The British people, the electorate, have a strange intuition about foreign policy and foreign affairs. I feel perfect-

ly certain that my electors do not want me to return to my constituency to engage in what I might call trying to pick to pieces the works of the Foreign Affairs watch. They want me to go down to my constituency and tell them that the time is right. I want to keep my eye on the time; I do not want to go to meeting after meeting upstairs or on the Floor to listen to the individual sections of foreign policy, and to hear the actions of foreign countries picked to pieces, and made the subject of party capital. That is not the way to the future. Let us avoid returning to that form of Parliamenetary life.
I have spoken long enough. There are many other things on which I should have liked to have said a few words. There is the whole question of the relationship between home and foreign policy. There is the question of the restoration of the prestige of the Foreign Office, and the strengthening of the office of the Foreign Secretary, in relation to the head of the Government—a condition which did not exist before this war. There is the important question of the conversion of the Enemy Department of the Ministry of Economic Warfare into a permanent economic intelligence service for the Foreign Office. Lastly, there is the reform of the Foreign Service. It is the instrument that has to execute the policies decided by this Committee. I look upon Missions abroad as equal in importance to the future Debates which must take place in the House of Commons. Our foreign policy may be everything that is desired to satisfy national honour and security; we may have in our service men and women of the highest talent to execute that policy, but if Missions abroad are badly served from the centre, badly housed, ill-informed and understaffed, with few persons caring for the higher motives which must surround the task of representing a great nation overseas, then our foreign policy must begin its descent to failure, sometimes to failure which will bring not discomfort, not distress, but perhaps acute misery to hundreds of thousands, nay millions, of people.
All these things will have to be threshed in the months and years to come. Not a Member of this Committee would deny to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, their prayers for the successful outcome of the work of his Department An unforgettable task is not


the surest guide in an unpredictable future. This much is, certain; the question of our power to put anything back exactly as it was before 1933 does not arise, and in the alternative, our chances of framing a foreign policy likely to please all our friends is equally remote. Some members of the Committee might have seen that splendid play "St. Helena" which was produced at the Old Vic some ten years ago, in which that fine actor Mr. Kenneth Kent played the part of Napoleon. The last part of the first Act of that play was devoted to illustrating the disdain with which Napoleon regarded Admiral Cockburn, not so much in his capacity of governor of the island but because he represented that great Service, the British Navy, which had done most at that time to bring about the downfall of the Grand Armies of France. Napoleon hated the sea; so too does Adolf Hitler. I implore Members of the Committee in the future not to allow the first insurance of a realistic foreign policy to go out of the hands of the nation. That first insurance of a realistic foreign policy is British sea power, and the greatest disservice which Members of this Committee could do to the world, would be to allow that first strength of the British people to be filched away by some supervising international authority which knows too much about paper resolutions and crying afterwards, and too little about battle stations, hitting first and the true interests of the British race.

Mr. Ivor Thomas: Among many contentious subjects, the hon. Member for Eccles (Mr. Cary) has revived the question of a Foreign Affairs Committee of both Houses. I do not think that that suggestion will commend itself generally to Parliament. It would, I think, be the first step in taking away that control of the British people over foreign affairs which he mentioned. It is not a system that has worked well in countries where it exists. It would derogate from the responsibility of Ministers to this House, and it would, I think, do away with the great usefulness of those committees set up by Private Members on their own initiative. Much of what is done in foreign affairs is done in the first place by someone who has a bee in his bonnet and converts others to his views. I hope that these committees will flourish in the House. But the hon. Member had a good purpose in view. He wanted to see greater

unity in foreign policy in this country. That is a need which no one can gainsay.
As I am the first speaker from the Labour benches to-day may I draw the hon. Member's attention to the fact that we in the Labour Party have recently made our contribution to that subject? The National Executive of the Labour Party has issued a statement on foreign policy which will, I think, in many parts commend itself to the House generally. We should not expect our opponents to agree with our argument about the necessity of Socialism for world peace but they will welcome the forthright statement that in order to secure the reign of law you must have the backing of force. That is said as categorically as it can be, and I hope it will be regarded as our contribution towards securing unity in foreign policy in the troublous times which lie ahead.
It is a great inspiration to a young Member like myself to listen to a speech such as the Prime Minister made to-day. I am forced to wonder at the Providence which has always matched the hour with the man in British history. In the course of that remarkable speech he took the liberty, which may well be excused on Empire Day, of describing the British Commonwealth as the British Empire. He went on to express a wish for the fraternal association of the British Empire and the United States. As it may be that the Prime Minister does not read the "Daily Herald" so often as perhaps he ought, may I draw the attention of the Committee to an article by Mr. Sumner Welles in the "Daily Herald" this morning? Speaking with all the authority of a former American Under-Secretary of State, he says:
I think there can be no question in the minds of the overwhelming majority of the United States that the continuing influence of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the world of the post-war period is essential to the basic interests of the United States.
There is no doubt that that is so, and we can, without any disloyalty to the greater ideal of world unity, be loyal members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. There is no contradiction between the two ideals. Naturally what the Prime Minister said about Italy was of great interest to me and I hope the Committee will permit me to express my gratification. I have spoken on this subject before, and I do not propose to do so to-day; but I would like to express


my deep thanks for those wise and moving words that the Prime Minister used.
I want to say a few words about a subject which was touched upon only lightly in the Prime Minister's great speech: that is, the terms which will be granted to Germany when her forces are finally and irretrievably defeated. That is a subject which has been recently considered by the European Advisory Commission, and it may not be much longer before it becomes a matter of topicality. I suppose we are all resolved that, whatever mistakes we make at the end of this war, we shall avoid the mistakes we made at the end of the last war: if we are to make mistakes at all, let them at least have the merit of originality. One mistake which we made at the end of the last war was that, after having beaten the German forces to their knees and forced them to sue unconditionally for terms, we did not have on the Armistice terms the signatures of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Instead, the terms were signed by a Centre Party leader, Erzberger, in the name of a Socialist Chancellor, Ebert. That meant that the German Army was able to pretend that it bad never been beaten in the field, and it gave the Weimar Republic a damnosa haereditas from which it never recovered. We thought we had the signature of a good German on the document; but we do not want the signatures of good Germans: we want the signatures of people who stand for something in Germany. It is important that, at the end of this war, we shall have committed to acceptance of unconditional surrender representatives of the German armed forces, of the German bureaucracy, and of the other elements which have formed the framework of the German State.

Mr. Petherick: Does not my hon. Friend think that it would be a very good thing, if the man is still alive, to have the signature of Adolf Hitler, and those of others who were mainly responsible for the outbreak of the war?

Mr. Thomas: I doubt very much whether Hitler's signature would be any good on any document. If Goering is still alive at the time, I think that his signature would be well worth having, as he probably stands for more in Germany than Hitler does himself. We cannot say

who will be alive; it is dangerous to mention names. When the hand of the assassin and the suicide have done their work we do not know who will be left. When our armies triumph, we may find Germany in such a state of complete disintegration that no one there can sign any document. There may be a period during which we shall have to take over the control of Germany ourselves. But we are fighting against the most highly disciplined country in the world, and I shall be surprised if, after a period, these elements in Germany do not raise their heads again.
As I have said, it is dangerous to mention names; but a few names may be the best indication of what I mean. If Rommel is still alive, and is still regarded as the darling of the nation—as he was recently called by the German wireless—his signature might be desirable on the document. There is every reason why he should not be left to preach the legend of another stab in the back by Jews and Socialists and others. Another man whose signature might be obtained is Dr. Meissner, who, it is well to remember, has been Secretary of State in Germany from 1920 onwards. He has been pursuing the same policy, whether his master was the Weimar Republic or the Nazis. Then there is Dr. Gauss, of the German Foreign Office, who has been at his post for a similarly long period. Hitler and others get the limelight, but these men are equally important. There are other people who have been put into cold storage for a time, it may be with the idea of bringing them out when the moment arrives. I refer to such men as Dr. Schacht and Von Neurath. Their names ought to be on the document. [An HON. MEMBER: "It will be a long list."] I see no objection to having a long list of names on the document.
I would like to ask for information about another aspect of the terms to be granted to Germany. When the Foreign Secretary replies, I would like him to say what measures he proposes, so that France and Poland may be associated with the terms to Germany. Those two countries have a special interest in this matter. It is most necessary that they should be assured that no future aggression comes to them from that quarter. The Prime Minister has paid a just and moving tribute to the work they are doing


on the Italian front and the whole Committee will echo that tribute. They should be taken into consultation on these terms. Let me raise a few points that concern France in particular. The first is the large holding in French firms that has been acquired by German firms in the course of the war. In some cases these holdings were confiscated by the Germans for non-collaboration, and given to such firms as the Hermann Goering Werke and the I.G. Farbenindustrie. In other cases, German firms have themselves acquired these holdings, with the help of a very favourable rate between the mark and the franc.
In these cases, if the matter is left for settlement after the war, the Germans, having paid francs for some of these holdings, would be able to set up a claim for compensation. The matter should be dealt with in the Armistice terms. I submit that these holdings, acquired by Germany in the course of the war, should be handed over to a body of trustees representing the French people as a whole. It would be undesirable to give them to a body of sequestrators, who would try to find the original holders, the greater part of whom have been paid in francs already. The procedure I have suggested is desired very strongly by the Resistance Movement in France, and by the French authorities in Africa, and it is by the French people as a whole that these holdings were really paid for. The French people are being compelled to pay very large exactions to maintain the German Army of occupation, and indirectly this is the means by which the Germans have acquired their holdings.
There is one other related matter about which I would like to say a few words. I would be very grateful if the Foreign Secretary would inform us about the present state of negotiations for the revision of the agreement made between General Mark Clark and Admiral Darlan, on 22nd November, 1942. There have been protracted negotiations on this subject. The agreement had many conditions which were inevitable at the time but which are no longer applicable when the French are fighting so gallantly at our side in Italy. Some of them resemble the terms that a victorious power would impose on a defeated nation. When the Giraud regime was set up, negotiations were started for a revision, and further negotiations were set on foot when the

French Committee of National Liberation came into being. Negotiations were actually begun in November last, when the British and American Governments accepted the view that the agreement was out of date in the changed circumstances, but they were broken off in January, and I do not think they have been resumed. My suspicion is that they were broken off owing to the question whether the French Committee should be recognised as a Government or not.
I do not wish to enter into that question, which has been dealt with so sympathetically by my hon. Friend the Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson), but I would like to interpose a belief, from my own contacts, that on the French side there is an understanding of the British Government's position in this matter. M. Massigli, for example, in a recent speech in Algiers, explained that, although the British Government had not been able to grant the French Committee the status of a Provisional Government, they had accorded it the prerogatives of a Government, and, in particular, he mentioned that the French Government were allowed to recruit soldiers on British soil for their own Forces, which, after all, is one of the greatest privileges of a Government. So the matter seems to me to be not quite so bad as the hon. Member for West Leicester made out. Although we do not call the French Committee a Government, we do give it many of the prerogatives of a Government.
The Prime Minister dealt, at the end of his speech, with the future organisation of the world. He dealt with it briefly, and I shall deal with it even more briefly, but there is one thing which it is desirable to say. In my opinion, that world unity for which we are hungering will not come about by paper theorising. A great deal of harm can be done by beautiful paper constitutions, for which there is no backing in reality. Any world unity must be founded on the interests of the countries concerned, and I think it will come out of existing institutions. We have, in the course of the war, achieved a great amount of unity already in the United Nations. Many of my hon. Friends are very keen, as I am, to see an international police force, but what many forget is that we have already an international force in existence. There are in the British Forces, Belgians, French, Czech, Dutch, and Polish soldiers, serving with ours,


under the same command. There is in existence a real international force, and it would be a tragedy if, after the war, all that were split up into its component parts. If we are to achieve world unity, it will be through that measure of unity which we now possess.
The leasing of bases is another fruitful idea developed in the course of the war, and it is one that may be of great value in the world of the future. Possibly, the idea of lend-lease is another that will help to bring about unity. On the economic side, I am sure that the sterling area of pre-war days is something that will also help to bring about that close association of the nations of Western Europe with ourselves that is so much desired in so many quarters.
The question of frontiers is very important, and they will have to be settled. I believe Mr. Cordell Hull has said there are about 30 waiting for settlement and they are probably all as potentially dangerous as the Polish Eastern frontier. But our great task, as I see it, is not simply to demark new frontiers, but to make frontiers less important than in the past; we can do that by economic arrangements, such as the sterling area I have mentioned, and if we pursue these questions along these lines, they will probably cease to trouble us to the extent they have done in the past. We are moving into a period when great decisions will have to be taken; it is one of the most thrilling periods in the history of the world in which one could have chosen to live. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary may congratulate themselves that they have the responsibility of handling great affairs in such times; I think we should also congratulate ourselves that such people are here to make the decisions in our name.

Lord Dunglass: The hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. I. Thomas) will forgive me if I give what I hope will be an orderly place to his point in my argument and refer to some of the questions he has raised about the future world organisation for the maintenance of peace. I would like, however, first to congratulate the Government on the outcome of the Dominions Conference. The Prime Minister has come here from a most notable meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers, has come fresh from it and has been able to tell us that they have achieved what

I think is a very impressive unanimity—a unanimity which serves the double purpose of confounding our enemies in the war and heartening our friends, and which shows us to-day that the British Empire is capable of being a potent and benevolent influence in world affairs in the future.
The statement which was issued about agreement on principles which should underlie and govern international and foreign affairs after the war was of deep significance, because, if the Empire countries and ourselves are agreed upon those principles, then it implies two things. One, from the point of view of security, is that we can rely upon the active cooperation of the Dominion countries in foreign affairs in fair weather and in foul after the war; and—let us make no mistake about it—there are going to be many periods of both, and we shall need their co-operation. The other is on the political level: for, such is the way of the world, if we claim influence with America and Russia, then we must have a rough equality of power, and, without the backing of the Empire countries for our foreign policy, that power would fall to pieces. Now, however, we can talk on equal terms.
I wish to refer to a point raised by the Prime Minister when he talked about political developments in Greece and Yugoslavia. Lately, observing things, as I have had to do, from a distance, it has given me great concern to see, in those areas in the Balkans and Mediterranean which have always been rich in political adventurers, how certain figures are written up by the Press, how they bloom for a short time and how, according to their colour of red, pink or blue, they attract the support of different factions in this country. This is a matter of great concern, and it is not a basis on which one can run one's foreign policy. It is quite impossible to do that. It seems to me that there are only two bases on which the Government in this country can deal with countries like Yugoslavia and Greece. First, there are the Governments with which we have had contact, political contact, since the beginning of the war, and we must preserve them and help those Governments to be true representatives of their own countries. The second thing is that there are certain military organisations who are, at the moment, harassing


the Germans. It is our clear duty, and, indeed, it is to our selfish interest, to do all we can to assist them. Sometimes, I am bound to say, I wonder where people collect their information about these curious figures who rise up in these countries. I sometimes think that the Foreign Secretary must wish that he had more information than he has. Certainly, for myself, I am willing to allow the Government to run their foreign policy—which they are doing with some success.
Foreign policy, as the Prime Minister pointed out, must be conditioned by military requirements, but the time is coming, we hope soon, when foreign policy will have to stand on its own legs, and if those legs are to be sound, then a great deal will depend upon a proper reading of the lessons of history and upon a comparative and approximately accurate assessment of political tendencies, particularly on the Continent of Europe. For the last four years I have had very little to do but study these problems, and I cannot say that the lessons of history are particularly encouraging. A study of the nature and history of man, for instance, would give very little ground for the assumption that he had either the ability or the wish to live at peace, but, of course, we must not carry that thesis too far, because it leads to a policy of despair, though to ignore it would be a policy of folly. I think it was the Prime Minister who, in this House earlier in this war, reminded us that Europe alone in these last few years had produced at least two men who would bear favourable comparison with any of the barbarians of the past. What is more sinister to me is that these people attract to their standards other people who are willing to be associated with them in their atrocities. That is a deplorable thing in this so-called twentieth century of civilisation, but it is a thing of which we must take account if we are to be realists. We must realise, I think, that there is no real promise of security in human nature itself.
May I now turn from man the individual to man as organised in society, and to his attempts to live at peace and to organise peace among nations? Such as they are, they are to his credit. But now, we are thrown back upon the theory that, if peace is to be won and achieved, it can only be done if it is backed by power. That may be so, but let us be frank and admit that it is an experiment.

It is true, aeroplanes and guns and tanks may be the foundation for the maintenance of peace, but they are quite certainly the indispensible raw materials for war, and I think we must realise that, during the experimental period, the balance between peace and war will be precarious and the transition from one to another easy and may be abrupt.
Then there are the attempts of countries to live with one another from day to day and in the ordinary foreign relations, and I would like to say -a word about that. There used to be a time when it seemed that the word of a nation, as given to another in treaties, conformed to some moral standard and was an absolute measure by which the intentions of one country to another might be gauged. What is the position now? The last 30 years have been more prolific in treaties and agreements than any other period in history, but the Committee will recollect that the concern of the majority of Governments in that time was much more with finding loopholes in the letter of the agreement than in observing the spirit of it. For myself, I put this collapse in moral values and moral standards in the world at the very foundation of the feeling of lack of confidence and insecurity in Europe to-day, far more so than this frontier or that, far more so than the possession of economic resources for defence. The unhappy thing is that, when the fundamental values are debased, it takes time for them to be restored, and that is why it is absolutely vital that the great Allies should be honest in their public relations with each other and in their relations with smaller countries dependent on them.
My last item is the condition of Europe as it will emerge after the defeat of Hitler. Without going into any details it is perfectly clear that it is going to be a cauldron of suspicion, civil war and revolt. There is no security there. Hon. Members may think that I have been too much concerned to prove this state of insecurity, and there is, of course, a brighter side, but my concern leads to two conclusions. First of all, there is no foundation, in morals or in facts, upon which you can surely build a collective peace system on the model of the League of Nations at the present time. That must be a slow organic process, and the best that you can hope for at present is to maintain order by military supervision.
There simply is not, at the moment, the necessary minimum of confidence on which a big international organisation could be built. Unless this basic insecurity is realised, and unless its implications are accepted, by the people of this country, it is my personal fear that our energies will be diverted and our sentiments harnessed to planning an international authority so that a Government in the post-war world will only get the most grudging consent for the defence plan which is vital to our security. I want the Government to tell the people that, if that were to happen, we shall be unable to shift the burden of our own defence on to the shoulders of others—and that a security plan must have first priority on important man-power and money and materials and all our resources. My anxieties are not exactly without reason. I have come fresh from going round the country lately and talking at meetings on the new security problems raised by the increased technical development in air power, and I have found that, particularly among the younger people who have stayed at home, and there are many of them in the mining areas and in agriculture, there is little realisation of the effort that will be required of the country if it is to maintain itself in security. Only the other day I was talking over these problems, and some of the new problems which the war has brought about, with a young man, who said, "That will be all right; we have no need to worry about that; it will be looked after for us by an international Air Force." When I questioned the wisdom of that he argued with me not on the basis that I was half-witted, which I could have understood and appreciated, but as though I had been guilty of some disloyalty.
I want to say a word about the question of divided loyalty as between the claims of an international world authority and the interests of one's own country. It is a false dilemma; I do not believe it exists. The Foreign Secretary will understand, when I use the argument which I am going to use, that it is quite impersonal. I take his position and the position of his office. The Foreign Secretary in war-time, in his foreign policy, has to conform to military requirements, but in peace-time, it is my strong conviction

that, subject to a code of international morality, his business is so to arrange the foreign relations on the highest political level that he obtains the maximum degree of security for his own country. He is British Foreign Secretary first; whatever other position he may hold in world councils is a secondary affair. There is this House of Commons. We have a world contact which gives us world responsibility, but if there is any conflict between the claims of a world authority and the interests of our own country, I do not need to ask where our duty lies. There is no option; of course, we represent our own people. It is important that we here in this House of Commons should make this clear, because the people will follow us, and unless we do so, we shall have a revival of that anaemic internationalism which we knew between the wars and to which I fondly hope that Russia has now given the coup de grace. We shall have a revival of the mentality of the peace ballot and we shall have the resurrection of those people who never tire of telling us that every country was in the right except our own.

Dr. Haden Guest: Does the hon. Member consider that the statement of the Prime Minister about the setting-up of a world authority, armed with power to preserve the peace of the world, is a form of anaemic internationalism?

Lord Dunglass: I want to make clear that we are in an experimental stage. I think that the hon. Member will agree that this whole conception of international organisation backed with power is new. It is experimental. We have no guarantee whatever that it will succeed; we have no guarantee even that the three countries who have the power at their disposal will be able to live at peace with each other. We hope so, but we do not know. Meanwhile, I am pleading for a security plan for ourselves which will enable us to meet every situation whether this international organisation for peace fails or succeeds.
I want to say a word about the plan raised particularly by the hon. Member for Keighley. The information that I have given, I think constitutionalists will agree with me, is true of every country, every foreign office and every legislative assembly, and that only on the basis of


home-based security and a feeling of confidence can you get the necessary detached and disinterested to play an impartial part in a wider world organisation. Home-based security must come first. I come to the point made by the hon. Member for Keighley about a world organisation and about a security plan for this country. In the last Debate upon Empire affairs almost every hon. Member concentrated on the need for a security plan. I was glad to see it. It is half-way to creating a public opinion which is willing to defend itself, and that is half-way to security. I do not think that it is possible or desirable to produce a detailed security defence plan at the present moment, and I only express the hope that the Government have been able to give the necessary data to the military planning authorities on which they may get their defence plan ready.
I want to look at some of the governing elements which will help us to decide the shape and the scope of it. It has been pointed out that a great Power, if it wishes to protect its people and its possessions, must command certain assets. There is man-power, raw material, industrial capacity, and last—and the one with which I particularly want to deal—there is depth in defence in terms of modern air power. The cases of America and Russia are instructive in this connection. The last of these requirements is causing them much concern; it is driving each of them into a policy of expansion. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) has just come in, and I think he raised this point in a previous Debate. They are both going in for a policy of expansion. Their methods are different but their goal is the same, and it is, to obtain depth in defence. I do not think that I need give a detailed example. Russia has already annexed the Baltic States; she asks for a great slice of Poland; Rumania has made a contribution; she will have military agreements with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; and she may make further demands on Finland. I am not criticising, but stating the facts. Here is a policy of expansion and that is the reason for it. Similarly, America has taken over a portion of Greenland. She has bases in the West Indies. She has declared that the West coast of Africa is essential for her security, and there are her oil interests in Arabia.

The only question is: how far will she go? The tendency is absolutely clear.
What of ourselves? For ourselves there are two immediate aspects of this question. There are two areas where, as the hon. Member for Altrincham (Sir E. Grigg) put it in a previous Debate, we might be "Pearl-Harboured" in a night; one our bases in the Eastern Mediterranean and the other in this Island. There are the immediate problems in the Mediterranean European orbit. The other is the political problem I mentioned earlier which the Prime Ministers' Conference has gone a long way to solve, namely, that if we are to exercise equal influence with America and Russia we must have a rough equality of power. In America and Russia, certain of the requirements I have mentioned, man-power, industrial capacity and raw material, are self-sufficing. Our two problems lie mostly in the realm of supplementing our man-power and of supplementing this deficiency in depth of defence in these two areas. We have certain reserves of strength. There is the Empire. We can count on that, but let us consider that the numbers even of this country and the Empire put together would not enable us to meet attack from a first-class European Power. There is this additional point that in modern war, with the technical developments repeatedly made, there may be a time lag between the mobilisation of the Empire for war which might be fatal to ourselves.
My conclusion is that we must supplement, if we can, our Empire power. An almost ideal solution would be if the Americans agreed to integrate their defence policy absolutely with our own. Again, I feel that we have been successful in our relations with the Americans and I feel pretty sure of their co-operation after the war, but it is the degree of their co-operation of which I am uncertain. They will probably wish to draw the line of their defence system inside a circle which we would consider would give the best defence for ourselves. Therefore, I come to the conclusion again, that even if we get American co-operation, we should supplement it by some regional security system in Western Europe. I have a strong preference, if there is to be some such regional system, that it should be cemented by specific military treaty.
I prefer that to federation, and for this reason. Europe, if it likes—and it would


be a good thing—can federate itself, and again the right hon. Member for Devonport the other day mentioned an economic federation. That would give Europe strength and cohesion but it would not give it enough to meet an emergency. I do not want to see this country take part in the organisation of a European federation for the reason that it would be too abrupt a departure in British foreign policy at the present time. I prefer, therefore, specific military agreements which aim at a closely unified defence scheme between this country and the countries facing us over the Channel and lining the shore of the North Sea. That seems to me to fit in as the logical development of our foreign policy, as we have run it since the beginning of this century, and to be in keeping with the development of our military policy. We have always tried with our limited land forces to combine them to the best advantage with our incomparable naval power, and now with our air power. The advantage of a regional plan of this kind with Norway and with Denmark, Belgium, Holland and France would be that it would enable us to assume commitments which we could undertake and fulfil.
These military agreements and treaties would have to give as well as gain advantages. They must be mutually agreed between these countries. For my purpose it is enough to consider the advantages at the moment which we in this country would gain. They would give us the necessary geographical depth in defence and the additional manpower which would be right on the spot to hold the fort until the arrival of the big battalions of the Empire and America.
The Foreign Secretary if he wished to be the architect for such a scheme would meet with great difficulties at the present time. He has to deal with exile Governments who have not the ultimate authority in their own country, and I would not ask him to do anything impossible. But if he can indicate at the end of the Debate the kind of political framework within which a military scheme could be laid down, I think it would be of assistance to us. Until lately I would have resisted any claim to a closer definition of our foreign policy. There is one over-riding reason now why we should have some closer definition of

our post-war policy. The objections to such a scheme of Western regional alliance in Europe bring up two objections. One is that it is a revival of power politics. All I can say is that power politics are ruling the world at the present time.
The other is much more serious, that it would run counter to the interests of Russia and would, eventually, lead to a clash between Russia and ourselves. I believe that is absolutely false reasoning. I believe we could achieve this regional Western European pact with Russia's approval, and that there would be nothing in it to which they could object. Two things are necessary in our dealings with Russia. The one is absolutely clear speaking upon moral issues when they arise and when we differ, and the other is to make absolutely clear to Russia, beyond doubt, where our vital interests lie in Europe. If they know where our vital interests lie then the Russians are realists enough not to run up against them, but, if they do not know, there might be danger of a clash.
I am grateful to the Government for giving us the opportunity of this Debate on foreign affairs. I hope there will be more and that we shall have a Debate upon our own organisation in this country which deals with foreign affairs at some time, but, in the meantime, I would like very much to congratulate, as I did at the beginning, the Prime Minister on the outcome of the Dominions Conference which puts the Empire behind our foreign policy. This is an immense help and of deep significance.

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: In common with many of those who sit on these benches, I have listened to the speech from the Noble Lord the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) with a great deal of misgiving, for reasons that I shall adumbrate later when I come to consider the formation of the machinery for post-war security. But before I come to that, there are other matters on which I wish to touch. I rise in this Debate with a great sense of responsibility. The subject matter of our foreign relations, both during the war and after the cessation of hostilities, is one of supreme importance. The time of our discussion is significant, being as it is on the eve of the opening of a new chapter in the struggle. Decisions taken by the Government now on foreign


policy may have an important bearing both on the character and length of the struggle, and on the stability of the peace which follows it. My sense of responsibility is increased by the fact that I speak not only for myself but, so far as I am able to reflect them, for the views of my party. My party yield to none in their faith in the British Commonwealth, which has so magnificently stood the test of these terrible years. Without any legal ties or binding Constitution, it has faced the common peril, with common ideals and common purpose, and its members have exhibited a loyalty to one another which is unsurpassed in the whole history of the world. Not only during, but after, the war we shall welcome any applications of friendly association which commend themselves to all sections of the Commonwealth, and we hope that the Commonwealth will be extended to include, as the Prime Minister said only the other day, the great Asiatic sub-continent of India and also the Colonies, in so far as they fit themselves for self-governing status.
But when we say that we shall welcome applications of friendly association, I want to make this one proviso. It is that this association shall be inclusive and not exclusive, that it shall permit of the closest relationship possible with our partners in the war, particularly with the great Republic of the United States and the great confederation of Republics the U.S.S.R., and also with the great Asiatic country of China, which, during this tremendously long-continued struggle, has shown the utmost fortitude, resource and determination. This must be extended still further to cover the other friends that we have throughout the world. This view, that it must be an inclusive and not an exclusive association, has been reinforced by the statements put out by the Prime Ministers and, in particular, by what was said by Field-Marshal Smuts in his speech at the end of last week. These were his words:
But let there he nothing exclusive about it and let it not exclude close collaboration with Russia. Thus would arise a triple bulwark—i.e., including the United States of America—of the great Powers against aggression.
Mr. Mackenzie King used these words:
If at the end of hostilities the strength and unity of the Commonwealth are to be maintained, these things will be achieved not by policies which are exclusive, but by policies which can be shared with other nations.

With these sentiments my party is in full agreement. This, indeed, must be so, because while it would be possible for the United States to take a somewhat isolationist view—the United States of America stretches from one great ocean to another—and while it might be possible for Russia to take an exclusive view—it is a colossus which stretches across two Continents—the British Commonwealth and Empire extend to every one of the Seven Seas and it has territories in five out of the six great Continents of the world. Therefore, only in association with the rest of the world can we hope to obtain peace and security for ourselves and our Colonies. We cannot isolate ourselves from world war because our interests are so closely bound up with those of the world that we must be part and parcel of its fortunes.
I come, in the next place, to the question of the resurrection of Europe. First, during the war we have, if the adventure on which we are shortly to commence succeeds, a tremendous problem in the restoration of the life and freedom of the occupied countries as they become liberated from the yoke of the aggressor. As to this I would only say that we must refuse no sacrifice that will help to restore, at the earliest possible moment, the life and liberty of those peoples who have been up till now overrun. They have been bearing the most terrible privations, and they will require the utmost help and consideration. It is of supreme importance that we should so arrange the government of those countries, as they are freed, that they can obtain adequate material resources for their food, their clothing and their shelter, in so far as it is possible to give them, and we must be most careful that no financial considerations block that advance. Above all, we must not only restore their material prosperity, but, in so far as it has been impaired, we must restore their self-respect. I am sure that is of extreme importance.
When the war comes to an end Europe must not merely be restored; it must be placed on a sounder foundation than it ever had before. Europe is an integral unit which has never been realised since the days of the Roman Empire. It is one of the curses of the Nazi ideology that there is often a germ of truth in some of the ideas which they have most gravely prostituted. Such an idea was that of


a united Europe, and because Hitler has besmirched it with his horrible Gestapo methods that is no reason why we should not cleanse it from the mud flung over it and ennoble it as one of the great pillars of future civilisation. The integrity of Europe, translated into actual fact, may mean some derogation from absolute sovereignty, and that can only happen if the component States of Europe voluntarily accept it. But I believe that such acceptance is essential if we are not to see once again a Balkanised Europe in a worse form than before.
I am not visualising some fancy paper creation of a confederation of Europe, but some friendly arrangement for mutual sustenance and succour and, to this extent, I am quite prepared to go with the Noble Lord who spoke before me in welcoming regional associations which will help towards that end. Some of the countries in Europe will, I hope, bend towards the British Empire. Some may bend towards Russia. I hope, also, that we may have throughout Europe democratic Governments. I listened with care to what the Prime Minister said and I was glad to hear him say, of course, that we would not tolerate undemocratic Governments in the enemy countries. I think he went too far when he was dealing with the non-enemy countries. I can quite understand that it is not for the British Empire or the Government of this country to go crusading and tilting at all kinds of persons who may not fulfil our ideas of democracy, but that is not to say that we should in the future connive at the destruction of democratic Government as we did in the days before the war.
The next question I come to is, What part is Germany going to play in this reconstituted Europe? It is not necessary to subscribe to the exaggerated views, which I believe are belied by history, that Germany has been the aggressor all down the Christian era. That I believe to be absolutely false. It is not necessary, I say, to subscribe to that view to realise the grave crime, the most hideous probably in all history, that has been committed by the German rulers at the present time, for which the instigators must be punished. I do not think anyone with any sense wants to be easy or soft with the German rulers. They will have to be punished for their crime, and the German

people as a whole will have to suffer the consequences of steps taken in their name. The innocent as well as the guilty will suffer, the innocent probably more than the guilty; those who stood out even more than the others because, being more sensitive, they will feel the punishment greater. Perhaps the greatest punishment of all that will fall on the German people is the environment of hatred with which they will be surrounded after what has been done by them and in their name during this war.
Fear and hatred are both very natural human qualities. To some extent they may not be bad things, but fear and hatred are unwise counsellors and worse masters, and if we allow our reason to be clouded by fear or hatred we shall not take the course most suitable for ourselves. Before the war, not only throughout Europe as a whole but inside this country, fear of war played a very large part in bringing war about, and it was the purpose and the design of the Nazi and Fascist régimes to create that fear throughout Europe; just as the beasts of the field make a loud noise to terrorise and paralyse their future prey. Equally there may be a danger of allowing hatred to decide the issue. As I have said, I have no desire, and I do not think any sensible person has, to be soft with Germany, but the most important thing of all is to prevent a recurrence of this horrible outrage, and therefore Germany will have to be subject to external restraint for a considerable number of years after the war is over—what, in the case of a private individual, would be called preventive detention. That will have to go on until she has lived down the hatred which surrounds her at the present time. Precisely what form that will take will have to be worked out when the time comes.
Now with regard to reparations. When the reparations scheme was worked out at the end of the last war and the first figures were put out, I said to myself "Cela ne marchera pas"—"That will not work." I knew it would not work. I did not know what would happen but, in fact, those ridiculous reparations were the cause of a very large part of the financial disasters of Europe in the years that followed the war and we must have no repetition of that kind of thing. We must be very careful about this, too. If we


set Germany to do the work, if it is suggested for a moment that the other nations shall sit around supinely watching Germany do the work, this is what will happen. The German people, with all their faults, are an industrious, original, vigorous people and we shall have to be careful that they do not get control of all the means of production in their country, in which case they would fit themselves more for a repetition of the struggle than they have done before. Therefore, I find myself in very full agreement with the statement which appears in the Labour Party's manifesto with regard to the post-war settlement which says that, so far as reparations are concerned, they ought to be of a character which will work themselves out in five or six years. I think that is a very sound and sensible suggestion—instead of hanging a millstone round the necks of the German people, which was partly responsible for the European disasters that took place after the last war.
Now I come to the mechanism of security. I find myself in considerable agreement with the speech of the Prime Minister, with this proviso, that in my opinion—and I think it is the opinion of those who sit behind me—the old League of Nations could have been made to work. It did not work not because of the failure of its machinery but because of the failure of the men who ought to have been able to use it. There was a lack of courage in the nations, and I am afraid that was reflected in those who were governing this country at the time, and they failed to use the machinery and to give the lead which the world looked for in working this out. I was not thinking so much of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, because, to do him credit, there came a time when he realised that his colleagues were failing in their duty and he came out from the Government at the time.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I am most interested in the remarks of my right hon. Friend, but the reflection which was passing through my mind was that the trouble with the League was that our membership was weak, and the very great powers of co-operation needed were not there.

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: I am not denying the defects of the League, and I quite

appreciate the point which the right hon. Gentleman has made, that there was not a strong membership of the League. That is quite true. Nevertheless, I am still of the opinion that had there been sufficient courage, the action taken by the Duce could have been prevented by the existing powers of the League. However, that is all past history. I agree with the Prime Minister that we should have the League brought up to date. Let us have it with new powers, added strength, and then I hope we will secure a more universal if not a fully universal membership, and that at any rate the United States, Russia and China, will all be parties to it.
Now I am coming to the point made by the Noble Lord the Member for Lanark to which I take exception. He asked us to imagine a position in which the Foreign Secretary had two conflicting interests, one that of his own country and the other that of the world; how would he choose? He suggested that we should all say, "Throw the world over and consider the selfish interests of our own country." I do not think the real dilemma is correctly stated. I do not believe that the vital, wise interests of this country can ever conflict with the interests of the world as a whole. If this country, for its own apparent immediate, selfish ends, sets out upon a course which is contrary to the interests of the world as a whole, it is doomed to failure. It is only through the interests of the world, and through always putting those in the first place, that this country can be wisely directed in its own interests. Therefore, I disagree entirely with the conclusion which the Noble Lord reached; and I would go further. He said, "Let us have regional military commitments with some of the countries in Western Europe," and to those commitments he proposes to look for the salvation of the future. It was because we looked to those, and to those alone, that we failed at the outbreak of this war.

Lord Dunglass: I made it absolutely clear that this was to be supplementary to Dominion and American backing, both of which I resolutely counted upon.

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: I quite appreciate the point; the Noble Lord need not have interrupted, because I did not say anything different from that. What he did say was that we are not to think of the interests of the whole world, we are to subordinate those—

Lord Dunglass: rose—

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence: I do not want to put it too strongly. He did pose the issue that the selfish interests of this country might conflict with those of the world; that we had to put our own selfish interest first; and that, if we had that backing, instead of putting our whole strength and weight on the world mechanism we should put it on this regional organisation of the western Powers in Europe, and that that would see us through. It would not. That is just what we had before and it failed, and it would fail again.
Now I want to come to the economic future. In the first place with regard to aviation, military aviation is quite clearly one of those things which must be supervised by the world States if we are to prevent a recurrence of this war. My own view is that we shall have to have something in the nature of an international inspectorate to see that countries do not surreptitiously build military aircraft. But that is not enough. Civil aviation, quite clearly, must also be recognised as part of a great international scheme. The party for which I speak is a Socialist Party, and we are Socialists because we believe that unless the State controls certain big activities, those big trusts will control the State. Now precisely what happens in what is commonly called the municipal position of the State applies to the world as a whole. Unless some international authority controls the great aircraft trunk routes, then the owners of those aircraft—whether a nation or private individuals—will tend to control the policy of the world. That is a danger to which we are fully alive. But that is not all. Great combines, cartels and all sorts of trade associations are spreading from one country to another, and they also will exercise powers over the lives of individuals and powers over the Governments of nations unless steps are taken to prevent it. We in the Labour Party are out to prevent that taking place.
Finally, we are determined that there shall be welfare for all. We have to start at home and in our own Colonies. We can no longer permit poverty and destitution to be rife in our midst. We are going to start at home and we hope that, through the organisation of the International Labour Office, we shall extend

those improvements that we make here and in our Colonies to the whole world. If we do that, I think we may use, slightly changed, the words spoken by the great Pitt, about the War against Napoleon, and say: "In the military, the political, and the economic spheres, the British Commonwealth has saved itself by its exertions and the world by its example."

Mr. Edgar Granville: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) would agree that the speech of the Noble Lord the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) who preceded him was one of the most interesting speeches to which we have listened for some time. I shall be expressing the opinion of the whole Committee in welcoming the Noble Lord back restored in health, and we shall look forward to renewed contributions of the same calibre from him on foreign affairs. He referred to a question which has been in the minds of most of us, that any international set-up or co-operation in the future must have force behind it, and, as one distinguished Dominion statesman has said, it must have teeth. There is another side of this, however, to which I thought he would refer in his interesting discourse. One of the tragedies of international co-operation before the war was that there were different Governments in office in different countries of different complexions. One of the difficulties was that there were a Left Government in France and a Right Government in this country, or vice versa, and that was one of the problems in reaching political agreement on international arrangements. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary, with his unrivalled experience of Geneva, when he is listening to these Debates casts his mind back to the early days of the experiment of the League of Nations. He must often reflect that, in the end, you can only achieve that about which you can get agreement. You can have the finest leadership, you can go to Geneva with the right policy, but you are not going there as one Power but as one of 66 Powers, and if among the other 65 there are those who disagree with your policy, you can only try to get them to accept it by being persuasive and showing strong leadership. If you cannot get them to accept it by this means, and you wish to insist upon your policy, then the only way you can get it is to use the bayonet


—and that is of course unilateral action and not international co-operation.
I was interested in what the Noble Lord said about the future of the Foreign Office. During recent years a considerable change has taken place inside the Foreign Office, both as regards its functions and its handling of policy. In some of the great Cabinets of the last century foreign affairs were very much the responsibility of one man, the Foreign Minister. After the last war almost every Foreign Secretary was presented with what is called the pro-French thesis of Anglo-French co-operation involving staff talks in some form or another, and tried to get it through the Cabinet. The Foreign Secretary who got nearest to its expression was Sir Austen Chamberlain, with his Locarno Treaty. But now foreign affairs have become a question of Cabinet responsibility, and I sometimes think, when one hears a certain amount of criticism of the policy, confined to one man, that we ought to remember that foreign policy is to-day not the province of the Foreign Secretary alone but is, in effect, the responsibility of the whole War Cabinet. The hon. Member for Lanark also referred to the fact that the Foreign Office will have to take a greater interest in questions of economic policy. Some years ago there was some criticism that the Foreign Office was in danger of becoming a post office, as the Department of Overseas Trade and the Treasury extended their powers. I think we ought to pay a tribute to such men as Sir Victor Wellesley, who pioneered in the early days, and was responsible for setting up, in the Foreign Office, a Political Economic Department, which proved of tremendous help, and does to-day at the Ministry for Economic Warfare. More and more then it becomes axiomatic that the Foreign Secretary will have to collect around him, as it were, a bureau of experts to constitute, in a sense, almost a small foreign affairs cabinet, to deal not only with the tremendous issues on international finance, economics and armaments but also what the Prime Minister described to-day as questions of machinery for collective security.
The Prime Minister took us on a delightful tour throughout 33 United Nations today. I think he cleared the air somewhat with regard to Turkey and Yugoslavia, but I must confess that when he came to Spain, I got the impression that he was

addressing, if not the Consevative Conference, the "Diehards" of his own party. I must agree with what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence) inferred, that what the Prime Minister said about our tolerant attitude to General Franco is far from being new, although I would like to see it in HANSARD, because I am certain that this statement of policy will have to be carefully examined to see its full implications. Listening to the speech of the Prime Minister, I wondered how much of it was the Prime Minister and how much of it was the Foreign Secretary, or whether the speech was a hybrid. This is not only a Debate on foreign affairs; it is the first opportunity the Prime Minister has had of reporting upon the results achieved at the meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers. But before I come to that I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary a question with regard to the shooting of 47 Royal Air Force officers in a German prison camp. Last night the B.B.C. broadcast the information that the Air Ministry repudiated a story that had been published the same day by the "Daily Express," and I would like to ask whether that means that the Air Ministry have in their possession more authentic information than the Foreign Secretary has been able to give so far to the House. When the right hon. Gentleman replies to the Debate tomorrow I hope that if he has anything further to convey on this fresh statement we shall be told of it.
As I have just said, the Prime Minister was reporting to-day on the result of the Dominions Conference which he referred to as a "meeting of minds" or a concerting of plans for the final overthrow of Germany and Japan. I would like to add to the congratulations which have been extended to the Prime Minister, not only for having brought together this Conference—better late than never—but because the success of the Conference owes much to the influence and great personality of the right hon. Gentleman. I think the House of Commons would like to pay a tribute to him for that. The right hon. Gentleman gave us some information as to what happened. I would call it an inspiring defence of the status quo, including plans for international co-operation. Unless there is more we can be told later when all the Dominion Prime Ministers reach home, I would say that


many problems have been left to a future Imperial Conference after the war to decide. I am disappointed; I hoped that this question of improving the machinery for consultation would be dealt with by the Conference on this occasion. I read carefully the statements which have been made by the various Prime Ministers who have taken part and it seems to me that we are still prone to look at world events in blinkers. In fact, we are living in an age of large scale organisation and the influence of vast areas such as the Russian Empire and the American Continent, but from the beginning to the end of the Conference all the statements that were made followed on the same line as the Prime Minister's speech in the Mansion House, when he said he had not become His Majesty's first Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.
There is not one spark of new vision of Empire in any of the declarations made to the world as a result of this meeting. We need more than Kipling and an occasional conference if we are to find something solid to replace the old imperialism which has gone. Whether the House likes it or not, this new conception of a democratic Commonwealth—and on this occasion I am not referring in any way to the party led by the hon. Baronet the Member for Barnstaple (Sir R. Acland)—will come. It will come because it is in tune with the 20th century and its ideas, and with the young people who are fighting this war. This new conception of Commonwealth, this more effective machinery for closer co-operation, this idea of concerted policy making between the members of the British Commonwealth, will come perhaps when Canada, or public opinion in Canada, realises that this idea is the counterpart of independence and not the old imperialism dressed up in some other Whitehall clothes. The Dominions must have a voice in the actual making and forming of foreign policy. Maybe the method is for the High Commissioners representing the Dominions to be made very High Commissioners, able to meet the Cabinet on a ministerial level on all questions of foreign, Dominion and Colonial affairs.
The question of security has been the keynote of this Debate and although I realise that a great deal of thought has been given to this matter I do not think

we have gone far enough. It may be that even with the addition of force behind international co-operation, it cannot be completely effective in the new world. I do not think that the British Empire could stand another Singapore misconception of defence. What does that mean? It means that in planning our Empire dispositions on security in future the Committee of Imperial Defence must be more than a body of Whitehall chiefs. What is called I believe the 10-year rule must not apply to industrial war potential. It means that the Committee of Imperial Defence must take into consideration the whole question of industrial strategy and the decentralisation of aircraft and armament production. Surely one of the lessons of Singapore is that if the British Commonwealth of Nations, or the British Empire, as the Prime Minister called it, is to continue to organise, as a unit, its own defence, it is no good starting off with concrete docks at Singapore or a number of tanks and warships and feeling that you are secure. On the Prime Minister's definition an aggressor, provided that he remains under the guise of neutrality, can make his preparations at any time and attack the British Empire at the weakest possible point. He gets three or four years' start.
Our problem in the Pacific was getting fighter aircraft on tramp steamers to try to give air cover to our troops. You cannot have any system of international co-operation unless you have decentralised your war potential so that you can have a nucleus of production available in each strategical area. It cost this country months, almost years, before we could finally come to close grips with the main enemy. Therefore if you are going to co-operate as a Commonwealth unit in a larger system of world councils, the first and the basic thing that you have to do—and the Dominion Prime Ministers and representatives of the Empire will have to face this sooner or later—is not to rely alone on your guns and tanks and airfields but so to organise your industry and economic co-operation that it dovetails into your Commonwealth trade arrangements and is part of your Empire planning as a whole.
On the last occasion when the Prime Minister addressed Parliament on this subject he criticised me because I said the world was one and indivisible. So it is, if you fly in an aeroplane and regard it


from the air, as Sir Walter Layton said in his interesting Sunday Postcript. The Australian Prime Minister said the other day that he hoped there was going to be a tremendous development of civil aviation and a concerted plan for the British Commonwealth of Nations. He also said that you must build up this system of air communication so that the ordinary common people of our lands can travel simply and easily throughout the Empire. Let us have these visits between the ordinary people of our country so that they can get to know each other in peace as well as war. Official party delegations, when they go on these visits and are given lunches and receptions, get nowhere. I ask hon. Members to talk to the young Dominion pilots who are flying bombers into the heart of Germany and ask them what ideas they have for the future. They have new ideas. Are you going to give them an opportunity in this country and in the British Commonwealth, to find expression for these new ideas, or are they going to find the response in America?
I believe that is the choice we shall have to face sooner or later. The Prime Minister has saved the traditions which came from the 19th century. As a result of this war, we may give the 20th century another chance to find its way. I am appealing for the beliefs of the young men in this war to find their way into Government policy, and I am appealing for the young nations of the Commonwealth and the Dominions, that their ideas on the future of the world shall find their way to the highest level of Ministerial policy on Dominion and foreign affairs. One of our tragedies is that after the last war the old men again took charge of the direction of policy. The result is a tragic repetition of history. I listened with great interest to the Prime Minister's idea of setting up a system of universal co-operation. I am pleading, in a world in which America and the Russian Empire have great power, that the British Commonwealth shall act as a democratic and concerted Federation or delegation. I am appealing to the Government to consider, at a future Empire Conference at the end of the war, the setting up of a Commonwealth Council in London. I look to this as a steppingstone to world government and eventual world peace.

Captain Grey: These two days of Debate can be amongst

the most important of the war, for they are concerned not only with our international relations as they are now but as we hope and intend them to be in that difficult period after Germany has been defeated militarily and we are faced with the simultaneous problem of crushing Japan and laying the foundation of an international authority under which all nations can enjoy the benefits of the Atlantic Charter with some assurance of a lasting and just peace. I was all the more delighted, therefore, when I learned that the Prime Minister himself was going to open the Debate and I looked forward to hearing him fresh from his deliberations with his Dominions colleagues lay before the Committee what would, in effect, be a united statement of the aims and intentions of our Commonwealth and Empire in the post-war world. The need for such a statement has been of growing and increasing urgency for many months, and it is a truism that there is no other individual in the Commonwealth so suited to the task. One may indeed say of him what John Selden said of Sir Robert Shirley in the days of our Civil War:
whose singular praise it is to have done the best things in the worst times and hoped them in the most calamitous.
What I want to appeal to the Leader of the House to do to-morrow and the Prime Minister on some other occasion is to lay before the world our intentions and aspirations with the eloquence and vigour of 1940. I am persuaded that there is as much need now as there ever was four years ago for the world to be quite clear what Britain and our Commonwealth stand for and we must be quite precise in revealing our ambitions. It was no particularly courageous act in 1940 for the Prime Minister to state that we intended to continue the battle till it ended in the defeat of Germany, for the whole country was behind him. Only people abroad could have imagined for one moment that we might give in. When we were alone, we were free to make our own decisions and say what we liked. It requires, however, infinitely greater courage when surrounded by Allies to continue to hold and maintain the same ideals as when alone, but I believe that it is essential that we should do so.
What, then, are the ideals and aspirations with which Britain went to war and has been waging war? The right hon.


Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) said two months ago that we went to war for the principle of negotiation as opposed to a fait accompli or force majeure, and that is undoubtedly one of cur aims but we also need to state equally clearly our other aims and intentions. It does not matter if they have to be modified afterwards in consultation with our Allies. Parliament and the country fully realise that when we are one of a large alliance we cannot get everything we want, but it is alarming to find that after four years of war we ourselves have no clear idea of what it is that our country stands for, and the ignorance of foreign countries about us under these circumstances is understandable.
It is obvious that peace no less than war has its strategic foundations, but I disagree with a very great deal of what the Noble Lord the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) said. It seems to me that the interests of this country and the Commonwealth are quite clear. Alone among all the other Powers we have possessions throughout the whole world. We are therefore in the unique position of having to regard threats to peace in any quarter of the globe as a direct threat to s. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that we should get an international authority with, as Sir Walter Layton said the other night, "teeth" in it. I am quite persuaded that if it is difficult to get agreement among the United Nations to produce this international authority now when we are at war and united against Germany it is going to be infinitely more difficult in time of peace, when our bonds of union are slackened by lack of a common aim. One of the most vital necessities for our defence after the war is not only a question of weapons and men but of getting the moral leadership of the world. If you look at the 19th century, superficially I suppose our strength lay in possessing the most powerful fleet in the world and the largest industry, but in addition a large amount of our influence lay in the fact that we were known everywhere as the champions of democracy and political liberty.
If we are to influence the world after this war it is not solely a mechanical problem of providing our Commonwealth and Empire with adequate defence. That

problem is not the main difficulty for it can be solved industrially and is largely a question of organisation. We need in addition both a world international authority and British influence and power on our own doorstep, West Europe. This is undoubtedly the last war that we can fight as an island Power. We were saved in 1940 not by our own exertions alone but also by the Channel. In 10 years' time the latter will afford about as much protection as the Rhine did to France in 1940. It runs entirely against the traditions of our foreign policy to become actively committed on the Continent, but I believe we have to realise once and for all that we are now a Continental Power to all intents and purposes, and not only a Continental Power but the one whose leadership since 1940 has done most to inspire occupied Europe. I do not suppose there has ever been a time when we have potentially been so great an influence as we are at present in Western Europe. I appeal to the Leader of the House and to the Government to try to take a lead in producing the ideals and mechanics of a policy for West Europe as a whole. It is of the utmost importance that if we are to have a policy for Europe our relations with our Western European Allies during the war should be on the closest possible terms.
Here I would back up the speech of the hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson) on the subject of France. I find it extremely difficult not to be indiscreet on the subject and I have spent a considerable time in wondering how to phrase what I want to say tactfully. It does seem to me necessary that we should recognise the French National Committee in Algiers as the Provisional Government of France. I am not going to accuse Washington or the Foreign Secretary or any particular person or country of being the cause of recognition being so far withheld. There seems to me only one possible reason why it has so far been withheld. This is where the need for tact comes in. If one studies the situation in French North Africa and if one meets some of our French Allies, one has occasionally, as a democrat, cause for anxiety. I have no doubt that many well-meaning people who do not desire to give recognition to the Provisional Government fear that, when it returns to France with an


Army behind its back, it may impose an authoritarian regime on the country.
I know also the argument that French North Africa is not France and that the strength of the Provisional Government is at present of necessity largely in the Colonies. But it seems to me, if that argument is true—and I do not believe it—that the one way to strengthen the millions of Frenchmen who believe in democracy is to recognise the present Provisional Government. If we do not do so anybody in France who dislikes democratic institutions can say that the reason why we refused recognition was that we, being in a dominant position, did not want to see a strong France rise again. That sort of argument is being made in France today. Field-Marshal Smuts's speech is quoted by Goebbels, and the whole time, we have this great nation, reborn under most terrible suffering in this war, with its nerves very raw, having anti-British propaganda pumped into it by Vichy, which it is vital that we should contradict. I believe that if we recognise the French National Committee as the Provisional Government of France the commonsense and patriotism of Frenchmen will see to it that we get a democratic France. I ant very far from being persuaded that the majority of the National Committee—

Whereupon, the YEOMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD being come with a Message, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair.

Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.

Orders of the Day — ROYAL ASSENT

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.

The House went; and, having returned—

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Consolidated Fund (No. 3) Act, 1944.
2. Pensions (Increase) Act, 1944.
3. Police and Firemen (War Service) Act, 1944.
4. Edinburgh Merchant Company Endowments (Amendment) Order Confirmation Act, 1944.
5. Connah's Quay Gas Act, 1944.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

Again considered in Committee.

Question again proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £40, be granted to His Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the following services relating to Foreign Affairs and the foreign policy of this country and the Dominions, for the year ending on the 3rst day of March, 1945:

Class I, Vote 4, Treasury and Subordinate Departments
£10


Class II, Vote 1, Foreign Office
£10


Class II, Vote 3, League of Nations
£10


Class II, Vote 4, Dominions Office
£10



£40"

Captain Grey: I want to ask again that the National Committee of Liberation in Algiers be recognised by us, if necessary unilaterally, as the Provisional Government of France. There are many provisos we can make to see that an authoritarian régime is not imposed upon the French people. We can make recognition conditional on the holding of free elections once the French prisoners of war have been returned from Germany when the war is over. When we have destroyed Germany in Europe we have not only to make certain of our own influence, but we have to make use of that fine reservoir of French culture that permeates throughout the whole of Europe. I am sure that after the experience of 1940 and the subsequent years France will recover with a rapidity that will surprise us to-morrow as it surprised us in 1871–72. The Noble Lord the Member for Lanark advocated security in Western Europe through a system of alliances, but it seems quite clear to me that the failure of alliances, as opposed to some such aim as federation, is that many small Western European countries have proved incapable of standing on their own economically, and were therefore bound in the end to be dominated by one large industrial Power, which proved before the war to be Germany. Those small nations must surely now desire to merge as free units into a larger federation capable of standing on its own. I believe that it is our interest and our duty to see that we nourish such an aspiration.
In conclusion I would say that a large number of the ideas produced to-day seem to be based on the thesis that another war, if not inevitable, is likely. I believe that if we approach the problems of peace in that atmosphere, not only


will another war be likely but it will become inevitable. One thing, however, is absolutely certain; that it is to the interest of all Powers, including the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China and ourselves, to have a lengthy period of peace for our own respective developments. If, ignoring this, we are to develop the logic of power politics, merging into larger and larger groups of alliance without international control, we shall eventually have a war of complete annihilation between merely two groups, fully as unsatisfactory a solution as could be devised even under the present system of innumerable sovereign States. I am equally certain that the only other cause of war, apart from Power politics caused by fear and distrust, can come in the breakup of our Commonwealth and Empire.
The breakup of an Empire always causes opportunities for war but we know in this House, whatever other nations may believe, that the chances of our Empire and Commonwealth breaking up are nil. We must plan peace on the assumption that peace is not only possible, but is a matter of self-interest to the rest of the world. We have to prepare in advance for peace, in the same way as preparing for war. It would be hopeless to have to improvise suddenly, upon the collapse of Germany. Improvisation was one of the main causes of this war. Year after year we were faced with sudden situations to which we had to react quickly. We had not foreseen events, so events controlled us. Surely, now is our opportunity to say on behalf of the members of our Commonwealth what we desire. If we say it clearly, other nations will follow our lead, and I am sure that lasting peace can be built up, but it will need courage on the part of our statesmen and energy and robustness from our people.

Mr. Petherick: I agree with the concluding remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Berwick-on-Tweed (Captain Grey) when he said that we should refrain from entering peace, having to improvise our foreign affairs as we went along, and having nothing but an opportunist policy. In the very brilliant speech which was made by my Noble Friend the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) earlier in the Debate he

quite rightly said that it was absolutely necessary that Great Britain and the Empire should look after their own interests. He was criticised for that observation, not quite fairly, by the right hon. Member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Pethick-Lawrence), who rather suggested that the Noble Lord's idea was that we should look after our own selfish interests only, regardless of what the rest of the world might think or the effect that it might have upon the rest of the world. I am sure that that was not the Noble Lord's idea. Those of us who take a realistic view of foreign politics feel strongly that, while we should not act selfishly and try to grab everything we can for ourselves and the Empire, nevertheless, if we do not look after ourselves it is certain that nobody else will.
My main object in speaking to-day is to draw attention to some failures of British foreign policy in the past with particular attention to the League of Nations. I will try to make out my case in as dispassionate a way as possible, in order that those who disagree with my conclusions may at least agree with the facts. At its highest point, which was in 1935, the League of Nations consisted of some 61 States. That number has now fallen, on paper, to 45. I elicited the information in reply to a question put to the Foreign Secretary that in 1942 only six of the 45 were paying their contribution in full and that those States all happened to be members of the British Empire. They were the self-governing Dominions and Great Britain herself. The rest paid token payments and in some cases arrears. In other cases they had made specific payments for certain subjects. The remaining 26 Member States valued the League of Nations, so far as money contributions indicated, at precisely nil. They still remained honorary members of the club, but it could hardly be claimed by any reasonable observer that a club in such a condition is really in a flourishing state.
It is often claimed that the League in its wider activities has done a great deal of good work, such as the suppression of the drug traffic and the traffic in women and in various other directions. I am inclined to think, and I have had no evidence to the contrary, that that good work League of Nations or by the I.L.O., but was mainly accomplished, not by the


by Scotland Yard, in conjunction with the Stûreté and Russell Pasha in Egypt. As a preventer of war, which was the main object for which it was set up, the League of Nations was a really grisly failure. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] I am coming to that aspect of the subject in a moment. For a long time the League was moribund, and now it is virtually as good as dead. There are many who are trying to resurrect it from its ashes and are doing their best to increase the strength of the old League, or to form another on the same model.
The conception of the League is no new one. It has been tried before several times in the history of the world. The last example, before the present League of Nations, was at the time of the Holy Alliance in 1815, when the conquering Powers set up a grand alliance which they dignified by the term "Holy," and which had precisely the same fate as the League of Nations. They tried to invest it with a sort of peculiar sanctity by calling it "Holy," and that kind of approach was followed by those who strongly supported the League of Nations. If any of us dared to suggest that the League Covenant was not the Fortieth Article of religious faith and was not set up with the same idea of holiness we were fiercely criticised. I would like to quote what was said by a distinguished writer of the last century and to show its applicability to the League of Nations. He said:
The Treaty of Holy Alliance was, in fact, the beatitudes translated into political terms and declared to constitute the politics of the civilised world. It became a jest, when to a document with such an ideal were attached the names of such eminent authorities on religion and morals as Ferdinand of Spain, Louis XVIII of France, the Czar of Russia, and the Emperor of Austria.
The League of Nations followed the same idea. The ideal behind the League was generous, noble and humane. It was a misguided though honest attempt to set up a new and better world than that which broke down during 1914–18. I hope that no one who disagrees with me will think that I want a sort of international anarchy, a sort of general smash and grab with no form of international co-operation or relationship. That is a perfectly absurd view and I should never for one moment be a party to it. Obviously in the long run, international relationships must base themselves on some international code. As

the Noble Lord said, one of the real causes of the last war and of this war was the breakdown of international law and order. It is like the base metal driving, out the good currency. That is the danger in which we now stand.
In reply to a supplementary question which I put to him the other day the Prime Minister said that the League of Nations would have been all right if it had been supported. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I thought I should get some cheers for that remark. I do not agree with that view. I think it quite conceivable that it might have stumbled along for some time if the United States had been a member of the League from the beginning, but she was not. In order to have the slightest chance of success, any League must be world-wide. It must contain every State including strong States such as ourselves, the British Empire, Russia and the United States of America. Otherwise, and this is what in fact happened to the League, it becomes nothing but a large alliance instead of a small one. There are some people who claim that a large alliance is better than a small one but I disagree with them for the good reason that in order to have any system such as the League we must be able to rely upon the good will of every individual member of it and upon the armed strength of every individual member. As the history of the League shows the members had not in each case the good will and in extremely few cases really had the armed strength.
The result of all this was that one of the main crises that came upon us was when we found ourselves in the peculiar position of having something like 50 obligations and only one asset, France, which subsequently proved to have been rather overvalued in the balance sheet. Hon. Members of this House, and a number of people outside, have said that His Majesty's Government were responsible for that situation—or a series of Governments in this country. It is the usual thing to buy a car with a bad engine and then blame the chauffeur because it breaks down. I would claim that the League broke down not only because of the failure of support abroad, certainly not because of the failure of the support of a succession of Governments in this country, but owing to a fundamental unsoundness of the conception on which it was based, as


I shall try to show. A reasonable accusation which could be made against a series of Governments in this country would be, not of failing to support the League, but of clinging to it far too long when it had been shown to be a dire failure. All the evidence merely goes to show that His Majesty's Government at the time would have been very wise to withdraw from the League when the United States of America refused to come in.

Mr. Bowles: In 1931, when Japan attacked China, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, although the United States was not a member of the League, offered to take every action which members of the League took against Japan.

Mr. Petherick: It is just possible, although I had it in my notes to refer to that, that-might have escaped me had the hon. Member not mentioned that point. I would like, if I may, to debunk that suggestion so often put forward before. I say that His Majesty's Government of 25 years ago should have withdrawn. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member will have a little patience I will deal with him faithfully in a few minutes. He talks quite a lot, but someone else is talking just for the moment. The British Government at the time would have been wise to go out of the League when the United States refused to join at the end of the war. The faith in the League on the part of a good many people, in fact most of the people supporting it in this country and elsewhere, reminds me of a story I heard last night which was given to me by a Member of this House. A distinguished foreign statesman of some 20 years ago, Monsieur Clemenceau, was talking about the League of Nations to a Member of this House of Commons, and he, having fought successfully through the great war, had not got many illusions left. He said that he used to go every night and stand in front of his looking glass and say to the reflection in the mirror "You believe in the League. You believe in the League. You believe in the League." It seems to me a lot of other people inside and outside this House ever since then have gone on—whether they consulted their mirror or not I do not know—saying "I still believe in the League. I still believe in the League. I still believe in the League."
I should like to show why the League is theoretically unsound. The idea of a world State is attractive on the face of it, but to my mind it is based on mathematics, a mathematical view of life on pure reason, and human beings do not conform to mathematics or to sheer, pure reasoning. The result is plain. I believe that you can forecast with a reasonable degree of safety what any person or group of persons or State or even Empire with whose tastes and virtues and prejudices and desires and history you are reasonably familiar may do in any given set of circumstances. You may be very often wrong, but you have a very good chance of being right. But when you are dealing, not with one person or nation but when you are dealing with a group of 72 States, containing innumerable individuals, and all with different aspirations, different desires, different histories, different prejudices and on top of that with tens of thousands of miles of frontiers which from the earliest ages of history have been constantly disputed, it is extremely difficult to know what will be the result in any circumstance from the whole global point of view and what they will decide in a dispute which may not concern them at all except indirectly. Hon. Members may say that there must be give and take in all these matters, but the whole of history surely shows that there has been very little willing give, and it has always been a question of take. From the times of the earlier conquering tribes to the time of the great wars of the Middle Ages and down to this day we have had a succession of ruthless rulers who, backed by ruthless peoples, have cast their eyes covetously on other States and in fact have overrun them.
Supposing a world organisation, a world court, was set up, this is where the difficulty arises to my mind. In theory that court, or Council of the League, or whatever you may call it, has to decide in any given dispute which of the two disputants is right and which is wrong, and the difficulty is that it has to decide in practically every case where there is no absolute right and no absolute wrong. As happened in the case of the Council of the League, it has not to decide on a legal, ethical or moral case. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred it has to decide a case in which there is no basic right and no basic wrong. The League, to my mind, broke


on that, and any League or world organisation of a similar sort will break on exactly the same stone. The reason for that is that the decision of the court to which the dispute is brought must depend not upon any given international law but on the particular weight which the court or council may lay on one part or aspect of the case or another. It is difficult enough to get a true opinion even when the judges are entirely impartial, but when they are, as they must be to some extent, prejudiced by the particular aspect on which they lay most weight it is difficult to get a fair decision. An example is whether any given court or council lay most weight on geographical, strategical, philological, or indeed religious considerations. They have to make up their minds not on a case of right or wrong, but on a collection of facts placed before them, and practically every one of these facts is in dispute.
Another thing about which they have to make up their minds, and have had to do in the past, is how large a nation should be to be entitled to self-determination and how far a small effete race, sparsely populating a country, has a right to occupy it. If a large virile race wishes to colonise what are the rights of that strong, virile race when it has in fact colonised that country? Still another thing to consider is whether such a court is going to rely on a status quo, and if so where is the status quo to be placed—in 1815, in 1914, in 1918, or where? Any court must take a view, a point of departure, in order that it can give a reasonable sort of decision. Finally, on this point I would say that only the most difficult cases go to the court at all, and it has to give its opinion on a vague series of facts and ideas, and a decision not based in any way on any code of law, equity or principle of legality. In fact, it has to give the best judgment it can on the circumstances as produced. What is the result? One of the two disputants will lose, and that disputant will feel eternally aggrieved, and sooner or later these perpetual grievances will find vent somewhere or other, and the unfortunate way in which they find expression is war. Peoples will bow to their own law, they will defer to justice, they will in very rare cases give in and acknowledge international law, but what they will not give in to, will not defer to, it seems to me, is opinion, and particularly opinion ex-

pressed by persons of another nation with whom they strongly disagree. Therefore it seems to me that "The Times" newspaper was quite right when last Monday, in the course of an important leading article, it said:
Can it seriously be believed that either the United States or Soviet Russia or Great Britain or the members of the British Commonwealth are prepared to make formal surrender of their rights of ultimate decision in' unknown contingencies on the issue of war or peace? If not, the attempt to travel farther along this path will lead only to misunderstanding and frustration.
What is the inescapable conclusion which arises from that? It is that the greatest Sovereign Power that any nation enjoys is, in any circumstances which may arise which may bring about a great emergency, the power it has to make war or withhold a declaration of war. Nationality is not a doctrine as some 19th century writers try to get us to believe; it is a fact, and whether we like it or not it exists and the only possibility of making any sense in the world is that of recognising facts, ugly as they may be.
There is one more consideration. Every new organisation, whether it be in ordinary civil life or whether it be the League of Nations, must have a constitution. Therefore, it must be a written constitution because it is a new one. That constitution has to be drawn up by somebody, or some body of persons, or committee. What, in fact, happens in the case of every new constitution, national or otherwise, is that those who draw up the constitution, although they are chosen as being the best men available, have the idea that their wisdom will hold good for eternity, and that the set of conditions under which they draw up their constitutions will also hold good for all time. That is why they so often break down, because the world is always changing, and to change a written constitution is always extremely difficult. Those who wish to maintain things as they are—sometimes they are wrong, and I say that as a Conservative—are in a stronger position than those who propose a change its a constitution. The result is that you do not get any change and, if you do, it is only at the expense of a number of people leaving the organisation to which you belong and which they have perhaps assisted to set up. Here, as in the League, there is, and must be every time, an over-emphasis and an exaggeration of


legalistic rights, with the result that every time a dispute comes to the Council of the League there are delay, bad blood, backbiting, even if it is does not actually lead to war.
There are two grave practical objections, also. The slowness of machinery and slowness of action on the part of the League have been shown by the history of the League; and, secondly, in any grave dispute which is presented to the League, the League must intervene or go under. I come to the interruption of my hon. Friend. Both those factors—delays, slowness, and the necessity of intervention—held good at the time of the Manchurian crisis, in 1931–32. Who, looking back at that affair 14 years ago, would believe that it would have been possible for Great Britain effectively to intervene alone, with America, outside the League of Nations, on one side of Japan, and Russia, outside the League of Nations, on the other? We who remember the events of Singapore know that Singapore was not ready, and we know the difficulty of any great intervention, in the Far East or anywhere else, with bases many thouasnds of miles away from the scene of operation.

Mr. Shinwell: Will the hon. Member take note that in 1939 we intervened in the case of aggression against Poland, although neither America nor Soviet Russia was prepared to intervene?

Mr. Petherick: I am aware of that, but would it not have been better if at that time, we had had Soviet Russia and the United States on our side? The conditions at that time were absolutely hopeless; and, since then—this is where I come 'to my hon. Friend's interruption—in spite of the fact that we have been told, time after time, that America asked us to take strong action and that we refused, documents have been produced by the State Department in America, a copy of which will be found in the Library, which show that, far from being weak at that time, we had been almost reproved by the United States Government for going too far.

Mr. Bowles: The hon. Gentleman's earlier point was that the League would, possibly, have worked during the interwar years if America had been a member. Now he is trying to say exactly the

opposite. I ask him now to give an answer to this question: What was the reply to the request made by the United States Government, to this country and to the other members of the League, to come in with them as a whole, to stop any Japanese aggression in Manchuria?

Mr. Petherick: To take the hon. Gentleman's second point first, he is effectively answered by what I said a few minutes ago—that, in fact, it did not happen. If he will go to the Library, and read the documents, he will find that what I have said is correct. His other point was that I had suggested that, with America in the League, the League would have been a success. I never said anything of the kind. I said that, if America had been in the League, it might have stumbled along, with some difficulty, and possibly for some time, but the eventual result would have been exactly the same. May I ask hon. Members to consider what might have happened in 1931 if, instead of having a League of Nations, before which this dispute was put, and which took a long time to consider it, and then did nothing, we had had an alliance between the British Empire, the United States, and Russia, and, if they had not only acted as we are hoping they are going to act in Europe in future, but if they had acted together in the Far East would Japan, if the three countries had taken a strong line, have dared to continue in her aggression?
There is nothing wrong in power per se. One can even go further, and say that the balance of power is wrong only if that balance is maintained precariously between two sides which do not fight each other only because they are mortally afraid of each other. If that balance is maintained by one side which is strong, there is some hope for the world. We are told during every war that we have the most marvellous allies, and that they have a monopoly of all the virtues and graces, and then, when another war comes along, we are told the same thing about another lot of allies. That rather cynical remark will, I hope, reinforce what I am going to say in a moment. There is a great advantage in having your allies on your flanks, so that you can move together, but there is another advantage if your ally is a strong one, in having a second ally on the other side


of the enemy so that you may squeeze him between the two of you. Sometimes there are difficulties arising between the three members of the triple alliance. As our triple alliance is right, from the point of view of keeping the peace of the World, is it not possible to build up, on that foundation, something durable, something based on mutual interest? Necessity makes strange bedfellows, but there is no reason why the bedfellows should kick each other in the back during the dark hours, or why one should get up early and pinch all the breakfast. I hope that after the war these three allies will continue the association they have made during the war, in which they have suffered so greatly.
I think we have to go further in our peace system. I think we must have a series of regional pacts. One device suggests itself to a good many of us; that is, an alliance between Great Britain, France, Holland and Belgium—which, curiously enough, happen to be the four great Colonial Powers of the world, and which could combine in their oversea Colonies as they combine at home. They should have a regional pact, not for vague, sentimental reasons, not because they were all boys together in the last war, but built up on military strategy, each contributing so much to the common defensive pact. I believe that there is a chance that, with that sort of alliance, we might get the backing of the United States, in exchange, probably, for a complete guarantee to defend the United States in the Pacific if she were attacked by Japan. That is the sort of scheme which some of us have in mind for keeping the peace in future. It is no good hitching your wagon to a star, as some hon. Members are inclined to do, particularly if it afterwards turns out to be a shooting star. I know I have spoken too long, but I wanted to make a coherent case against such a rigid system as the League of Nations. I have tried to show why not only in theory but in practice, such a system is theoretically unsound.
The Prime Minister said that the League was not supported. The reason is that the nations of the world knew that, in practice and in theory, it was unsound. Now we are to have a new world organisation. We have not been told what it means. I suppose it is going to be a featherless phoenix—a featherless, egg-bound phoenix at that—fluttering

feebly out of the dead ashes of the League of Nations. I do not see any hopes for the world in that. I gather from the Prime Minister that we are not committed; and, indeed, we ought not to be tied to some rigid system, which has always failed in the past, until the people of this country, and, indeed, the peoples of the Empire, have been consulted in the course of an ordinary general election, to take place after the war. We do not want to wake up one morning and find that we are tied for ever to something that will not work, and which, even if it did, would only make for more wars. I am certain that Russia, for one, will not go into any such scheme. "Izvestia." stated the other day that Russia would not join the I.L.O., as long as it was an appendage of the League of Nations. Governor Bricker, Presidential candidate for the State of Ohio, said very much the same sort of thing. I do not believe that our people ever liked the League. I know that I have spoken too long—[An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear."] I have the support of an hon. Member for at least one of my remarks. Russia is realistic; she is very wise. We should be realistic too. She is all the time regarding her own safety; she is quite right to regard her own safety. All three of the great Powers must have regard to their own safety. They must also have regard to their own honour.
Let me say a word about Poland. How should we feel if we were asked, at the end of the war, to give up East Anglia to our Allies, and to get back the Ukraine instead? I think that if Russia is approached sensibly, she may think very differently about all these problems from the way she is thinking about them now. If Germany is completely crushed, Russia may think, as we do, having a lot of experience, that it is no good allowing a number of Eires to clutter up your doorstep. It is by no pedagogic system, born in libraries and on demagogic platforms, that we are going to maintain peace in the future. It is only by mutually growing respect, restored respect, for inter. national law, international commitments and international honour. I believe that that restoration will be a slow and laborious process, but if we do that, and if we try to build up from the bottom, and not build down from the top, then, I believe, there is some hope for the world.

Major Vyvyan Adams: I hope to establish a precedent and be brief. Seldom have I heard so outspoken an argument in favour of complete anarchy as has just fallen from the hon. Member who spoke last—anarchy internal, personal and international. This, the hon. Member said, is an old House of Commons, and his constituents in Penryn and Falmouth must have been interested at the last General Election when he described what he called the ugly facts about the futility of the League of Nations, which, I am sure, must have fallen from his lips.

Mr. Petherick: He did.

Major Adams: I am very glad to hear it. The hon. Member was largely echoing an observation made by the hon. Member for Eccles (Mr. Cary). I do not understand what exactly the hon. Member was attacking. He complained that the League had no power to enforce its will. I do not understand what he meant by the League. Did he mean, I wonder, the Covenant of the League of Nations, or the States Members of the League? Obviously, the Covenant, being a mere document, could not enforce the will of itself against anybody. Yet, if the hon. Member will look at the Covenant of the League of Nations, he will discover that it contained full provision for the restraint and punishment of the aggressor. I refer him to Article 16 of the Covenant. Did the hon. Member, I wonder, mean the States members of the League? They had ample power—which cannot be denied—to enforce their will until they lost their self-confidence and so their authority.
When we hear this tedious tale of the failures of the League of Nations we should remember that it is, historically, untrue. Let me ask hon. Members to recall the early days of 1935 when, beyond question, the collective system stopped two wars—on the occasion of the Saar Plebiscite and on that of the dispute between Hungary and Yugoslavia. It cannot really be argued that, in the autumn of 1935, there was not at the disposal of the States Members of the League an ample reserve of power to deal effectively with the Italian aggressor, nor that., at the beginning of 1936, the States Members could not have collected the power to kick the Germans out of the Rhineland when they broke the Treaty of Locarno. The

fact is—and it must be re-emphasised in the interests of truth—that the States Members of the League lacked the necessary courage and determination to apply the Covenant. If hon. Members are arguing for a change of name and for the pooling of force I am with them every time. If, on the other hand, hon. Members imagine that we shall ever have an ordered world without some form of collective security I cannot begin to agree with them. What principle could civilised man possibly accept other than the dedication of the strength of all to the defence of each?
Defence against what? We had an answer given by the Prime Minister today. It is a very subtle and insidious danger which we should do well to remember. The Prime Minister said—I think the first time it has been stated from that Bench—that, after the war, we would not allow a form of Fascist Government to be set up in any country with which we had been at war. At last—and I think this is significant, for it is the first time we have heard anything of the kind—we have an official repudiation from the highest possible authority of the doctrine that the internal affairs of other countries are no concern of ours, and that was the fallacy, I submit, which did more than any other single illusion to produce this war. As I listened to the Prime Minister, I thought it must have occurred to him in the small hours of the morning, that the success of the revolting Spaniards under General Franco, himself once a creature of Mussolini and Hitler, seriously endangered our own Mediterranean security.
I wish to refer to something said by the hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicholson) who is always so interesting. The hon. Member implied, and I entirely agree with him, that we needed, in these declarations from our Government, something rather more than bare bones. A little more flesh on the skeleton would make the subject more lively and more attractive. I suggest that there are certain questions which might now, at this stage of the war, conveniently be answered. They arise largely out of what the Noble Lord the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) said in the speech which I know the whole Committee enjoyed very much. The first question is—what contribution is Britain prepared to make in the scheme against aggression? There are two forms which this contribution might take. In


the first, the political aspect, it could take the form of this question: Are we, or are we not, in future, going to take instant action against the aggressor? It would be in common, of course, with other powerful States, and we must act from power, not from weakness. I hope the answer to that question will be "yes," but it has not yet been given. The second question is this. What measure will Great Britain and the Dominions contribute? This is very important. I hope we shall shortly have a Government declaration stating how strong Britain intends to remain in the immediate post-war world. I hope that we shall see that we are most formidable—one of the most formidable of the victorious Powers.
Confidence in our intentions to-day and to-morrow will be raised if, now, the Coalition Government, which includes a number of very honourable Socialists—I do not want the House to misunderstand me, but I have heard leading Socialists, great leaders, say on platforms in the city which you, Major Milner, and I, represent in common, that they are not prepared again to see the army sink to the low level that prevailed before 1939—if this Coalition Government, comprising Liberals, Socialists and Conservatives, declared at once, and without hesitation, that all young men in this country will be required to undergo adequate naval, military or air training. Let no one say "This is not a threat to anybody." It is a threat. I intend it to be a threat—a threat against the aggressor. And, unless we have this force, all the threats in the world are so much hot air.
This then is what we have to do—to see that our policy is advancing beyond what I am afraid has prevailed throughout the war hitherto—a series of generalities. Sometimes these generalities have been embellished and embroidered by the wit and humour of the Prime Minister, but so far we have had no real advance beyond generalisations and excellent intentions. We must say that we wish, by this physical means, to produce security, as well as to preach it. Such a policy is going to cost money. We are going to have a far higher level of taxation in order to produce this security after the war than prevailed before it. I suggest that we ought to make the public familiar now, with the idea that both the training and the war-like stores, which will be necessary to raise our Forces above the pre-

war level, will cost a good deal of money, so they will have time to get used to the prospect of footing the bill.
I want to say something rather more domestic about the Empire Conference. All of us were glad to hear of the unity of principle that emerged from this Conference, and we all hope that that unity will persist, but I would like, with the greatest possible respect, to utter a slight word of warning. The British Commonwealth or Empire to-day consists of a number of units which are nation-conscious. All of them are conscious of their own nation-hood, and I do not think we should hope for, or expect, the kind of unity or harmony among members of that Commonwealth that you find in an orchestra which is implicitly obedient to its conductor. It is far too much to expect from the British Commonwealth of Nations that Australia, Canada or South Africa would always and invariably respond to the wave of the wand in Whitehall. Inded, one of the most interesting features of the old League of Nations, over which we have been singing so many funereal and obituary hymns to-day, were the occasional friendly variations of view between the Mother Country and one or other of the Dominions of the Commonwealth. Between the units of the British Commonwealth, after the unifying experiences of 1914–18 and between 1939 and to-day, we need very little more than a common basis of loyalty. Good nature and good tempered agreements to differ, whether in the council of the international authority or in the council chamber of the Empire will injure nobody, and will indicate health and vitality.
I do not quite understand what is obviously troubling the Prime Minister in his anxiety about Poland. I ventured to say something on this subject on the last occasion when I spoke on foreign affairs, and I do not apologise for repeating it. It was that it was not for Poland alone that we went to war. I entreat the Government not to allow our unparalleled cause to be reduced to the dimensions of the Polish Corridor. We are not fighting to preserve frontiers which have been fluid for centuries. Indeed, our moral case would have been no less strong if, in 1938, we had not stooped to Munich, even supposing that the alternative had, at that moment, meant war. We are fighting to destroy aggression, to batter down


Hitlerite Germany. We have fought to defeat Fascist Italy and we fight to defeat an aggressive Japan. We have not been fighting merely to restore Abyssinia, or Greece, or Belgium, or Poland. These motives are only incidents in what we should never forget is a very great crusade against unprovoked aggression. When we speak of Poland, I suggest it is foolish to turn away from what is, quite clearly, the Russian point of view. It can, quite simply, be stated in this sentence—that she wants, between her centres of industry and administration, as much territory to intervene between her and the evil centre which caused this war in Germany.

Mr. Pickthorn: Who does not?

Major Adams: What is wanted is to deprive Germany of any territory required to satisfy that view, and I submit to my hon. and historical Friend, who is one of my own Members of Parliament, and whose conduct I am therefore very keen to watch, that the Eastern frontier of Poland should go West and that East Prussia should go to Poland. The larger the German Reich, as the history of the last quarter of a century has shown, the greater has been the danger. I believe this is a view which is gaining acceptance as the war proceeds—that if you allow German sovereignty after this war to prevail over as wide an area as it did in 1939 nothing is more sure than that we shall have a third German war. And that is something well worth trying to prevent.

Mr. McGovern: After having listened to the last two speeches I am driven to the conclusion that the Members who have spoken recognise clearly that this Empire and the British Isles cannot be defended on the cheap, as has been suggested by some Members of this Committee. The League of Nations was an attempt to provide a cheap defence of the British Empire, and to get control of a number of States within that body which could be utilised for our defence, without having to pay for that defence. If hon. Members desire an Empire they must recognise that that Empire can only be defended, in the final analysis, by force and that the force must be created in the shape of the weapons of war if the emergency should arise. That

is not my own expression and desire. It must be recognised by Members of the Committee that I am against anything in the nature of Empire, while I am all for the free association of the English-speaking peoples, forming an entity and co-operating with the rest of the world in trying to outlaw war for all time.
The hon. and gallant Member for West Leeds (Major Adams) has given us the usual moral cause. He says that we did not go to war for the defence of Poland. That is handing out to Members something that every person in the country realises. This country did not go to war merely for the defence of Poland, but one of the things for which it did go to war was the defence of Poland. To say otherwise at this stage would condemn us morally in the eyes of a large number of people in this country. There is the danger presented to the nation and the world of succumbing to German military power, and there are the methods employed for under-mining and overcoming resistance in the various countries. Is the hon. and gallant Member satisfied that Russia is not performing the same function; that Russia is not also attempting, by the creation of quisling Governments, to undermine the will to resist of internal organisations, and then, in the name of independence, moving in and creating the same circumstances as were created by Germany previous to the war? There can be a case for going to war to resist aggression and the insidious methods of Germany, but there can be no case for refusing to recognise the selfsame methods when they are employed in Poland and elsewhere by Soviet Russia. You lose your moral case entirely and also the will to resist.
The Prime Minister gave us a description or survey of the position in war, but omitted to state all the great difficulties that are being encountered. There was the Teheran Conference, a report of which I read last night. After reading it I had the feeling—if I am not being too jocular at the expense of a person who has gone—that it might have been a spiritualist circle, with the late Ramsay MacDonald controlling the planchette that wrote that Declaration. It was most ridiculous and silly, prescribing no principles or moral codes of any kind. Probably it was intended to be that. What happened at Teheran, and what happened


at the various other conferences to which the Prime Minister has gone? I ask this question in relation to Japan. If the Foreign Secretary were here now, I would like to ask him about Japan. There are a few questions which should be answered in order to satisfy the people of this country and of the world. Was Russia asked about the position in relation to Japan? Does she intend to enter into the struggle to suppress the activities and the aggression of Japan? If not, why not? It is well known that Stalin refused to come to conferences because he could not be included in a party that was dealing with the Japanese struggle. It would be an unfriendly act. He could not discuss anything which dealt with Japan while the Japanese Ambassador was sitting in Kuibeshev and the Soviet Ambassador was at Tokyo.
We are told with regard to China that Chiang Kai-shek has an army of 250,000 according to some and of 500,000 according to others, fighting against the Communist army of China. Who is financing and arming this Communist army? Has Stalin any part in arming and financing this Communist army to fight China, and to stab China in the back, when she is engaged in her struggle with Japan? These are things which the country has a right to know. Chiang Kai-shek is one of the Allies in this struggle. There is the question of Poland, and the Prime Minister can speak of these other States such as Lithuania. I remember when Poland was invaded by Russia the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Mr. Hare-Belisha) writing in the "News of the World" to the effect that we should have sent 35,000 troops to fight Russia. They talk of Finland now, so that anyone might think that Finland was the aggressor. The Prime Minister said that Russia had been very tolerant to Finland. That was not so, when Russia invaded Finland. Finland is only defending her national existence and her boundaries, against aggression and against Stalin, at the present time. Finland was prepared to go out of the war if her national entity was recognised by Russia.
These things have to be said. Soviet Russia is going to make great inroads into Europe because nations fear to stand up to her and speak to her in the language that she understands. I have had experi-

ence of the party of which the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) is a member. I used to work in unity with the Communist Party, when sent by my own party. There was one thing I recognised about it at the beginning and of which I warned my party. I said, "You can never satisfy these people. They are out either to swallow you up if you resist their policy, or to slander and libel you if you fail to accept their policy. Therefore, you have to stand up to them as men and fight them because that is the only method." The same method is employed by them all over the world.
It was said that 8,500 Polish officers were destroyed by Russians, but nobody in governmental circles may mention these things now. We have to be kind to Joe, in case he walks out of the party. Therefore, we did not say, "Joe, you and your fellows murdered 8,500 Polish officers. Why did you murder them?" Why—because it was a question of destroying the ruling class of Poland. Poland had to be destroyed as a Polish national unity and the only way to destroy it was to murder the ruling class of that country. There was the creation of the Polish national army on Soviet territory with Communist quislings. They were prepared to march into Poland to set up an independent State. I have no great amount of time for the Polish Government in London or the Polish Government at any time. I have in this House often expressed my views about the Polish ruling class but that is a very different thing from destroying the national outlook and entity of the Polish people. The Communists tried to destroy them. Propaganda goes out and the Polish people ask for an inquiry into the allegation that 8,500 of their officers were found murdered. Then Russia gets all flurried. They have been accused of this, and therefore they repudiate the policy of the Polish national Government in London.
We have also had the question of anti-Semitism. There has been a tremendous lot of anti-Semitism in Poland, there has always been. Anyone who has read the history and record will agree that there has been anti-Semitism. Polish Jewish soldiers came to London to have a showdown, and to demand that they should be transferred to the British Forces. Many people in this House and the country are aware that the Communist party


in this country had a hand in that. I am told on very good authority that they paid the fares of the men to come to London, because it was part of their instruction to work for the denunciation of the Polish Government in London.
Then there is the recognition of Tito and the report to-day that Mihailovitch has been overthrown. Mihailovitch is not of my way of thinking. My way of thinking is that every section, in every country, has a right to be defended by this House and to express itself. If there is a struggle internally in Yugoslavia it becomes a struggle of two sections with different ideologies, the one trying to put their feet on the necks of the other people and the others resisting. Therefore, they are drawn from the struggle against the external enemy, because the internal foe is being armed and financed to put the country under an ideology which most of them would refuse to accept in Yugoslavia. Revolt took place in Greece. The King of Greece was being financed.
Then wa have the French National Committee. Are the hon. Members who demand recognition of the French National Committee so sure that the French National Committee should be the Government of France? Who knows? If hon. Members say we are going ahead with the war, in order to place Germany under heel, and to create a fresh democratic power in Germany, then France ought to be taken in charge by the Allied Powers and the stage should be set for a proper democratic trend in Germany, with an election to decide the government of the country.
Who are some of the French National Committee? An application was made by Moscow for an individual to be on the French National Committee who had actually run away from military service when this country entered the war. After having run away to Moscow and having been denounced for running away from military service, fie wants to appear on the African stage as a liberator of France with the young men of France who have fought since the beginning. The people who, to a large extent, were responsible for the failure of France to stand up in the military struggle were the Communists of France who coined the phrase, "You had better live under Hitler, than die under Daladier." To this country I

would say: You are in grave danger of economically surrendering your place to the United States of America and of surrendering politically to Soviet Russia. If we go to Germany what is going to happen there? We are going to be in the most tremendous mess this country has ever been in, and the war will be nothing to the difficulties after the war. You will have civil war right over the Continent, because there are elements in those countries which will not have such an ideology imposed upon them.
I have said before that I believe in Socialism but I do not believe in Socialism with a tommy gun. I do not believe in imposing my will upon people who have not agreed to a change and transfer of power. In this war, I see this gradual development taking place all over the Cohtinent, drawing Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania and Albania all into this common struggle, this civil war, which is going to be worked out in its most brutal and acute form. That is being imposed on Europe and at this stage the Prime Minister says, "There is nothing for it but the abject surrender of Germany in this struggle." Let me say this—I do not want to be misunderstood: People have talked, in this country, about the armed might of Germany, but they have never talked about the armed might of Russia. Yet one has been the natural result of the other. If you are going to disarm Germany completely, are you going to allow Russia to retain her great military strength and arms? If so, after this war, Stalin will be able to carry on from one end of the Continent to the other, through the Balkans, and place the whole of Europe under his totalitarian form of bureaucratic government.
Those are the dangers I see, and they have to be stated. It is not very popular at this moment to draw attention to them because there is a tremendous admiration for the Red Army and the effort it has maintained. But do not let us be carried away by admiration for somebody associated with us, and lose the finer things that should come out of a struggle of this kind if you entered it on a real moral basis. The argument put by a number of hon. Members to-day has been, "We must have moral power." Yes, have moral power, but keep your bombers too, and keep your battleships at action be-


cause you are not entering into any new order after this war. If you are to maintain your present Empire, in the position you are taking up to-day, with the Polish Government, there is nothing for it after this war—if there is not some form of international agreement among the people of this world—but to maintain force. Disarmament has always been a convenient doctrine and policy of this country. The Labour Party, for example, between wars are opposed to armaments. They are against the creation of weapons that could be used in war. They gather round them the Anti-Vaccination League and the Vegetarian Society, and they say to all the old ladies, "You know there is no need for bloodshed. Maintain yourselves on moral force and appeal to the peoples of the world." Then the war comes and they say, "It was not we who let down the nation; it was the others. We will join the Coalition Government and help to defend the Empire." There has been a refusal to recognise facts. I think the hon. Member for Seaham (Mr. Shinwell) has subscribed to it in a most extreme manner, which would almost make him eligible to be a member of the Primrose League.

Mr. Shinwell: May I ask my hon. Friend to which particular declaration he refers?

Mr. McGovern: The general speeches of the hon. Member—

Mr. Shinwell: But my hon. Friend must be much more specific than that. Will he refer to any particular statement I made which would make me eligible to join the Primrose League?

Mr. McGovern: My analysis was made through reading and listening to the speech of the hon. Member, and I would advise him to go and read it if he is in any doubt about qualifying for the Primrose League.

Mr. Shinwell: May I ask the hon. Member to be a little more specific, and not to indulge in general allegations which have no foundation at all? If my hon. Friend wishes to make an allegation, will he substantiate it by producing some evidence?

Mr. McGovern: Really my hon. Friend is indulging in too much by-play and evasion. I said that I had heard his speech, and the general tone of the statements in that speech were, in my estima-

tion, such as would qualify him to join the Primrose League, and this was said only in passing, regarding the Empire. Also, many of the newspapers of this country said the same thing, and I believe the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Arthur Greenwood) said it also.
Passing on from that, may I say that if I believed in this policy of Empire, I would go to the country and say, "We have to be prepared to defend this Empire and there is nothing for it but for the young men in this country to be ready to do military service. We have to foot the bill for the instruments which will carry out the policy while trying to ensure peace. If that fails, then, in the last analysis, we shall be reluctantly compelled to use force. Therefore, the force has to be there, in order to be used in such a situation." That would, be my attitude. I could not subscribe to Empire and be a pacifist, or be against the rearmament of this country. I say, therefore, that there has to be a new trend of thought and action if, in this country, there are large parties who believe in this policy of Empire. They cannot, between wars, dissociate themselves from the responsibility of defending their Empire if the eventuality arises.
I rose chiefly for the purpose of asking the questions that I have indicated in general terms. Will the Foreign Secretary tell us whether Russia was consulted in connection with the Japanese War? What is her attitude towards it? Who is financing the Communist army fighting Chiang Kai-shek? Could he give us a clearer indication of how we stand in relation to all the little States over which so much blood and sweat have been lost in this House? For example, how do we stand in relation to the independence of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Yugoslavia? Can he give us an unqualified statement in this House that we stand for the complete independence of these States —not for the creation of Soviet "stooge" Governments but for the complete independence of the people of those countries who have drawn up their own Governments. In my estimation you are marching towards a show-down. You are evading the issues of the present moment, but they are coming faster and hotter on your trail as the war comes to a conclusion. I would not be surprised if it ends before October of this year. If it does, you will


have a tremendous responsibility for the settling of the affairs of Europe and the Balkans. As I see it, the lack of decisive war declaration and power at this stage, will prolong the period of bloody struggle and civil war throughout the Continent and throughout the world.

Mr. Wedderburn: The independence and candour of the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) are always most refreshing to hear. I have listened to parts of his speech with a considerable measure of agreement. Sometimes it occurred to me that he too might be trying to qualify, if not for membership of the Primrose League, then of a kind of independent Primrose League which might put him into the position of being able to preach Conservative doctrine with complete disregard for the official leaders of the Conservative Party. I do not wish to speak for more than a few minutes, and I hope that the Committee will allow me to divert its attention for a short time from what has so far been the main current of this Debate in order that something may be said about our Far Eastern Ally, China, to which the hon. Member for Shettleston made some allusion. My own information about the Communists in Northern China is more than a year old, and is, perhaps, rather out of date by now, but I do not think there is any reason to suppose that the Chinese Communists are being armed by the Russians. My own information is that they are poorly armed, indeed, and have practically no equipment at all. I do not think that we have enough material to debate China. My only reason for referring to it is because of the recent war news from the Far East. For seven years now the Chinese people have been holding out, almost unarmed, against the immensely superior mechanical power of the Japanese aggressor. Now it seems, from the news of the last month or two, that they have suffered further incursions into their territory, further massacres and atrocities and migrations. What is more, they have no prospect of any speedy deliverance from the terrible sufferings which they are having to endure.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. J. J. Lawson) and I went to China the extraordinary kindness and altogether unusual honour with which we were treated, were accorded to

us, not on our own account, but because we were representatives of this House, and I know the House is duly grateful to the Chinese people for the manner in which we were treated. It was evident to us that they were very anxious to know when they might expect some measure of assistance from their European and American Allies. We, like they, began this war very ill-armed, but the experience we have had has been one of growing strength. We have felt and seen our own strength increase every month as the war has progressed, whereas the Chinese, for seven years, have had to go on fighting with nothing but an inadequate quantity of rifles and machine-guns. We took very great care not to give them the impression that the strategical picture was likely to alter in the near future, because we thought such an impression would have been false. We told them that for strategical reasons, we thought it necessary that Germany should be beaten first, which might take a long time; that after that, it would again take time for our forces to be assembled in the Far East, and that the struggle there might be a lengthy one.
We did not try to raise their hopes, but we did say that the British people drew no distinction of a moral kind between Germany and Japan; that we were determined to continue the war until Japan had unconditionally surrendered and that it would be necessary to deal with Japanese war criminals in exactly the same way as German war criminals and to take the same measures to prevent Japanese re-arming, as we would take in Europe against Germany. It was satisfactory to us that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary should have met General Chiang Kai-shek last winter, at Cairo, and that a statement should have been made on behalf of the British and American Governments defining our war aims in the Far East. As for our relations with China, taking the longer view, the Chinese expect and hope that after the war they will do very much what Russia did between 1920–40. They want to industrialise their country, including part of their agriculture, and by very much the same methods as have been followed by Russia—although they do not favour quite the same political system—they want to emulate the economic achievements of Russia. They think that with their population more than twice as great as Russia's


and their natural resources as great, and with the industry of their peoples probably greater than that of most of Europeans, they will be able to out-strip Russian progress both in speed and in volume. Some people regard this as a dream not likely to be fulfilled, and I am not going to be foolish enough to make any kind of prophecy to the Committee. But I will say that we should make a mistake if we were to base our foreign policy in the Far East upon the assumption that China will always continue to be a weak and disorganised Power.
For the present they are going through a very bad time, and it will be a long time before we can give them effective help on a really major scale. In the meantime, I hope the Committee will allow it to be said that while Chinese patience may not receive its reward for a long time that reward is certain to come in the end, that our hearts are with our Chinese Allies and that we are resolved to see that in this war their victory is our victory and that our victory will be theirs.
I do not think I need apologise for this digression from the main theme of the Debate. I do not wish to draw the Committee away from a review of European affairs, and I think the Prime Minister's statement was one which met with general satisfaction in most parts of the House. He pointed out that one result of the Imperial Conference had been unity among the Governments of the Empire about our foreign policy. What a very significant thing that is, not only for our own Empire but also for collective security, which will depend so much upon the combined and concerted action of the British Empire, which is always, rightly, held up as a practical example of a League of Nations which has had a real existence for some considerable time. I think it is a very great advantage, both a present and a future advantage, that this Imperial Conference should have resulted in unity in principle among the Dominion Prime Ministers about the kind of foreign policy that we ought to follow.
I think the majority of the Committee also agreed with what the Prime Minister said in his catalogue of our relationships with foreign countries in Europe. It would be a great mistake to be grudging in acknowledgment of the advantages that we have derived from Spain. We may get further advantages from them before

the war is over. The Prime Minister was also right to be candid in expressing his regret that Turkey has not given us more assistance. That is another country which the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street and I visited and, if I had time to give a report of our visit, I think the Committee would see that the Turks are certainly not pro-German. There is no, doubt that their sympathies are on our side, but it is regrettable that they have not seen their way to provide us with a fuller measure of assistance of a belligerent kind.
The two points in my right hon. Friend's review most likely to cause tension between us and our friends are Poland and Yugoslavia. On Poland I only want to put forward one personal opinion, and I entirely admit that there is a great deal to be said on both sides. My own view is that, quite apart from any question of territorial compensation, it would be a good thing for Europe that Poland should have East Prussia. It has always seemed to me that, since the Germans have removed I understand some 20,000,000 unfortunate Europeans from their homes to Germany against their will for forced labour, when it suited them, we might quite well allow 2,000,000 Germans to be removed from East Prussia when it suits us. As for Yugoslavia, I have always thought this primarily a military question. I do not think I have enough knowledge to criticise the political side of it. In this country we know even less than is known in some others. In America I understand that the communiqués of General Mihailovitch are published in the newspapers, but we are never allowed to see them in our newspapers here. It would be rash if, without full knowledge, we were to say anything against what we are advised is the best course of action on military grounds.
But on the political side there is one thing which ought to be said. In 1941 it was still thought in most countries of Europe that the Germans were on the winning side and we were on the losing side. That is what the King of Bulgaria, the Rumanians, Hungarians and Italians all thought, and they all acted upon it and joined with Germany. But the young King Peter, although it must have seemed to those who surrounded him that the Germans were more likely than we to, win the war, came out on our side and


did what we wanted him to do, and we are under some obligation to him, whatever the course of events may have been since then in Yugoslavia. You have only to think what might happen in another war supposing this situation were to arise again. Should we have let him down, it might be said. "It does not really much matter what you do, whether you collaborate with the aggressor or not, because if you remain in your own country you will be called a quisling and, if you leave it at the request of Great Britain, you will be called a de-partisan." We have an obligation to help this young King in his efforts to unite his country, and I am sure the Government will carry out that obligation.
The only thread of continuous controversy in the Debate has been what is perhaps a slightly academic one, the controversy between those who think we should have collective security and those who are more inclined to think that we should rely on our own strength, with appropriate military alliances. I do not really know that the difference between the two points of view is so wide as it appears to be. My own feeling is that we shall not get a system of collective security ready made. We shall have to begin with alliances, I hope with the United States—we have one with Russia—and I hope with other countries in Europe. Out of that we may hope to build up a system of collective security, but it will perhaps take a very long time to do. What we can all agree on is that in any system, however much it is collective, however much it is particular, we must be strong. We must have an efficient Army, we must have a large Navy and we must have a very large and powerful Air Force, with bases in all parts of the world. The foreign policy of the future will depend very much on air power, and if a very great proportion of the air power of the world is British, I think the prospects for the existence of a certain amount of freedom and peace in the world will on that account be much brighter.

Mr. John Dugdate: I want first to say a word or two about the Prime Minister's speech, in particular his reference to France, and I should like to add my humble request to that of others that the Prime Minister should take steps to see that Britain and America

and Russia afford the earliest possible recognition to the French Government. I know it is said that one has to be very tactful and very careful not to offend the susceptibilities of our great American Ally, but my experience of Americans is that they like blunt, plain speaking and they do not like people to be too tactful with them. They consider that what we call tact is what they call "high hat," and they dislike it intensely. I would ask the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary if they cannot be a little more definite in requesting that the American Government agree with us in recognising the de Gaulle Government as soon as possible. There are many things that can be said against de Gaulle, but he did stand out in 1940 as, indeed, the Prime Minister stood out, and we must never forget that. He has as much right to be called a representative of France as certain other leaders, such as the members of the Yugoslav Government, have to be called representatives of their countries. If we are not going to question their bona fides, I cannot see why we should question the bona fides of General de Gaulle and his Provisional Government.
My main object in rising however is to turn the attention of Members in the direction to which it was turned by the hon. Member for West Renfrew (Mr. Wedderburn), namely, towards the Far East. The Prime Minister omitted any reference to the Far East, and I can only assume that he did so because the Foreign Secretary will deal wtih the matter. I know that he would not wish to appear deliberately to have left it out. The hon. Member for West Renfrew talked about the Chinese struggle. I thought some of the details about that struggle were not to be published because they were too terrible to be made public, until I read an article in the "Sunday Dispatch." As they have been made public, therefore, there is no need to be silent about them. That article said that China had two machine guns per battalion and one rifle for every five men, and that she had equipment all along the line on that scale.
I would ask whether it is not possible for us to do something to help the Chinese in both equipment and moral support. Last autumn I asked that a small token force should be sent to China; not a large force, because I know that we have plenty of other things to do with our troops, but


a small force, it may be only a brigade, to take part with General Stilwell's American troops in helping to defend China from the inside. I was told by the Foreign Secretary that we could not do that, and the main reason given was that it might interfere with American susceptibilities and that the Americans might think we were interfering with something which it was their duty to do and something which was their sphere.
Since that time I have been to America and have had the opportunity of asking a number of leading Americans what their view was on this question. I will mention only one, because he happens to have been in China recently. In spite of his recent decision not to stand for the Presidency, Wendell Willkie still does, I think, have a large following in America. He represents a big section of the people in that country. I said to him, "What is your view on this question of sending a small force of troops out to China? Do you think it would be interfering in some way with America's duties and responsibilities?" His answer rather surprised me. He said, "Far from that, the attitude of the ordinary American would be that, if you do not send troops, you are not fulfilling your obligations in that part of the world." He is only one man, I agree, and he does not represent the whole of America, but I would ask the Foreign Secretary to consider whether the American people might not take the view that we were shirking our responsibilities by not sending troops rather than the view that we were interfering with America by sending them.
I submit, however, that there are other things we can do apart from sending troops. I suggest that we might improve our supply organisation in China. I know that recently we have had the Needham Supply Commission which has gone out there and which, I think, will do much to improve the supply position in China. In the past we have seen some terrible cases of failure to send the supplies that China needed. I know the difficulties of sending supplies. I know that it means sending aeroplanes over the top of the Himalayas and that there is little space for supplies. That space, however, is not utilised to the best possible extent. The Chinese have asked for doctors from time to time, and they have been told that they cannot have them because they are needed for the

second front or for something else. With all the doctors we have at our disposal it is hard to make the Chinese understand that there are not two or three doctors available to go to China. It would be worth while for the Foreign Secretary to suggest that in future we will, as far as we can, put into the planes that are sent across the Himalayas such supplies as the Chinese Government ask for and not such as we think best for them to have.
The Chinese want not only force to help them, but moral support and evidence of British friendship. Do they get it to-day? I am not so certain that they do. Take the case of the Ministry of Information and the British Military Commission in Chungking. They are composed to a large extent of Shanghai merchants in uniform. Are these the best type of people to represent us in China? Those of us who have followed Chinese public opinion will know the views expressed about these Chinese Shanghai merchants, who used to stand at the world's longest bar day after day talking about the failures, the stupidities and, indeed, the alleged dishonesty of the Chinese people. These are the men whom we have selected to serve as British representatives on the Ministry of Information and the Military Mission in Chungking. I will quote in support no less a person than Madam Chiang Kai-shek
It ill becomes the Shanghai merchants to come to Chungking now in the name of assistance to free China.
That is the view held by the wife of the Generalissimo. We should take the same course with these representatives of the Ministry of Information as we take with foreign embassies. If a minister or an ambassador is distasteful to the foreign Government to which he is accredited, he is removed. I submit that these people are distasteful to the Chinese Government and should be removed.
I would ask for yet another reinforcement. While paying the highest possible tribute to our Ambassador and to his magnificent work in difficult circumstances, I submit that he needs reinforcement from above. During these past months, indeed, during past years, we have seen prominent people from other countries, particularly from America, going to China. Yet no British Cabinet Minister has been out there. No British Minister has been out there. I


know that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) was there at one time, but only temporarily and not in an official capacity. The hon. Member for West Renfrew and the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. J. J. Lawson) have been there, but no people with responsibility in the Government have been there. The Americans first sent out a private individual, Wendell Willkie. He went out on a mission similar to that of the right hon. and learned Member for East Bristol. America has now decided to send no less a person than the Vice-President of the United States. The President considers that the Chinese situation is so important that they should send the second most important person to represent America to discover what is going on in China. I would submit that His Majesty's Government should send out a man of Cabinet rank to China, so that he can make similar inquiries and see what can be done now to help the Chinese.
Lastly, I would suggest that there should be a special Cabinet Committee to deal with Far Eastern affairs. Maybe there is one now, but I think the Chinese have the impression that their affairs are settled at a very low level and not on the same level as are the affairs of, shall I say, the U.S.S.R. or America, that they are in fact dealt with largely by civil servants. I hope that the Foreign Secretary can assure us that there will be in the future a committee on Cabinet level to deal with Far Eastern matters. China is fighting under very great handicaps. She is short of food, clothing and materials. I ask that she may not be short also of good will.

Wing-Commander James: The Committee and yourself, Major Milner, should be relieved to hear that my speech is going to be very brief and that I am not going to refer to anything that has been alluded to previously in the Debate. The speech of the Prime Minister, particularly the early part of it, will relieve a good deal of anxiety, but there is one source of anxiety which will not be removed, and that is related to the present lack of information on all subjects about the course of events abroad. We are all in the same boat. We have a sort of conspiracy of good

will, but I think we are also a very long way down the slippery dope towards keeping things out of the newspapers because they are not pleasant. It is most disturbing to meet Americans or foreigners, or British subjects who have been abroad for a long time, and to find how much more they know—or think they khow—than we do, or perhaps how much better sources they have on which to form a judgment. A great deal of acute anxiety has been caused in this country since it has been realised that we do not get enough information, and I would ask whether the Foreign Office could not let up on its discreet directives to the responsible Press.
I come on to my other points. The first is that ever since the war began there has been one very simple rule in foreign policy, which is to avoid doing what the Germans wanted us to do. I think that can be narrowed down to saying, not to do what Goebbels wants us to do to suit his propaganda. I want for a moment to examine how far we have failed to follow this incontestable rule. Take first the case of Germany itself. In Germany to-day, Goebbels says all the time through the Press and radio: "You have now no choice but to follow us. We are all in the same boat. You people who have had your houses destroyed, unless you stick by the Nazi party to the end, you have no chance of surviving. Your only hope is to carry on to the bitter end." That is generally believed in Germany to-day. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs knows that I have been fortunate enough to have some recent first-hand information out of Germany. That is the belief of the man in the street, even the man who is sick and tired of the war and hopes to get out of it in some way or other soon. He thinks that he has no option.
What do we reply to it? We say: "Unconditional surrender." Surely we could qualify that and make it more intelligible, and not play into the hands of Goebbels. That is what I am complaining about. Instead of drawing the Germans together, as Goebbels wants us to do, we must seek to separate them and draw them apart. Let me put it the other way round. What we are doing at the present time with great success is to soften the Germans in a military potential, particularly by our terrific bombing, and


to harden them in a moral sense. We are neglecting Napoleon's incontestable dictum as to the value of the moral in relation to the physical. I am convinced that unless this point in our propaganda announcements is not altered very shortly it will cost needlessly tens of thousands of lives in the coming offensive, because we shall be up against people who feel themselves cornered and who will fight to the last man, because they see no other way.
Surely, after the last war, we made one very simple, fundamental mistake in our treatment of Germany. We failed to bring home to the German people the fact that they were utterly defeated militarily. We failed to destroy the nucleus of militancy as we should have done and as we must do this time; but at the same time we did not take steps to ensure that the great mass of the German people had a fairly rapid chance of material recovery. The effect of that mistake was that we merely drove Germans, who for the time being were a bit tired of war, into the hands of the General Staff, for the next attack. This is the fundamental mistake that we must avoid this time. Let us make certain that we utterly destroy every vestage of militarism, but let us at the same time give the German people a fair prospect of living when they have reformed themselves—not before. There has to be a drastic purge; let us make that plain; but that nation, being what it is, will not mind a good many people being executed if the rest can get away. In the meantime, let us not play the Goebbels' game of keeping them together.
After all, there are only two logical alternatives; either we are totally to destroy 80,000,000 Germans, or we are not. The Prime Minister said three months ago in this House that we were not. Surely there is no argument, in that case, for not telling the Germans, in specific terms and quickly, what we are going to do. I say again, to use a horrid phrase of the time, let us plug this information all the time in our B.B.C. British broadcasts. All the information from Germany to-day suggests that the Germans, oddly enough, believe what we say. Let us put it across in the B.B.C. broadcasts here, not only in our German broadcasts, because I think the German people believe our own broadcasts even more than they believe the broadcasts to Germany. Let us show them that there is no incompatibility be-

tween unconditional surrender and the Prime Minister's statement made in this House three months ago.
The other subject I wish to touch upon I have referred to before in this House, and it is the position of the so-called satellites. I think that a number of Members have read during the week-end what I think is an extraordinarily good pamphlet on the subject of Denmark by Christian Möller. It not only explained the position in which Denmark found herself in 1940 but illustrates the position in which all the little countries of Europe found themselves at that time. I think we differentiate most unfairly between what we are now pleased to call satellites and the occupied countries. There is a difference, but it does not pay us to overdo it. In that awful time after the collapse of France, everybody in Europe thought that we were beaten. The examples before the small countries of the consequences of resisting German demands were discouraging, and we must not be too hard on people who took what then appeared to be the only possible course to save their womenfolk and children from extermination. We are being very unfair, in my submission.
What of Austria? We have said that Austria is to be independent, but there were a great many more Nazis in Austria in 1939 than in any other of the small countries of Europe. I spent a certain amount of time in Austria. I did not mix in their politics at all, but one saw certain reasons why these people took this line; but there are more Nazis there than in Hungary. Why do we brand Hungary as a satellite? Why, only a few weeks ago the Germans occupied the country by night with five divisions. Was that action necessary to a country friendly to the Germans? Hungary is as much an occupied country as Denmark and Finland. Could we possibly expect Finland, in view of what occurred to her in the last six years, not to have taken up the line she did? She could not help herself. How could Finland extract herself now from the German pocket? She cannot do it. She cannot feed herself. She has no fuel. We must make allowances for the position of these people.

Lieut.-commander Gurney Braithwaite: Would the hon. and gallant Member develop that point a little


further? He says that Hungary is as much an occupied country as Denmark. Surely that is entirely misleading. The acid test in these matters is, surely, whether troops of these countries are fighting with the enemy or not.

Wing-Commander James: I agree that I overstated that; I was using too broad a brush. Nevertheless, I stick to the point that, by comparison, the Hungarian position resembles much more that of Denmark. What have we done to detach these people from the Germans, to give them hope, to avoid playing the German game? There have lately been published with the authority of the Government two declarations. The first was published in "The Times" under the headline "Official Joint Declaration." The main headline is, "Warning to Satellites" and the statement reads:
It is officially announced that the Government of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States have made the following declaration.
Then follows what in my submission is one of the most foolish statements of policy I have ever read or hope I shall ever read. It starts:
Through the fatal policy of their leaders the people of Hungary are suffering the humiliation of German occupation. Rumania is still bound to the Nazis in a war now bringing devastation to its own people. The Governments of Bulgaria and Finland have placed their countries in the service of Germany and remain in the war at Germany's side.
Then, later on, it says, refering to Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland, paragraph r, sub-paragraph:
These nations still have it within their power by withdrawing from the war and ceasing their collaboration with Germany and by resisting the forces of Nazism.
and so on. In my submission they could not have it in their power. It is not in their power, and to say that is to bind them to the German chariot, and is a fatal mistake from our own point of view.

Mr. Lipson: Is it not as much in their power as it was in the power of the Italian Government to make peace with the Allies?

Wing-Commander James: Before we landed in Italy? The hon. Member's timing is wrong. Could the Italians have broken away before we landed? Certainly they could not. That is the comparison to make. I submit that the declaration

to which I have referred was an unfortunate one which plays into Goebbels' hands. Do let us keep in the front of our minds that the enemy is Germany first, last and all the time, and that these other people are really subsidiary to our main task. Let us keep our eye on the ball. We are fighting to free Europe, not to enslave it, to free these people, not to enslave them, or to let anybody else enslave them if we can help it. We have our honour to consider, and we must be very careful that we do not compromise for the sake of temporary military advantage. I submit that there are three steps we should take and could take right now to facilitate the operations of the Second Front. The first is to announce clearly and continuously that we are out to restore the liberty of these people and to guarantee it so far as lies in our power. Secondly, that we shall punish the Quislings or, better still, facilitate their punishment by their own people. After all there are not many of them. Thirdly, and I submit that this is a practical step, we should announce the formula of what I would call a pre-Amgot Mission, a mixed Allied Mission, British, American and Russian, to accompany the troops into those countries to see that the promises we make to them are in fact carried out. That is surely the way to make their position and our position easier. If these things are not done I am convinced that our Second Front task will be very much harder.
In conclusion, as the Prime Minister made reference to him, I might be allowed to say one thing about that remarkable Australian who died last week, Arthur Yencken. Until the war is over it is not possible to record what the British war effort owes to that man. I would just record one characteristic sentence of his. I was complaining to him, about the middle of 1940, of the way in which he was exhausting himself by overwork and also deeply dipping into his private means to supplement the official entertainment allowance granted in that period. His reply was, "0Don't you worry. It is my contribution to the British Empire in which my children are going to live."

Mr. Raikes: A Debate of this character is almost always an occasion for all parties to justify their own actions in regard to the League of Nations. It seems to me that at the present time our task is to try as far as


we can to seek to avoid the mistakes which brought this war about, and to remember that it is very easy to sow the seeds of another war even before the Armistice. We heard a very remarkable speech from the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern) earlier today, a speech which, unfortunately, will probably be not nearly so well reported to-morrow as many less interesting ones. I do not intend to deal with the aspects he dealt with in regard to Russia and Poland. Of our failures at the end of the last war I place first and foremost the failure to deal with German war criminals and to make Germany realise she had been properly beaten. I am convinced that we must have the whole question of war criminals treated as part of the Armistice terms rather than have it left for peace treaties, which may not be signed for a considerable period.
I think a great mistake after the last war was the forcible incorporation of various minorities with Powers they never wished to join, with the result that there were a number of new States set up which were not stable States and which held within their orbit people who never wished to belong to them. The result was that there was political dynamite with which Hitler did much to destroy everything that had been done in the course of the last 20 years. I am certain that if we are to see a happy Europe at the end of this war most careful efforts will have to be made to see that the peoples of Europe find themselves in the States in which they wish to live, and not within the States in which they have been placed as being most convenient in order to avoid trouble with somebody else in Europe.
I would like to utter one word of warning about the League. Much has been said about it. I do not propose to make a pro- or anti-League speech, but I do think that in the past the League has been assumed rather too much to be an end in itself rather than a piece of machinery designed to increase the chances of arbitration and reduce the chances of aggression. If we simply say, "Of course, if people had worked the League differently it would have been successful," if we build up the League in just the same form at the end of this war as it was built up at the end of the last one, it seems to me extremely likely that just the same weaknesses in human nature may materialise and may lead to the

failure of the League itself. That blessed phrase "collective security," which under certain conditions could mean so much, in fact did more to help aggressive States in Europe than anything else, because to a large number of peaceful States collective security was a good reason for leaving someone else to do the rearming they should have undertaken. I do not say that we cannot have some form of League. I am going to suggest the lines on which we might proceed in the days when the war is over. Do not let us forget that people have been told about the ideals for which we have fought the war. We went to war to restore the rule of law in Europe. It was those bright ideals which inspired our people in 1939 and which kept our people going in 1940. They mean that a State, whether it be a small State or a large State, shall have the right to live as the ordinary people within it wish to live.
Some people say that the small State is the cause of war. I have heard it said many times. The small State is so often the occasion for war because it is so tempting to the larger neighbour if the latter has aggressive ideas, but if you had a world of small States you would never have universal war. I suggest that the small States have to be made, in some way or other, less tempting propositions to their more powerful neighbours than they were before. The only way you can do that is to encourage the joining together of small and medium-sized States in Europe in some sort of federation for their own benefit—some form of regional federation, whatever larger bodies you may have over the top. If you had a small number of these States, well-meaning and bound together by a common policy for defence, they could, T maintain, be secure themselves, because they would be too strong to be split by one wedge though not strong enough to intimidate any great neighbour. You would, by this means, achieve something which the League had completely failed to attain in the 20 years between the two wars.
Finally, I would say that it is easy enough to talk of this federation and of the spirit of the Europe that we want to see after the war, but it lies in the hands of this country and of this Government, more, I think, than anywhere else, how the future of Europe is going to materialise. The alternative to the peace-


ful federation of States, having equality and protection against their neighbours, is the "sphere of influence," which means, in the long run, that you will have the same small Powers of Europe, grouped either under the influence of Russia in the East, or under the influence of Britain, and perhaps America, in the West, and that is a policy that must lead to war. I think that, for that reason, if you accept the "sphere of influence," rather than try to maintain in Europe comparatively large bodies of small States strong enough to defend themselves, you will have no moral reason whatever for opposing certain States, which make use of the "sphere of influence" policy in a way of which you do not approve.

Sir Edward Grigg: Does the hon. Member include a combination of States?

Mr. Raikes: You must, of course, have a degree, but that is a very different thing to the sort of sphere of political influence, which may be nicely done between friendly Governments and in which a small State might be regarded as a satellite of a great neighbour. I believe that we have a great deal of influence on our great Ally Russia, and whether we exert that influence, in these times, is going to be the cross-road between war or peacemaking in Europe in the next 20 years. Collaboration between great democracies in making a free Europe, in which there should be no fear of terror of war, like those fears and terrors that have raged through Europe within the last 20 years, would be, from the longer point of view of Russia herself, an advantage. On the other hand, Russia might say that it is easy enough for Britain and America, with no particular interest in Europe, to talk of no territorial aggrandisement, but that the Soviet Union is a European Power. If the Soviet, instead of collaborating, makes the end of this war a little bit like the ending of the last, when a good many territories were taken by the victors, they will cause a great deal of bitterness.
I heard one hon. Member opposite say that a convenient thing to do with Poland would be to move the boundaries, so that Russia took Eastern Poland, and Poland took Eastern Germany. Well, that is not the way in which to solve the problem. It is the way in which you are going, once again, to incorporate dissident min-

orities in States in which they do not wish to live. True, there are small States that are backward and not strong enough to exist by themselves. All I say in regard to small minorities of that sort is that they should have some form of free plebiscite in which the people should have the right to decide, themselves, in which State they desired to be incorporated. If you put matters in that way, you will do something, at least, to solve the minority problem, and if you can do something to solve the minority problem in Europe, you are going to strengthen the ordinary medium-sized States in Europe, and the strength of that State is vital in time of peace. That depends very largely on ourselves. If we are prepared to wait until the end of the war, we shall be told that we are humbugs, and nothing will be achieved. I rarely give a quotation, but I see the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs is in his place, and I would remind him of what a famous predecessor of his, Lord Palmerston, said in 1848:
I hold the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right. As long as England keeps herself in the right, as long as she wishes to permit no injustice, as long as she sympathises with right and justice, she will never find herself altogether alone.
If the present Foreign Secretary can lead this country with the same idea, I venture to suggest that many of the dangers that now afflict us will be swept away, and our country will, once again, lead Europe and civilisation towards the paths of peace.

Mr. Rhys Davies: I have listened to nearly the whole of this Debate, and I must say that parts of it have pleased me very much. The hon. Member for South-East Essex (Mr. Raikes) will forgive me for saying that I was delighted with some of the sentiments on world organisation for peace he expressed, because they coincided with what I want to say. The next thing I want to say about this Debate is that I am satisfied that we have collected here to-day some of the ingredients that this country will import into the Peace Treaty when it is made at the end of this war. There is, however, one thing apparent in the Debate to-day. There is, obviously, a clash of opinion arising already between the Left and Right parties in the Commons. Let me give one or two instances. From some of the benches opposite we have


had the usual talk of punishing the whole of the Germans and of trying war criminals—

Hon. Members: Not one.

Mr. Davies: The hon. Member for Penryn and Falmouth (Mr. Petherick) made almost the whole point of his speech that it was no use trying to establish a world organisation for peace, and the hon. and gallant Member for Wellingborough (Wing-Commander James), if I did not mistake him, wanted to punish the Germans too. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] At any rate some of the speeches delivered in this Committee to-day tended that way—

Wing-Commander James: The hon. Member has completely mis-quoted me. I said that drastic punishment of evildoers and leaders must come first, and then there would be a chance of leading these people in a better way.

Mr. Davies: I would like to know how the hon. Gentleman will decide who are the evil-doers; the evil-doers are not all, by any means, on one side during a war; you cannot possibly calculate how many criminals there are in Germany or in any other country at war. What I fear is that if there is any punishment forced upon Germany as is suggested, it will come back on the working classes of this country. Statesmen who govern the several countries at war never, somehow, punish each other. I once stood outside the palace where the ex-Kaiser whom we were going to hang lived in exile in Holland and said that I would not mind hanging there for ten years myself. What happened to our own miners at the end of the last war? The German miners were working furiously for a pittance providing coal for nothing for France, Italy and Belgium, and 15,000 miners in my division were unemployed and tens of thousands more miners in South Wales in the same plight. That was a consequence of the spirit of revenge introduced into the Versailles Peace Treaty. I should like the Committee to remember those facts before importing revengeful provisions into the Peace Treaty that is to come. I want them to understand, too, the boomerang effects of anything of that sort on tens of thousands of workpeople in this country Whole districts were made derelict and shipyards became idle for years because we got coal and ships for nothing from

Germany after the last war. Some of the more sensible people in this country are now saying that we should not ask for reparations in kind this time; we should demand that German workers should be transferred to devastated territories and work there to rebuild them. Let me ask honourable Members not to have anything to do with a proposition of this kind. What would the working-classes of this country say if thousands of them were unemployed and German workmen were brought to this country to rebuild London, Manchester and Coventry?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Why does the hon. Member assume that thousands of people in this country will be unemployed after the war?

Mr. Davies: Because I do not believe that any Government, either in Germany, France, Italy or Great Britain, will be clever enough, at the end of this war, to harness the economic and financial consequences of this war. Let me give the hon. Member a case from my own division. Between the two wars I had 15,000 miners unemployed, with 22 pits closed down for good. There are no industrial prospects in my division, of any kind, at the end of this war. As soon as the manufacture of munitions is finished in my division, I know of nothing that any Government can do to find employment there. The hon. Gentleman must not be too clever. We can put any Government in power, but war must have its consequences. It destroys trade. Half of our merchant shipping is at the bottom of the Atlantic already. Where are we going to get ships to carry our exports at the end of the war? I was in this House when the late Mr. Ramsay MacDonald stood at the Box, as Prime Minister, and said that the American Federal Reserve Board would not give us any more loans unless the Unemployment Assistance Board reduced benefits by 2s. a week. We are in the hands of the American financiers now, a thousand times more than we were on that occasion.
I am very apprehensive of the consequences to our people of this great conflict. Hon. Members must not mistake my patriotism when I talk like this. I feel so deeply for my country that I do not like to see it going down to poverty; I do not like to see it descending to bankruptcy. I feel there is a genius among our people that could bring mankind out


of this terrible conflict soon if it were properly employed. I know a little about Central Europe—mentioned in this Debate. I can never understand where we got the conceit that 46,000,000 Britishers can effectively police the whole of the peoples of that vast area. There are 30,000,000 Poles, 20,000,000 Rumanians; then there are Bessarabians, Transylvanians and many other races. I have been over some of those countries, and the Committee may be interested to know what I have told some of their leaders. Until the people of Central Europe learn how to tolerate each other's religion, language and customs as we do in these islands not all the power of Great Britain, the United States and Russia combined can bring them peace. Peace must always come from within and not from without.
I come now to other problems of foreign affairs. Some little time ago I secured 70 Members of this House to sign a Motion calling the attention of His Majesty's Government to some serious departures on their part from the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. What are those departures? First of all, the Prime Minister told the world that India did not fall within the provisions of the Charter, that Burma and no other British Colonial territory is within the Charter either. More than that, he said that as a matter of right, neither Germany, Italy nor Japan, nor any of their satellites, can come within the terms of that Charter. What does that mean? I can remember him standing at that Box and saying, "Let the Italians stew in their own juice." When we consider the exclusion of so many nations of the world from the Atlantic Charter the Prime Minister has said in effect that 50 per cent. of the human race should stew in their own juice; that these international provisions do not apply to them. I am not without appreciation of the difficulties of Governments in wartime. I know, too, a little of Yugoslavia where the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians are always quarrelling amongst themselves. I am doubtful if even Marshal Tito, the Communist, can ever bring them to live together unless they adopt, as suggested by one hon. Member, the federated principle to their State. The same principle should apply to Czechoslovakia as well.
I want now to say something else about diplomacy. Our Government seem to base all their actions on expediency. They have no definite set of principles to guide them in their diplomacy. I wonder whether they take note of recent events in the United States of America. I have been there several times and I know a little about the grand old Republican Party. I would ask the Committee to remember the tendency towards isolationism in the United States. I know that newspapers will say that the defeat of Wendell Willkie at the primaries did not mean isolationism.

Mr. Vernon Bartlett: What newspapers said that?

Mr. Davies: The American newspapers, and some of our own, too. I receive newspapers from America by the way.

Mr. Bartlett: So do we.

Mr. Davies: I do not want to quarrel with the hon. Gentleman, because in the main he and I agree on foreign affairs. At any rate he ought to agree with me on that issue. I am very much afraid that American politics are gravitating once again towards repeating what happened to the late President Wilson. Once the Republican Party disposed of Wendell Willkie it meant a throwback towards isolationism in America.
I agree with one or two hon. Gentlemen who have spoken from the benches opposite that there is little chance of a successful world organisation for peace unless the United States is in it. One hon. Gentleman—I am sorry he has gone out —delivered a very pessimistic speech on that score; he said that because of language, religious and racial difficulties we could never hope for a world organisation at all. If he has been to Chicago, New York or Philadelphia he has seen there every colour and almost every race living together in one city. Let me give another example of collaboration. People say that you cannot get these several nationalities to live and work together. What about Switzerland? The French, Germans and Italians are living together in Switzerland. If we come nearer home, we have the Welsh, English and Scottish people living together too.

Mr. Kirkwood: It is not very easy for a Scotsman.

Mr. Davies: I know that it is not easy, and it may comfort my hon. Friend when I say that "Haw-Haw" is neither a Scotsman nor a Welshman. The Foreign Office ought to have regard to these tendencies, especially in the United States of America, and in anything they could do to try to get the United States to assist towards this world organisation they would find the key to the success of such an organisation. Let me interpose for a moment about the suggestion that Russia should annex part of the Polish Ukraine. I have been there, too, by the way.

Mr. Pickthorn: And the hon. Member seems to have kept on coming back.

Mr. Davies: It will please the hon. Gentleman to know that I am as great a patriot as anyone when I am abroad. It may be of interest to him to know, too, that I had dinner at Christmas in 1938 with the arch-Isolationist Senator Borah, and he will be interested to know what I told him in reply to his criticism of Great Britain. It is the duty of the citizen of every country to try to keep his own country straight but when he is abroad to stand up for his country against the criticisms that are made against it. One suggestion was made that annoyed me about East Prussia. That is sowing the seed of the third great war in Europe. Can anybody imagine that the Prussians would live happily under the Poles?

Mr. Kirkwood: No, but we are going to teach them.

Mr. Davies: Why on earth should it be suggested that people should leave their homes and be dealt with like chattels by the great Powers? I want to protest against the assumption of the great Powers that they are entitled to throw batches of the human race like goods from one Government to another without consulting the peoples. I do not think I am saying anything too strong when I add that the present proposal—because I am not so sure that Poland has asked for East Prussia yet—is about the most foul conception in the whole of this business and, at any rate, is against all the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
I wonder if I dare, as an ordinary individual, quote Clausewitz in support of what I am trying to say? He said "Wars are just the continuance of policy in other

fields." That is exactly what happens; and if the diplomacy of a nation is not straight and honest, then we are bound to have wars. President Wilson, soon after the last war, made a statement about the reasons for war: "The seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry." I wonder, therefore, whether there is any substance left in the statement that we went to war for the independence of Poland? Some hon. Members contradict that. Some hon. Gentlemen said that we went to war for other reasons entirely. Well, we led the peoples of these islands to believe that we went to war for the independence of the Poland of 1939, and now I doubt very much whether the British Government will have a word to say as to the kind of Poland that will emerge from this conflict. Stalin, I suppose, will determine all that.
I want, if I may, to strike a personal note. The Committee knows my views on war and peace and I have to thank it for its toleration. It is a great tribute to the House of Commons that it is tolerant; and when I have been to Central Europe and talked to some of the people in authority there I have pointed with pride to the House of Commons. If they learned the toleration that we exercise toward each other here, the sort of conflict we have in Europe at present would never have arisen. They must learn to tolerate each other as we do.
My last word is this: The common expression, of course, is that Hitler made this war. What is ten thousand times more important is to find out the causes that made Hitlerism. When the statesmen sit down in Conference, as they will do, to draft the next peace treaty they will not be concerned about Hitler and Mussolini; what they will be concerned with will be tariffs, trade barriers, commerce, shipping, banking, colonies, territories and frontiers. That is what they will be discussing. They will never say a word about fighting for freedom and religion either—that vocabulary will have passed away. I have been here for a number of years and I am older than most. I am sad beyond measure at the state of affairs in my native country. I do not like to see us going down once more into poverty and unemployment. I am afraid that General Smuts was right when he said there would be nothing in


our till when this war was over. I hope, however, that the British Government will take a strong hand to see that the poverty and unemployment which prevailed between the two great wars will not come upon us once again.

Mr. Hamilton Kerr: I shall be brief but, as Mark Twain once said, I cannot guarantee that I shall not be tedious. The hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) mentioned the fact that he was old. Now a certain number of hon. Members on this bench have been classified as "young Tories." For myself, I insist on being classified as middle-aged, because I am certain that youth is a luxury which no serious politician can long afford. I think the hon. Member for Westhoughton did some hon. Members an injustice when he claimed that they all wished for the indiscriminate and ruthless punishment of Germans. I think the hon. and gallant Member for Wellingborough (Wing-Commander James) put the case very well. Our bombing must be a terrifying experience for the German people at the present moment. They put up with it because they feel that the peace which is going to follow will be even more terrible perhaps than the bombing. I would say that perhaps the best formula to tell them now is, "Butter but no guns." For surely Hans Schmidt—or some typical German citizen in Essen—first got work in 1935 when Krupps started making howitzers or some such implements of war. Having assured him that in the peace he is going to have a job, but is never to be allowed to fight again, you might persuade him to resist with less determination than he does now.
The hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Granville) is temporarily not in his seat, but I must take him up on one point which be made and which was not challenged. He said the British Empire would never stand a second Singapore. Well, Singapore was captured and what has happened? Is Australia downcast or beaten? Do we see processions in the streets of Melbourne or Sydney asking for release from the British Empire? Not at all, the Australian lion roars even louder than the British, and I believe that no material disaster will ever rend asunder the British Empire, which is tied together by stronger links.
The Noble Lord the Member for Lanark (Lord Dunglass) made this point in his interesting speech, that we in this island —some 45,000,000 people if you include Ulster—cannot hope to remain a great Power as long as we stand alone but, in conjunction with the British Empire and Commonwealth, we can exercise a tremendous influence. Surely one fact is obvious, that the British Empire and Commonwealth is a series of islands dependent primarily on air and sea communications. Now only one Power, if hostile, can interrupt those communications, and that is the United States of America. Fortunately, the United States and the British Empire are vitally important to each other, the one not more nor less than the other.
Let me try to illustrate my point by two examples. Let us imagine the impossible situation of war between the United States and the British Empire. Canada could not long resist attack. Australia and New Zealand would be isolated and, were an American fleet able to cross the South Atlantic, and establish a base at Dakar, then the route round the South of the Cape of Good Hope would be cut. But let us look at the other side of the picture. Have Americans ever thought what would have happened if Nelson had lost the Battle of Trafalgar? Canada would have doubtless returned to the French flag. I doubt if Napoleon would have ever considered the completion of the great Louisiana Purchase, and perhaps in Washington to-day we should have seen the Tricolour flying over the White House and America part of a great French Empire. America, in fact, as Mr. Lipmann pointed out, owes its independence entirely to the fact that at Portsmouth there was a strong line of British battleships throughout the 19th century.
Even in this war, what would have happened to America if Hitler had succeeded in conquering the United Kingdom? Imagine the scene at Washington if the news had been telegraphed through that German tanks had landed and, perhaps, copying the stategy of William the Conqueror, had swept over the Thames at Wallingford, and stood between London and the industrial Midlands. Many would have said, "The war is over; we must make peace with the new masters of the world." Others would have said,


"Tell the British to fall back to the Western ports, and we will try to supply them from the Atlantic." Surely, Mr. Lipmann was extremely right when he said that President Wilson entirely failed to convince America about the rightness of her entry into the last war because he relied on slogans—he used the words, "To make the world safe for democracy." Why, indeed, did the United States enter the war? Because the United States could not tolerate a strong hostile Power dominating the Atlantic.
If we wish to get real co-operation among the Allies after this war we must rely not on slogans but on practical facts. What does the slogan "make the world safe for democracy" mean. It means the possession of bases. None of us know what will happen in the United States after the November election. We do not know what President will he sitting in the White House, or what majorities will dominate Congress or what mood the American troops will be in when they return to their country. However, although the minds and tempers of people change, geography does not, and I therefore suggest that the most practical form of co-operation with the United States is to have a discussion now on the joint use of bases. General joint staff machinery is already in existence and surely it would be easy for that joint machinery to continue after this war. Thus, although a. majority of the Congress of the United States were hesitant about signing a formal treaty of alliance with this country, in fact practical co-operation would exist.
What briefly are our joint requirements? We, as a great air and sea Power, want strong bases in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. What does the United States want? Already we have leased to the United States the inner line of defences guarding approach to the Panama Canal, the series of bases and islands which run from St. John's, Newfoundland, down to Trinidad. Now the United States, as the Noble Lord the Member for Lanark said in his admirable speech, has begun to realise the value of defence in depth, and, after the war, we shall no doubt find America demanding bases in Greenland, Iceland and perhaps in the Azores and at Dakar. In the Pacific they will require similar bases.

Already they have the Aleutians and Pearl Harbour, but perhaps an outer line of bases would serve their interests, bases in the Bonin Islands, Formosa, Manila, Singapore, Sourabaya, and if we could reach agreement with the United States on the pooled use of these bases for after the war, I claim that this would be practical co-operation. Further, we should not confine this pooling merely to the United States and the British Empire, but to other Allied Nations.
What is the problem in Europe? It is this: We have a 20 years treaty of Alliance with Russia. Here again the interests of Russia and of the British Empire come together. It is certainly true that the great Russian Army has been essential to us in this war. What would we have done without the tremendous battle which 200 Russian divisions have offered to the German Wehrmacht? But what is the other side of the picture? Had Hitler conquered this island in 1940, and had we not been able to send supplies to Russia, I doubt whether she, even with her illimitable resources, would have been able to sustain her people single-handed against Germany.

Dr. Morgan: Would the hon. Gentleman give Russia bases?

Mr. Kerr: Certainly, on a mutual basis. If the Russians, say, allowed us to use Vladivostock let them use in return Singapore.

Mr. Martin: What the hon. Gentleman is saying is very important and I would like to get it clear. Is he suggesting that these bases should be in a pool of alliance or a pool of nations that happened to have been in alliance during the war? That distinction is important.

Mr. Kerr: I would start by pooling bases between the United States and the British Empire and then offering them on a reciprocal basis to the Soviet Union, and to other Allied Nations such as the Dutch. I would start by pooling them between the three or four great Powers which have been instrumental in winning this war and later offering their use in more settled times to other Allied Nations. When Bismarck came to power in Germany that far sighted statesman knew that the one hope for the German domination of Europe was to separate the East from the


West. A highly efficient general staff in Germany, in subsequent years, has seen to it that Germany enjoys every possible advantage from her central position, through her superb railway system and now through her air bases. Germany is the roundabout of the European traffic ways. To travel North, South, East or West you must pass Germany. If Germany is allowed to recover after the war she will be by far the strongest Power in Europe. What will help her? It will help her if England and Russia fall out.

Mr. Kirkwood: The hon. Gentleman means "Britain."

Mr. Kerr: I beg the hon. Member's pardon, remembering that Dr. Johnson once said, that the best road a Scotsman sees is the high road to England. There is one thing which will encourage the resurgence of Germany after the war, and that is the lapse of the 20 years Treaty between Soviet Russia and Britain. Let us be quite frank about this issue. A great deal of suspicion exists on both sides. The Russians are suspicious of their Allies. They look back on history when numerous aggressions have taken place from the West. We on the other hand are not at all sure about Russia's ambitions in Europe, in the Balkans and perhaps in the Middle East. Therefore I suggest that the one way to encourage the removal of these suspicions would be to have a joint staff machinery in Europe just as we shall have in the Mediterranean, the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Make no doubt about the point, if that 20 years Treaty were to lapse the inevitable consequences would be either war against a resurgent Germany or perhaps war against Russia herself. If that Treaty lapses it will not be more than five or ten years before the sirens are sounding again in our cities, or ten years before German tanks are ploughing through the wheatfields of the Ukraine. Considering power in its naked aspect we must realise that this alliance is essential if Germany is the chief enemy. Now I am extremely worried about public opinion in this country after the war. We are such a kindly, tolerant and forgiving people. It is true that we have been bombed, but to the limited imagination of most people an aeroplane in the sky is an impersonal thing. We might feel different if German tanks had trav-

elled through the Kentish Weald, or the people of Sevenoaks or Canterbury had had Gestapo officers knocking at their doors.
Even now we have people protesting in the country about our Lancasters and Halifaxes bombing the vital industrial centres of Germany. If that is possible now I am more than frightened that it will be possible in 1960, when imagination has faded and the threat of the ever present Germany will not seem so terrible as it is now. If it is hard for people in Birmingham or Hereford to remember what a tremendous menace Germany is now, haw much harder will it be for the man in the Mississippi Valley, Detroit, or California to remember the dangers to his country. I feel that one of the main tasks of statesmanship will be to beat the warning tap of Drake's drum, in the years after the war, and keep people informed about the true facts of foreign policy.
Let us give up slogans, let us have no more of making the world safe for democracy. That means the possession of power and the possession of vital bases. The strength of a great country is made up of its industrial resources, its geographical position and its population, but there is one other factor, the character of its people. Now the character of the British people has been one of the dominating factors in this war. It is such that we can always tell them the truth, however hard it is. I would have this fact continually brought home over the microphone, in Parliament and on the public platforms for the next half century, that peace has its price, and can only be earned by personal effort, and that effort has to be made by each one of us.

Mr. Vernon Bartlett: I am particularly glad to follow the hon. Member because I find myself in entire agreement with everything that he has said. He talked about public opinion here. I should like to call attention to the state of public opinion on the Continent. It seems to me that during this Debate there has been a lot of academic talk about the League of Nations and, as one hon. Member said, some have been defending their attitude because they criticised the League, and others because they supported it. I cannot get away from the feeling that, possibly within a few hours, days or weeks, our men will


be going overseas on the gravest mission that any army has ever undertaken. What is going to be the attitude of the people in Europe when these men have gone? What can we do to see that the effort made by that army meets with the fullest possible success?
The days have gone by when our friends in the Allied countries came out into the streets and cheered when our bombers came across, because it is a tragic but inevitable fact that in the process of softening up Western Europe, we have to inflict a great deal of destruction and suffering and misery on our closest Allies. We have to face up to the fact that the Vichy propagandists are making the fullest possible use of this, and to some extent they must have met with success. Nor is that all. As soon as the invasion begins, our Allies will be faced, in some cases, with the problem of starvation. I was told the other day that it is believed that the stocks of food in Paris are only sufficient for 48 hours. In other words, as soon as the invasion begins, the Germans will pay no attention whatever to the requirements of the civilian population and we shall have, in the large cities of France, not only hunger but possibly actual starvation, and we shall have this appalling competition for shipping, between our requirements in munitions and arms, and foodstuffs for our Allies.
I do not remind the Committee of these points because I want to spread alarm and despondency—far from it—but because I want to suggest that the gravity of the situation in France makes the political lesson very clear. Surely, the political lesson is that we must hand over the full responsibility for the government of France to the French people as soon as is possible. I was very sorry to hear to-day that the Prime Minister could not go further than he did in that matter. I think, as the hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson) said in his admirable speech, that the time has very definitely come when General de Gaulle represents France as much as any other leader in any other Allied country. I know he is a difficult man. I met him first in February, 1940, behind the Maginot Line and had to stand far two hours hi the snow watching his beastly tanks going up and down a hill. I was clad only in an ordinary London suit and overcoat. He had a leather overcoat and high boots, and

I have had a certain resentment against him ever since. He is a difficult man, but every time we postpone the full recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Algiers, we are playing definitely into the hands of the worse elements in the French Liberation movement.
I take the case of France as an illustration of our foreign policy generally, just four years ago the courage of the Prime Minister, wedded to the courage of the people of this country, carried us through at a time when nobody outside the British Commonwealth believed there was any hope, and if it were not for the memory of that courage I would sometimes think that the foreign policy of this country was frozen by fear. There is a certain fear of the unknown.
Events are happening on the Continent of Europe about which we do not know very much. As one of my hon. Friends urged a few moments ago, we ought, if possible, to be told more than we are told. I happen at times to write for the newspapers, and I think that sometimes I should write with much greater frankness and worry a little less about hurting the susceptibilities of some of our Allies. We are faced with a Europe which will have changed beyond recognition during these four years. Those of us who come in contact with any members of the resistance movements, or of any of the Allied countries, have all been impressed by that sense of a new era and the feeling that the people of Europe are on the march.
I get the feeling sometimes that the Government try to turn the clock back, or that they hope that we shall go back to the sort of conditions there were in 1939. The men of the resistance movements may not know very clearly what they want, but they do know what they do not want. As far as I can make out, they do not want a return to that corruption which often went by the name of democracy in their countries. They do not want kings, if the kings have only held power in the past with the help of dictatorships. I do not think they want dictatorship of any kind because they have seen enough of what it means under the rule of Hitler. I think that our anticlockwise policy has led some of them to fear that they cannot get the advice, guidance and help that they need here. All these peoples in Europe do look to


this country for advice. They know that if this country had not held out four years ago, there would have been no hope of their regaining their independence for generations, and perhaps for centuries. If they do not get the sympathetic advice from us that they want, they must inevitably turn to the Soviet Union.
I have felt throughout this Debate that one of the troubles about our foreign policy is the anxiety of a good many hon. Members about the intentions of the Soviet Union. We are told that the Greek national liberation movement is under the control of Communists, but there is only one member of the ten on the E.A.M. political committee who is a Communist. We heard this argument about Spain. We were told that the people of Spain on the Republican side were all Communists, and it was not true. The people of Spain and of Greece are not people to take naturally and willingly to Communism at all. It was not true in the case of Spain, and I doubt whether it is true with regard to Greece or Yugoslavia. It is difficult for us to know. When the hon. and gallant Member for Lancaster (Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean), who has played so remarkable a part in Yugoslavia, comes back and gives his impressions about what is happening in that country, I am predisposed to accept them. Unless we give help to these new young movements, they are inevitably going to come under the control of the Soviet Union.
I am not interested in the slightest bit in power politics although a lot of my hon. Friends are. It is a legitimate approach to foreign affairs, but it seems to me that the people who mostly fear the influence of the Soviet Union are doing the most to extend its influence. I believe sincerely that there can be no major war in Europe if Britain and the Soviet Union are in agreement. For that reason I plead for a more sympathetic welcome to these new movements and a little less fear of them because their manners may be a little rough and they may talk the kind of language that we do not all like. If we do not get the support of these movements, the European Continent will be divided into two rival camps, with Britain on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. We shall be on the losing side, because we shall not be on the side of those great popular movements.
May I add a word about the Soviet Union? My hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) told us a little time ago about the many places he had visited. I shall not try to compete with him in that respect, but I think I am one of the relatively few Members of this Committee who have been to the Soviet Union during the war and been for a short time on the Russian front. I was very shocked by some of the things I saw in Russia. I do not like the inequalities I found there, or the lack of respect for the integrity of the individual which, to me, is the most important thing in the whole of political life. I do not find that it is a country that a lot of my hon. Friends on this side of the House believe it to be. I say it quite frankly, because I am convinced that there cannot be genuine and lasting understanding between peoples if their relationships are based primarily on a misunderstanding.
But having said that, I would conclude by saying that I am absolutely convinced that the Soviet Union desires to interfere as little as possible in the affairs of the European Continent. I think that the interference by the Soviet Government will be in direct ratio to the amount of distrust that members of that Government feel towards British and American intentions. Also, I do not believe that the Soviet Government in the least want to see Communism established throughout Europe, and that if Germany were to go Communist there would be a considerable amount of disquiet in the Kremlin. Russia would see Trotskyists around every corner, even more than the Minister of Labour thinks he sees in this country. When I was in Moscow, I spent the whole of one day studying the propaganda posters. The Russians do a great deal of their propaganda by poster. Not once did I find a poster referring to Communism, although I found any number referring to Fascism. The whole line of propaganda was "Our Russia, Mother Russia"; so I do not believe that the Soviet Government desire in any way to see the spread of Communism throughout Europe.
So far as I can see, there is no fundamental, basic conflict between this country and the Soviet Union. There is a common interest, which is that Germany shall never again become so strong that she can be a danger and that she can bring all the smaller countries of Europe


under her domination. We have that in common, and we have no fundamental conflicts. Therefore, I believe, as I said at the beginning, that our foreign policy should be more sympathetic towards these great new movements that are passing over occupied Europe, so that not only shall we maintain the affection and the admiration of these smaller countries in Europe, but we shall avoid any serious conflict between ourselves and the Soviet Union. I want to emphasise the importance of the smaller countries of Europe. It has been encouraging to hear, during this Debate, very little talk about the three major Powers on the Allied side dominating the rest of the world. There has been a lot of talk about how we can help those other countries, and that is a very encouraging thing.

Sir Richard Acland: A great part of this Debate has taken place on the assumption that foreign policy is something quite separate from domestic policy. I take the view that that is nonsense, and that foreign policy and domestic policy are two different sides of the same basic unity, and that both spring alike from the fundamental social ideas of the Government, the individual, the organisation, or the people concerned. I have no hesitation in examining those social ideas, even though it means going into the past, because those who disagree with the views which I hold are, in multifarious ways, going back into the past, to spread a wholly false idea about it. A legend is being spread that everybody in this country is really equally to blame for this war, because we all failed to realise how incurably horrible is everything German, and the unalterable villany of the German people.
A large part of this Debate seems to be based on the idea of keeping the German people down by force. A propaganda of hatred is being spread. I want to call attention to one very flagrant example of it, which appeared yesterday, in a newspaper controlled by a Cabinet Minister. Why he remains a Cabinet Minister I do not know; under the principle of collective responsibility, I think the Government are responsible for this sort of thing. The "Daily Express" yesterday produced a cock-and-bull story, to justify the suggestion that the loss of the lives of 47 officers in a German prison camp was the result of a mass murder, with guards

running riot, all allegedly based on the evidence of eye-witnesses in Sweden, all with the idea of stirring up hatred. The thing has been contradicted by the Air Ministry, and the "Daily Express," this morning, put that contradiction into a very small part of the paper. I cannot go further into the matter, but I give notice that, on the earliest possible occasion, I shall call attention to the position of Lord Beaverbrook. Which Minister will have the responsibility for answering I do not know. I think it intolerable that a man who conducts this utterly irresponsible propaganda, this vile sort of campaign, should hold a responsible position in the councils of the nation.
This analysis of the situation, that we are all equally to blame, because we all failed to see how intolerable the Germans were, is utterly false, and it leads to a completely false picture of the present war and a complete misunderstanding of it, and to gross errors in the politics of the war. Also, it is stirring up appalling dangers for the future. Those who hold this idea treat this war as a military struggle by the United Nations against Germany, Italy and Japan. The Prime Minister, whose social and historical sense seems to me to be by far the weakest part of his whole make-up, looks upon this war simply as a military struggle between the United Nations on one side and the whole of Germany on the other. He does not at all see, nor do many hon. Members speak as if they see, that this war is a part of at least 300 years of social history. For at least 300 years—and that, I would remind hon. Members, is an extraordinarily short time in human history —we have been living in the midst of a titanic revolution. It is the revolution for the whole of democracy—political, industrial, economic, social, and international. We need not for one moment expect that this revolution will be completed at any time within the next 300 years. Three hundred years is perhaps about the time in which it will be completed. Do not let us suppose that it will be completed in 50 years' time. Every major event in modern history has to be interpreted against the background of this mighty and beneficent revolution, which is going on and which has now reached a considerable stage of development.
In the Western countries of Europe and in America the bare skeleton of political


democracy was established about the beginning of this present century, In those same countries economic and industrial democracy had taken roots in the minds of men, not in practice, but as ideas, acceptable to influential minorities. The practice of economic democracy began only in 1917, in Russia. Although I am inclined to feel that there' is real substance in the criticism which the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Bartlett) brought against Russia, I think he was speaking more of their failure to achieve a complete social or political democracy, and that he was not saying that the Russians have not achieved a very great advance in the way of economic democracy. Then, again, it was in 1919 that we first attempted on the practical level an international democracy. I am sorry that some of those who have poured out their cynicism and their contempt of the League of Nations in the course of to-day are not here, particularly the hon. Member for Penryn and Falmouth (Mr. Petherick). I would like to point out to him that a very great difference between the League of Nations and the Holy Alliance is that the Holy Alliance was simply and solely an alliance between the big men at the top. The League of Nations, on the other hand, was the first brave attempt at a practical world brotherhood which carried with it the hopes and aspirations of thousands and millions of ordinary people. That is the difference between the League of Nations and the Holy Alliance.
These millions of people did not hold the levers of power in one country or another but the fact that their hopes and activities were not enough to overcome the cynical minds—the practical and realistic minds, I suppose the hon. Member would say—of such men as the hon. Member for Penryn and Falmouth, does not mean to say that the attempt will not be made again. It will be made again. This international democracy will be established either peacefully or in bloody wars which we shall be forced through by the cynical, timid minds of those who have spoken against this thing. This international democracy which made its first practical appearance in 1919 will be established.
Fascism, against which we are fighting, has got nothing to do with German blood whatever. Fascism is found in greater

or smaller degree in every country in the world, and Fascism is the most titanic counter-revolution in the whole course of history, just as the revolution in which we live is the greatest beneficent revolution of all history. Fascism was a counter-revolution against the political democracy of Western Europe, against the economic democracy of the East, against the international democracy of Geneva. It was against the Greek conception of the supremacy of human reason, against the Roman conception of the rule of law, against the Judaic conception of social righteousness as the supreme source of social wellbeing, and against the Christian tradition of love and brotherhood amongst ordinary people.
Fascism was against everything for which humanity stands, and that Fascism, present in every country of the world, is what we are fighting now; and, in relation to these facts I say—and, as long as the contrary view persists in its expression from so many sources, I shall continue to say—that we in this House were not all equally to blame. There were those of us in this House who, from the earliest days—I can go back myself to the days long before I was in this House, in a humbler but more interesting chamber in Oxford University—took part with the utmost vigour in condemning this damnable thing that was established in Italy. We did see what this beastly thing was and we did all in our power to warn the people. An hon. Member referred with the usual contempt to the organisation of the peace ballot. What was the organisation of the peace ballot? It was an organisation which showed that the overwhelming majority of the people of the country were prepared to stand against the threat of Fascism, if necessary by armed force. It was not a peace ballot; it was a ballot in which the people said, "We are ready to fight against this thing growing up all over Europe." But Lord Baldwin chose to lie and distort everything which the people were then saying.
We, who warned the country against Fascism, were out-voted in this House by a majority, who hoped that this thing could be used as a great bulwark against the great economic democracy of Soviet Russia. That was their dominant hope, and it was that hope which dominated foreign policy in the years between the wars, and which killed collective security


and the League of Nations, because any attempt to stand up against the aggressors at that time would have meant weakening this bulwark against the Soviet Union; and in countries like Spain, it would have meant letting into Spain ideas which were going to further this revolution towards democracy in the midst of which we live.
Foreign policy is to-day in the hands of the same sort of men as those who were moved by these ideas. They do their thinking in the same kind of way, and rather than survey the whole of the field, I want to keep to one particular corner of it and to mention facts of which I know. There has been an awful lot of woolly sentiment about this Debate to-day and very little attention to hard facts which belie some of the generous statements and hopes that are made. The facts that I am going to give have the additional advantage of being extremely relative to the immediate military campaigns which lie in front of us. The Prime Minister said he hoped that all hon. Members would be careful not to use any words which might make the task of our fighting men harder. I would never be tempted to speak at all in this Debate except for the fact that the actions of this Government, which speak far larger than my words, are already making the task of the fighting men infinitely harder than they need be. The country is not aware of the kind of things done in its name which are to-day as shameful as anything done by the Chamberlain regime before the war. They are as certainly building up the next world war as the things which were done by that regime led up to the present world war.
We put up posters in this country displaying the typical fighting soldier and underneath, apparently carved out of the rock, are the words "The Liberator." Our soldiers want to think of themselves as liberators because that is the greatest source of energy and enthusiasm for any army. They want to behave as liberators, and indeed, they try to behave as liberators. I challenge denial of my facts because I get them first hand on this matter. When our soldiers went into Sicily they did so as liberators. They were welcomed by the people. The scenes were described in the Press at the time. There were cheers and flowers and nothing was too good for our troops. These men behaved as every liberating army in history has always behaved. They went, with

their officers' approval, and fetched the political prisoners out of gaol, and perhaps a few other prisoners as well. They held informal elections in the squares of the towns and villages they occupied and immediately began to arrange the civil administration of the towns in the hands of the officers who were chosen in this informal but thrillingly democratic way. And then what? When the battle had moved a convenient distance forward A.M.G.O.T. arrived.
I challenge this. There is not one man in any influential position in A.M.G.O.T. whose past record shows that he understood and opposed Fascism before September, 1939. The supreme disqualification for the work of restoring order to the peoples who have been saved from Fascism appears to be the fact that you understood what Fascism meant when a good many hon. Members opposite were hobnobbing with it. The same is true of the new organisation G.5, which is, apparently, going to administer Europe and Germany. If that is not true, let the Government, in reply, mention the name of one man who has any influential position in A.M.G.O.T. or G.5 who has any public record of speaking and working against Fascism and against the policy of appeasing Fascism at any time before September, 1939.
How do these people behave? The first thing they do is to get hold of the Carabinieri Reali, who, of all Italian organised bodies, have the highest record of complete collaboration not merely with Mussolini but with Hitler and the Nazis. They then parade in front of the representatives of the Carabinieri Reali those prisoners who were released by the front line troops, and these agents of Nazidom decide which of the political prisoners shall go back to gaol. The complete administration of the whole district is then handed over to the nominees of the Carabinieri Reali, and the result is that the civil administration of Sicily and now of Southern Italy has fallen into the hands of the worst and the most disreputable Fascist gangsters and the whole thing is a most abominable and contemptible racket. This is quite true, I am not exaggerating it at all; people who have been there say that this is so. This is perhaps one of the most sinister things about it.

Mr. Tinker: These charges are so serious that I hope some reply will be


given to show whether they are true or not. What the hon. Gentleman is saying is a revelation to me.

Sir R. Acland: The next thing I say is that at the time the campaign moved from Sicily to the Italian mainland a General Order was issued—for which of course the War Office is responsible—forbidding the front line soldiers to act as a liberating army. They were forbidden to go near the gaols, forbidden to release political prisoners, forbidden to hold informal elections, forbidden to do anything of that kind, The excuse being that a few criminals might be set at large. Well, what does that mean? A few burglars, a few pickpockets might have been released before their sentences had expired, but that is what always happens when liberating armies march about the world in triumph and roll back the forces of tyranny; and how do you weigh a handful of private malefactors against the deliberately organised groups who have been running the counter-revolution against humanity for the last 20 years? How do you weigh them so that you hand over the government of a country to the latter in case you have prematurely released a mere handful of the former? Which is the greater damage? The premature release of a few prisoners, or the destruction of the enthusiasm of a whole people, and perhaps of a whole Continent? Because that is what has happened.
When we went into Sicily there was an enthusiasm which showed that we had potential Allies available to us all over Europe. There was unlimited support there for the Allied cause; unlimited potential inspiration for all the guerilla movements in Europe was to be found in Sicily. Instead of that, you have in Sicily to-day an utterly listless, hopeless, bewildered, frustrated people who do not see a halfpenny to choose between our administration and the administration from which they thought they had been liberated. This, of course, affects the whole of the partisan movement throughout Europe, starting with the Italian partisans in the North. Some of them who filter through the German lines come into contact with what is happening in the South, and then go back again. They cannot understand it. Some of them are beginning to realise that while their first enemy is still of course Germany, the second task they

have to look to is to prevent a sort of A.M.G.O.T. arrangement taking control of their country.
I must say I think the hon. Member for Bridgwater was extremely wise when he said that unless we can give these people a little more encouragement, where else can they look except to the U.S.S.R. for inspiration? But it does not just amount to giving them a little advice when they come to London. What it comes to is that we have to put men in control of this task of administering occupied territory who have some record of understanding what Fascism is. Unless you have shown that before the war you understood what the thing was, how in the world are you qualified to deal with territories when they are liberated from it? It is not just advising the guerillas and talking nicely and supplying them with a few arms; it is showing in our administration that we understand the sort of thing which they are groping after, because, believe me, one of the things the partisans are groping after is the internationalism of Europe. The Maquis, the Yugoslavian and the Northern Italian resistance movements are spreading their tentacles and becoming an ever-more widely embracing Internationale. This is the greatest hope for an international Europe—

It being two hours after the hour appointed for the interruption of Business, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to make his Report to the House, pursuant to the Order of the House this day.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

Orders of the Day — STANDING ORDER (SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Beechman.]

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: This is a magnificent opportunity for making half an hour's speech on foreign affairs, but I shall resist the temptation. I rise for a few minutes—and I am glad that the Minister of State, the Treasurer of the Household and a few Members are still present—to call attention to a piece of House of Commons machinery which, I think, needs a little improvement. At the beginning of our Business we move,


sometimes, the suspension of the Standing Order for a limited period of one or two hours, as the case may be. Once that Motion is on the Order Paper it has to be taken, and the effect of it to-day is that we have had two hours added to our normal time of Debate. There are at the moment in the Chamber four people who wanted to speak in the Foreign Affairs Debate, and others, possibly ten or more, who have been disappointed and who have gone away.
I suggest that we should make use f the machinery which, in fact, exists—we have discussed this in the past and the same situation occurred the other day in the Currency Debate—of not moving the suspension of the Rule at the commencement of Public Business but inviting the Government to watch the progress of the Debate, see how many Members wish to speak and then, in consultation with Mr. Speaker, moving a limited extension of time, for a definite period, say, up to three hours, to cater for Members who wish to take part in the Debate. This Motion to suspend the Rule could be moved, perhaps, in the middle of the day's Business. If we did that we should get much more flexibility into our debating arrangements, and we should not disappoint so many Members. I think it is important that there should be some indication to Members generally, at the beginning of the Debate, that the suspension of the Rule is likely to be removed during the course of the day, but I suggest that the length of the suspension should be left to the period late in the Debate. I do not ask for a reply to what I have said now, unless the Minister of State wishes to say something.

Mr. Mander: I would like to support what the Noble Lord has said, because there appears to be no real reason why the Debate on Foreign Affairs should not have continued for another hour, or another hour and a half. Members who have wanted to speak have waited for a long time, and are here now, and there are others who would have stayed. I think there is a great deal to be said for continuing the old Rule of allowing Debates to go on, on certain

occasions, for an unlimited period. Let the House go on as long as it likes. While suspension for a limited time has certain advantages, it has certain great disadvantages for the Private Member, in that whereas previously we used to go on as long as we liked, now we have to stop after a comparatively limited time. I hope, in the light of what has happened to-day, the Government will give serious consideration to acting on the lines the Noble Lord has put forward, so that on an occasion like this the House will have an opportunity of continuing for another hour.

Mr. Tinker: When the Sitting is extended at a time like this and there is to be no official reply, to my mind there is no reason why the extension should not be unlimited. We only agreed to a time limit in cases where the Government wanted to know when the wind-up was to take place so that they could give their answer. When we do not expect a Government reply it would meet the wishes of the House to allow the Debate to go on as long as there are Members wishing to speak. I have not wanted to speak today. The subject matter is rather beyond me, but the great interest taken in it is evident and it would give more satisfaction to give Members who have sat all through the Debate a chance to make their speeches. We want to keep an interested House, and the House has been interested. It would have been a great service, if Members who desired to speak had been allowed to make their speeches.

The Minister of State (Mr. Richard Law): My Noble Friend, I know, does not expect me to comment on the very interesting suggestion that he has made. Of course, I will report what he and others have said to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, and I think the House knows that he will always try to meet its convenience. In this case I cannot speak for him and I do not know what difficulties there may be. I can only say that I will faithfully report what has been said.

Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.